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 No. 13 
FOREWORD 
In the past two years, the European continent has become the target of mass 
migration of various ethnic and religious groups who, for reasons of security or 
economic hardship, have decided to leave their homelands and go into dan-
gerous exile, mostly by sea. In order to reach the world perceived by them as an 
oasis of security and prosperity, and above all tolerance for racial, ethnic, 
cultural and religious differences, the arrivals are deepening the already large 
diversity of the Old Continent's population, where the various minorities have 
been living for a long time. 
Particularly interesting is the question of the functioning of national and 
religious minorities in the borderlands between countries, as well as the forma-
tion of such borderlands by different nations. Therefore, the editors propose that 
number 13 of Region and Regionalism addresses the issue of Borderlands of 
nations, nations of borderlands.  
The proposed subject matter met with the lively response from the authors, so 
much so that the number of submitted papers prompted the Editorial Board to 
divide them into two volumes. The first volume, collects the works discussing 
Minorities in the borderlands and the fringes of countries. 
It was divided into two parts. The first includes papers on the functioning of 
Minorities in the borderlands. The volume opens with a paper by Jan Kłos from 
the Catholic University of Lublin entitled The modern idea of religious tolera-
tion versus the state, in which the author uses a philosopher's point of view to 
discuss the relationship between an efficient and ideologically neutral state and  
a world-wide religious tolerance, which is of particular importance in the light of 
the massive influx of people of other faiths into Europe (especially the con-
troversy triggered by the influx of radical Muslims). The author emphasises that 
the idea is not new at all, and has been present in states since antiquity. The 
contemporary aspect involves a question of whether a state has the right to 
decide the beliefs of its citizens. Since the seventeenth century, Europe has faced 
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the problem of further divisions within Christianity, and is now struggling with 
the problem of radical Islamism. Locke's version of the idea of separation of 
Church and state is mentioned. The author argues that in modern philosophy, it 
is possible to recognise the right to diversity of religious views of citizens and its 
acceptance by the state.  
The next paper, entitled Minorities in protected areas. Theoretical approach 
and political visions submitted by Slovenian author Jernej Zupančič from the 
University of Ljubljana, discusses minorities in protected areas. The author 
points out that the minorities existing in European space are particularly 
vulnerable. Declarative support for minorities by the EU institutions is met with 
a real ethnocentric policy of the governments of some European countries. 
Minorities living in borderlands that were declared protected landscapes due to 
their natural values (the parkisation of space) are in a peculiar situation. On the 
one hand, it brings economic benefits to the population, including minorities, but 
on the other, it significantly limits their freedom to operate in such space.  
In the third article, Roman Szul from Warsaw University (Euroreg) addressed 
the problem of Regionalist, ethno-linguistic and separatist/independence move-
ments in Europe after the Second World War and European integration. The 
author argues that the EU states favoured regionalisms, but only until they turned 
into separatist and independence movements. EU membership stabilises the 
internal situation in individual countries. On the other hand, the Union, perhaps 
unconsciously, supports the separatist trends in other states, sometimes leading 
to their disintegration, and then returns to the policy of maintaining their unity 
by force, although the instruments that can be used for this purpose are mostly 
ineffective.  
Italian geographer from the University of Milan Antonio Violante devoted 
his paper The new Balkan antemurale to the issue of influx of refugees to 
Europe, some of which have chosen to travel from Turkey to the Balkans. The 
author analyses the course of this trail, its potential measured by the number of 
refugees. It shows the paradox of immigrants getting to Europe through Greece, 
a member of the Schengen area, but having to leave the area in the Balkans in 
order to get to other members, then being unable to re-enter in Slovenia, Austria 
and Italy, as they encounter closely monitored and tightly fenced borders. The 
influx of refugees also creates conflicts among Schengen states, whose politi-
cians accuse each other of inadequately securing borders. The states outside the 
Schengen Area and the EU, such as Serbia and Macedonia, have taken over the 
obligation of stopping the wave of immigrants. The author points to the key 
significance of the land border between Greece and Turkey and, above all, the 
marine border between Asia and the Greek islands. 
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Marcoandrea Spinelli from the University of Modena in Italy took up the 
issue of the Invisible exclaves, or isolated areas inhabited by Slovak and Czech 
minorities in Serbia. These are remnants of the eighteenth-century internal 
emigration within Austro-Hungary, groups that were not later repatriated. The 
author shows the reasons for the migration, mainly economic ones (miners look-
ing for work in mines) and discusses the reasons for their continued existence in 
foreign Serbian or Hungarian environment, or their decisions to return to their 
ancestral homeland, also for economic reasons.   
Marek Battek from Wroclaw University of Technology uses his paper Cyprus 
as the borderland of nations to present a specific case of two conflicted nations, 
Greek and Turkish, inhabiting a small island, an EU member. The conflict has 
been going on for more than half a century, taking on various forms, from open 
armed struggle to the frozen status quo, which proved particularly persistent and 
led to the division of the island into separate geopolitical units. The author 
discusses the possibility of resolving the dispute in a peaceful manner.   
A similar problem was raised in by Marek Sobczyński from the University of 
Lodz in his paper about another island, namely Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka as the 
borderland of nations). He showed the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict and its genesis, 
spanning over two millennia. Both papers devoted to national conflicts on small 
islands, constituting confined spaces of rivalry, are based on the authors' studies 
in the regions described.  
The second part of this volume has been titled Minorities on the fringes of 
countries. It is opened by a paper by Ryszard Żelichowski from the Institute of 
Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw Flemings over 
the border. Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie. The author describes the historical 
region of Flanders, the genesis of its division by borders and the eternal rivalry 
between France and Germany to influence this land of rich merchant cities. He 
also discusses the situation of the Dutch-speaking population in the northern 
region of France and in Belgium. This is a diametrically opposite situation, as 
France does not recognise national minorities at all in its territory, while in 
Belgium, Flanders is a constitutive part of the federal monarchy. The Flemish 
people are the most dynamic, rich and innovative social group in Belgium.  
In the paper by Alessandro Vitale of the University of Milan entitled Building 
a new border: the case-study of the new barrier between Ukraine and Russia, 
and the problem of minorities, the author discusses the current problem of 
conflict between the two post-Soviet states and the fate of national minorities. 
The author analyses the functions performed by the Ukrainian-Russian border, 
describes its extensive infrastructure and the dynamics of phenomena around it. 
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He also discusses Ukraine's aspirations to establish its borders and their effective 
control. He argues that in eastern Ukraine, the traditional definitions and rules of 
establishing borders have been questioned, and the intercultural dialogue be-
tween the two states is conducted through the viewpoint of the Russian minority 
in Ukraine and its separatist and anti-Ukrainian aspirations.  
Very similar issues are discussed in another article by Ukrainian author 
Roman Slyvka from the I. Franko University in Lviv on The preconditions for 
conflicts in Donbas and Crimea: similarities and differences. Based on the results 
of the census, the author shows the distribution of ethnoses in conflict regions 
and discusses their long-term activities aimed at torpedoing the functioning of 
the state. He names several reasons, namely postcolonial heritage (treating these 
areas as former Russian colonies), the shortcomings of the political transforma-
tion and the inertia of the functioning of the Ukrainian state in its complex geo-
political situation.  
Hungarian author Zoltán Hajdú from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 
Pecs uses his critical article entitled The political geographical aspects of cross- 
-border illegal migration at the south Hungarian borders since the collapse of 
the bipolar world to return to the issue of migration crisis in Europe and the role 
of Hungary in stopping the wave of refugees. The author relates the development 
of the crisis on the southern border of Hungary with Serbia and Croatia, which 
led to the construction of long fortifications along the border, which effectively 
halted the uncontrolled crossings by refugees. He also points to the political 
solution, namely the EU's pact with Turkey, which has led to a significant reduc-
tion in the influx of immigrants.  
The first volume of Region and Regionalism (No. 13) closes with a paper by 
Joanna Szczepankiewicz-Battek of WSB University in Wrocław, on the Geogra-
phical coverage of Sorbian languages. The author presents a borderland minority, 
fighting for centuries for their identity, while undergoing gradual Germanisation. 
Since the end of the Second World War, due to the changing borders, the 
minority has found itself in the periphery of Germany, along its eastern border.   
The editors hope that the material collected in the volume will inspire further 
research into the boundaries of nations and national minorities who have come 
to live on the peripheries and in the borderlands of states.  
 
Marek Sobczyński and Marek Barwiński 
Department of Political and Historical Geography, 
and Regional Studies, University of Łódź 
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Jan KŁOS 
The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin  
Department of Social and Political Ethics, POLAND 
No. 13 
THE MODERN IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION 
VERSUS THE STATE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I shall focus on the question of toleration within the State with 
reference to its origins, for the idea of toleration is not new. By saying this, I am 
not claiming that it has been practiced all over the world from times 
immemorial. What I am saying is that toleration has always been present in 
world history either as a theoretical postulate (at times even put into practice), or 
as a desire when it was missing. We can find some traces of the question about 
toleration as early as antiquity. We know, for instance, that the philosopher 
Socrates was charged with the corruption of young people because he did not 
believe “in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual 
things”1. What is implied in this accusation is that – to render it in a more 
contemporary language – it is the State that is entitled to determine what its 
citizens should believe. Anyone who dares to undermine this requirement is 
bound to be punished. One State and one religion – such was the underlying 
principle and the precondition of political safety. Therefore Socrates was 
brought to trial and sentenced to death because he seemed to have violated this 
principle. 
The story of Socrates brings to mind the main perspective I am going to 
consider, which is the question of varieties within a more or less closed state 
system. If we can imagine the State as an area structured in a concrete way and 
inhabited by a concrete people, a question arises: to what extent is this area 
unified or homogenous? Does it allow for any differences? Varieties are said to 
           
1 Plato, The Apology, http://www2.hawaii.edu/~freeman/courses/phil100/04.%20Apo 
logy.pdf (8.10. 2016). 
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be an evidence for the State's openness, i.e. its democratic shape, but democracy 
itself as a political idea is not unanimously comprehended, let alone universally 
endorsed. 
In this text I would like to show that the modern idea of toleration, which had 
brought forth the idea of separation between the State and the Church, is 
ineffective in solving social problems of toleration on the grounds of religious 
varieties. Rather, it causes clashes and conflicts or else eliminates religious 
freedom. It is far more appropriate to assume the idea of dist inct ion, thereby 
assenting to the specific characters of the two systems: the socio-political system 
of the State, and the religious system. Being distinct, they can be combined into 
a fruitful cooperation. 
2. THE MODERN ORIGINS  
OF TOLERATION 
The modern equivalent of toleration was born in 17th century Britain, but 
practically it was quite popular before that time in other countries in Europe. The 
fact that Poland accepted the Jews who were expelled from Europe and began to 
settle in Poland is an example of toleration. The Polish king (Sigismund II 
Augustus) is often cited as having said: “I am not a master of your consciences”. 
And this is also an example of toleration. Now the question is what had 
happened with this practical manifestation of toleration, why it had to be 
theoretically defined and explained. There are two causes in general: one 
religious and one philosophical. The fact of the Reformation in the West (the 
second schism in Europe) called for the need of a peaceful coexistence of the 
rising number of Christian fellowships other than Roman Catholics. Seven-
teenth-century intellectuals thought it particularly inappropriate to be engaged in 
military conflicts on account of religious differences. Quite naturally, religion 
was expected to be an area where freedom of conscience reigned, not coercion. 
The philosophical cause of toleration can be found in empiricism, one of the 
dominating (aside to rationalism) modern philosophical idea, with its main 
elements: reason and experience. In line with the empiricist philosophy we are 
products of our own experience – the primary sense data translated into the 
conceptual world by our mind. The consequence of this new approach is that 
nothing can enter the mind if it has not been produced or accepted by its 
immanent logic. And the practical conclusion in the context of interest results as 
follows: a free choice should hold sway in religion. 
The modern idea of religious toleration versus the state 
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The idea of religious toleration became particularly topical in the 17th cen-
tury, the period of military conflicts on the grounds of divided confessions. It 
dawned on intellectual Europeans that they should come up with a theoretical 
foundation for toleration. The philosophy of empiricism seemed to be the right 
solution then, for it provided a plausible way out of the religious puzzle. Taking 
into consideration the abundant panorama of religions it seemed quite right to 
make them all a matter of private opinions, and separate the private affairs from 
the public. Thus the Church was pushed to the area of privacy, and the State was 
made public. 
Let it be observed that at the same time modernity set into motion the process 
of levelling (as we shall see from Locke's idea of toleration). The main driving 
force of this process being rationality narrowly understood, for if we com-
prehend toleration as a kind of homeostasis, with one universal logic, it is after 
all the decision of the majority that dominates, since universal logic is believed 
to be shared by all rational people alike, so it has “no address”, no unique traits. 
Levelling also meant transparency – the religion that was approved of by the 
State was supposed to be transparent, i.e. without any appeal to whatever 
mystery it could entail (reason does not like mysteries). Now the argumentation 
of a religion with transcendent claims cannot be held true merely by virtue of  
a majority decision or an individual choice; in the deistic form of Christianity 
transcendence is explained away. Therefore when 17th century Europeans wished 
to have political peace, they naturally resorted to political means, and combined 
religion with power (although they originally sought to separate them). There is 
no other way out if one claims that the religion of the people should be the same 
as the religion of their ruler. Such a religion then becomes a tool of oppression. 
It cannot be different, once religion is merely yet another product of the thinking 
mind.  
3. JOHN LOCKE'S IDEA  
OF TOLERATION 
Reducing religion to a private judgment of the thinking mind, Locke excludes 
Roman Catholics and atheists from toleration. Roman Catholics are excluded 
because they are not rational enough, i.e. they hold ideas their minds have not 
produced, or accept ideas from outside without appropriate attendant evidence. 
They accept dogmas, that is, philosophically (or, to be precise, epistemolo-
gically) speaking, they hold ideas by way of obedience rather than rational 
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argumentation. They are excluded and earned the derogatory name of Papists 
who “are not to enjoy the benefit of toleration because where they have power 
they think themselves bound to deny it to others”2. And he excluded atheists 
because they cannot be trusted. Locke writes:  
Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, 
can have no hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in 
thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their Atheism undermine and 
destroy all Religion, can have no pretence of Religion whereupon to challenge the 
Privilege of a Toleration3. 
Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration was originally written in Latin as 
Epistola de Tolerantia and published in Holland, the haven of Calvinistic ideas, 
in 1689. It was Locke's plea to Christians to renounce persecution on account of 
religious varieties. The question is: did he succeed? If the answer is yes, to what 
extent? If no, the question is why? As I have said, in Holland Locke was exposed 
to Calvinistic ideas. He criticizes Roman Catholics that they “are subjects of any 
prince but the pope”, therefore “such opinions” and “fundamental truths […] 
ought not to be tolerated by the magistrate in the exercise of their religion unless 
he can be secured […] that the propagation of these dangerous opinions may be 
separated from their religious worship […]”4. It is just amazing that such  
a subtle philosopher, as John Locke certainly was, could not disentangle himself 
from certain pitfalls of biased views. He claimed toleration, which in his case 
meant separation between the matters of the State and the matters of the Church, 
and yet at the same time proposed, for the sake of peaceful coexistence, an 
official state religion. No wonder then that instead of toleration he introduced 
intolerance for centuries onwards. His worst enemy was narrow rationalism, 
which claimed that in fact religion could be considered as any other social matter 
(discussed in purely rational and logical terms). Contemporary social philosophy 
has called it disenchantment of religion, taming of religion, or secularising. 
Religion could be accepted, but only as a well-defined point of view without any 
aspirations to the supernatural. Such is the deistic position. If we appeal to 
general rules and principles in the hope of reconciling all participants of political 
life, we are certainly setting into motion the process of levelling. The rationalist 
           
2 J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, par. I, files.libertyfund.org/files/2375/ 
Locke_1560_EBk_v6.0pdf (8.10.2016). By saying this, Locke simply points out that 
Roman Catholicism rejects the idea of private choice as the only criterion of religion and 
abides by the objective truth. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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wishes to play it safe, hence he is forever torn in between the cosy world of 
universal concepts and the unsteady territories of idiosyncratic beliefs. 
Thus it was yet another step on the path of the process of disenchantment. 
How can one claim freedom of religion, if only such religions can be approved 
of, which are accepted by the magistrate? Disenchantment and rationalization of 
religion are destructive for its very nature. Strangely (and logically) enough, the 
process that was supposed to bring relief from religious persecution, ushered in 
oppression instead. And this happened not only in Britain, which up until the 
19th century imposed a very oppressive system for Roman Catholics, but also 
abroad. In Britain, for instance, Catholic citizens were disabled from holding 
public office, unless they were communicant members of the Anglican Church. 
Puritan communities in America became also oppressive for their fellow be-
lievers.  
If Locke was in favour of the separation of the Church (or religion) from the 
State, how could have the magistrate been made to decide whether certain 
religions could be tolerated or not? I understand that, obviously, the State must 
be on its guard against any destructive currents that are bound to overturn its 
order. We take it as natural to stamp out any revolutionary attempts. But I do not 
understand why it should have bothered Locke, if the requirement of obedience 
to the pope was of religious rather than political nature. No doubt the process  
of levelling is at work in his argumentation, the process that erodes the trans-
cendent claims. 
He sought to preclude coercion on account of religion. And he rightly 
assumed that the mind cannot be coerced into holding certain views or 
withholding others. Indeed it is the mind’s nature to work in freedom. But on the 
other hand it is not true that the only way of holding ideas or assenting to them is 
intellectual (that we always have to give reasons for our beliefs, that are clear for 
intersubjective communication). And only such views that are clear (clear and 
distinct, one might add the modern Cartesian requirement) are safe for the State. 
After all the latter is a product of rational efforts on the part of its citizens.   
Struggling against the alleged Roman intolerance, Anglican intolerance was 
introduced instead. It was manifested by certain political acts, e.g. the Thirty- 
-Nine Articles, Toleration Act. From then on any person who wished to hold an 
important public office was obliged to subscribe to the Anglican creed. Stephen 
Macedo defined Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration as an impassioned plea 
“for a separation of sacred and secular concerns, and the confinement, and the 
confinement of political authority to certain narrowly drawn ‘civil interests’: the 
security and property of individuals, goods of the body rather than the soul” 
(Macedo 1993, p. 622). Contrary to Locke's intentions, however, his idea of 
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toleration never completely separated the two areas in question. Indeed the 
boundaries are blurred, for it is difficult to discriminate between sacred and 
secular concerns if one kind of rationality is applied, namely that of the State. In 
such cases usually the tendency is to absorb the area of religion, i.e. it was made 
merely an object of reason and experience. 
4. TOLERATION – THE AMERICAN CONTEXT 
The Lockean concept of toleration was conveyed to the New World and is 
articulated in the Constitution. And the Toleration Act, as Samuel Adams (1722–
1803)5 commented, stated that “every subject in England, except Papists […] 
was restored to, and re-established in, his natural right to worship God according 
to the dictates of his own conscience” (Adams 1963, p. 178). I should have 
written “paradoxical Toleration Act” because we find seeds of intolerance in the 
very wording of the document, i.e. “except Papists”. Such statements were 
obviously in essence intolerant, and any religion that cherished toleration in line 
with them ended up as no religion at all. It is interesting that Samuel Adams 
mentions Magna Charta as a good example of civic liberty, but Magna Charta 
was a Catholic document!6. 
Samuel Adams noted that “mutual toleration in the different professions” of 
religion “ought to be extended to all whose doctrines are not subversive of 
society. The only sects which he thinks ought to be, and which by all wise laws 
are excluded from such toleration, are those who teach doctrines subversive of 
the civil government under which they live. The Roman Catholics or Papists are 
excluded by reason of such doctrines as these, that princes excommunicated may 
be deposed, and those that they call heretics may be destroyed without mercy; 
besides their recognizing the Pope in so absolute a manner, in subversion of 
government, by introducing, as far as possible into the states under whose 
protection they enjoy life, liberty, and property, that solecism in politics, 
imperium in imperio, leading directly to the worst anarchy and confusion, civil 
discord, war, and bloodshed” (Adams 1963, p. 177).  
The public man was born. Such was the message that was brought to 
America – the precondition of public affairs is that religion be separated from 
political matters. This is how the relationship between the two areas is defined in 
the American Constitution. We read there that “no religious Test shall ever be 
           
5 He has been called “the Father of the American Revolution”. 
6 It was initiated by Bishop Langton (c. 1150–1228). 
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required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States” 
(The Declaration... 2002, art. VI, p. 36). And in Amendment I we find: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances (The Declaration... 2002, Amendment I, 
p. 43). 
These two points are especially interesting in this context, since if we 
consider Locke as the intellectual predecessor of American democracy we find  
a considerable discrepancy between what Locke proposed, what was then the 
British practice, and what was implemented in America.  
On the other hand it was hardly imaginable to find an American, holding an 
important official position, who could quote no religious affiliation. Such people 
were simply not trusted. And this is again much in accordance with what Locke 
placed in his exposition of toleration: “atheists were not to be trusted.”  
Now if we compare the former statement with that of the famous statement of 
the Declaration, namely “that all Men are created equal […]” (The Declaration... 
2002, p. 9) we have clear encouragement for religious liberation. The liberation 
movement found a strong support in the Bible, and that was such a support that 
no serious Christian could possibly deny. Obviously, this claim could be denied, 
but only on the grounds that the blacks were refused to be treated like human 
beings. 
Now a question arises: what happened to these original declarations, if we are 
witnessing attempts to remove religion from the public sphere? Democrats 
establish organizations, such as Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good and 
Catholics United, whose main purpose is naturally to support the political cause 
of the democratic party and to drive a wedge between the Pope and American 
Catholics. The point is to modernize the Church, to open it to the modern trends 
of syncretism and political correctness. I think such attempts can easily be 
accounted for. If we put the two realities (the Church and the State) on the same 
level, we are forever engaged in a duel: the dialectic of separation versus 
appropriation and subjugation. The end result of separation is either a hostile 
relationship or the process of taming the opponent. One of the systems (usually 
the State) thus brought into a collision with the other tends to absorb it; the 
reversal of this situation would happen in a typical theocratic regime. Under 
such circumstances the cause of religious freedom is lost. 
Why was toleration introduced? Why was there a need for a reflection on 
toleration in the 17th century? First of all we must say that the basic precondition 
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for toleration is difference. Toleration is not needed where we have a certain 
level of homogeneity. If the basic precondition of toleration is difference, then 
toleration must respect difference. If it does not respect difference, it undermines 
the reason for its very existence. Let us observe this interesting and fundamental 
point. Toleration and difference coexist, although they have a tendency for mu-
tual annihilation. Toleration, when misunderstood, struggles against difference; 
and difference, for its part, is set against toleration. 
5. SEPARATION VERSUS  
DISTINCTION 
There can be two options: either the religious sphere has been reduced, or the 
public sphere has expanded. This alternative “either-or” is obviously possible 
where theoretical separation is working. Because separation can be imagined as 
a clash of two physically outlined areas. In this case, it comes only natural that if 
one area expands, the other one must necessarily diminish. Only distinction 
allows for infiltration, and only distinction eliminates hostile clashes. 
I think that distinction would have even solved the question of the races. As 
long as Americans held on to the idea of separation, it was next to impossible to 
find a solution. It was difficult to revive the Lockean liberal ideal, for instance, if 
the South in the 19th century stuck to the feudal image of society and the North 
had already entered the age of industrialization. The Southerners who kept 
defending slavery were in the grips of some illogical argumentation. They 
could not remove the Negro from the human category, and, not being able to do 
so, their logic of inequality was bound to backfire on themselves. Again we are 
confronted with that strange intellectual rationale whereby the South, assailing 
Locke, found itself going back to the hierarchical world that the theories of Locke 
had destroyed (Hartz 1955, p. 170).  
I think that the bone of contention is inherent in the very work of Locke, in 
his conception of toleration, which is – to say the least – conditioned. So the 
choice that Hartz poses before the South: whether it wants to be Biblical or 
Greek, for, as we know, Aristotle claimed that slavery was a natural state, is still 
of value. At the same time I do not agree that America could find some solution 
in Locke because was not that clear-minded about toleration as he seemed to 
have been.  
Seventeenth-century empiricism seemed to be the right solution of the 
problem of mixed confession within the British state. And one of its main 
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representatives, John Locke, set to the task of elaborating a new doctrine of 
toleration. His epistemology amounts to defining the human mind as a product 
of experience. Our primary ideas come directly from the senses, and our 
secondary ideas are created by the mind. All in all we are masters of our minds. 
No one can impose on me from without what I do not understand from within.  
I have created my individual reservoir of ideas and will not admit any foreign 
ideas that do not fit to what I already have. 
This philosophical stance seemed to fit very well. Let us make religion  
a matter of personal choice, indeed a private business, then we shall solve the 
problem of any contest on the grounds of religion. At the same time, however, in 
his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke suggested that it would be better to 
have one official religion, and it should have a religion shared by both the ruler 
and his subjects. Separation then becomes oppressive because we propose 
toleration (religion is a private matter), and at the same time we suggest that 
there should be one official religion within the state. 
The British historian Lord John Acton (1834–1902) proposed distinction 
rather than separation. Separation can be (and often is) enforced institutionally, 
distinction allows for interdependence. In Acton's writings distinction is set in 
opposition separation. He writes the following: 
All liberty consists in radice in the preservation of an inner sphere exempt 
from State power. That reverence for conscience is the germ of all civil freedom, 
and the way in which Christianity served it. That is, liberty has grown out of the 
distinction (separation is a bad word) of Church and State (Letter CXI 1906,  
p. 254).  
The term “distinction” emphasizes the fact of being different, although not 
necessarily separate. If I were to give an example, I would show the case of two 
twins. They are distinct because they are different, and yet they not have to be 
separated – as having no contact with each other. Distinction allows for 
interpenetration. Another example can be taken from nature. Each organ within  
a body is important but different from another organ, i.e. it is distinct from it, for 
it plays a different function. Separation would immediately introduce a kind of 
opposition; distinction stresses coexistence. In this sense a religious person is not 
forced to be “privately” religious, but can be religious quite officially. Distinc-
tion does not call for separation between private life and public life, in the sense 
that they are entirely and radically different, for they are both integrated with 
inherent shades of meaning. 
If we abide by distinction rather than separation, there is no problem of 
interference. This charge of interference is often raised when politicians do not 
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wish to be criticized by an independent institution (assuming that it is distinct 
and independent). Once a body is distinct it can penetrate any social and political 
area, assessing it from its own point of view. There are no taboo areas. I presume 
therefore that inasmuch as separation is artificial and imposed from without, 
distinction is natural and given from within. Following the way of distinction 
man is never a complete part and parcel of any political system, but always 
distinct from it. 
If a true religion has claims to the human person, it is impossible to separate 
it without destroying it, or at least destroying its sense in the individual human 
being. Besides, if we separate the Church from the State, we thereby treat them 
as if they were placed on the same level, governed by the same kind of 
rationality. Now by applying the same kind of rationality to the State and the 
Church, by using the same measure clashes seem to be inevitable, unless one 
initiates the process of levelling. Where a religion is made into a state religion, 
with a national Church on top, conflicts apparently disappear. Surprisingly, the 
religion exposed to such rationalizing processes may disappear as well, at least  
a theistic religion. It is constantly reduced or modified to fit into state rationality, 
into a state template. In the United States, where religion is neither established 
nor prohibited by the Congress, the same processes are under way.   
The case of religion is especially interesting here, for religion has various 
forms of its manifestation. It is internal and external: the believer tends to 
express his or her beliefs in everyday life, religion has its institutional and 
normative expressions etc. Ultimately, it is not possible to delineate the same 
determining lines of religion. Hence if we propose separation, we risk a conflict.  
Our knowledge amounts to probability. The higher it is, the readier we are to 
assent to a given truth, but it is hardly ever complete. The final gap between 
probability and assent is covered by the readiness of our very person to give 
assent. 
If religion and the state are considered on the same level, ignoring their 
idiosyncratic rationalities, then a clash inevitably follows. Either the state usurps 
the function of religion, or religion interferes with the state. Thus we have either 
a kind of dictatorship in which the state has a say in matters that naturally remain 
within the jurisprudence of the Church, or else we have to confront a theocracy. 
Under communist regimes it was a party official who often intervened when the 
persons they do not accept are nominated bishops.   
The problem of the border between the State and the Church, as I think, can 
only be solved when we consider the State and religion not on the plane, but in  
a two-dimensional structure; in other words when we apply spatial geometry 
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instead of plane geometry. It is a grave error to regard this relationship as that of 
separation, while it is distinction. Now we can understand separation on a plane 
in the following manner. The curved line denotes the conflicting border area: 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
The space between the two rectangles can be regarded as the area of friction, 
tension, or conflict. The two figures seem to have nothing in common. And 
attempts to cross the barrier is interpreted as interference or intrusion. 
Now let us imagine that we are dealing not with a Euclidean plane, but with 
three-dimensional space. And the rectangles are placed one above the other. 
Then, when viewed from above or from below, they can be interpreted as almost 
one figure, although we know that there are two of them because they are 
different. 
In this process of usurpation (when the Church and the state are believed to 
be separated and this separation is theoretical only) there are pressures to 
“modernize” the Church. Therefore anyone who holds simply an orthodox 
position is called conservative. And conservatism is immediately thought to have 
a derogative connotation. If, however, the Church is distinct (distinguished) from 
the state, they both, like two bodies in space, move (along two different planes).  
 
 
    
 
 
  
Or, they revolve round two different orbits. 
In this figure above the space in-between the 
State and the Church, between, let us say, 
religion and science, faith and reason are not set 
in opposition or confrontation. It is the space of 
interrelation, interpenetration and inspiration.  
They do not have to be separated, therefore there is no danger of appropriation 
or elimination, which come to the same result. 
Religion has its universal claims, but at the same time it takes on particular 
forms. This is true especially of Catholicism. When it takes these forms, it 
resembles a plant that grows on a concrete soil, with its special, say, mineral 
contents, and its peculiar geometrical positions (whether it is plain or crooked). 
The essence is the same, but its concrete shapes differ. This what we call 
idiosyncrasy. Now the danger is that the form may become dominant and 
oblivious of the foundation. This is what happens under the circumstances of 
politicization, aestheticism, and expedience. 
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The situation is therefore the following: either we have an invisible religion 
that pretends to have no concrete historical form or we have a visible forms of 
religion. The former is in danger of being totally diluted, as it is linked with 
individualistic claims to domination. The latter is in danger of exploiting the form 
for political purposes. Therefore Newman so harshly criticized the Anglican 
Church for losing its life. 
I think that distinction does not introduce into everyday life anything arti-
ficial, for it allows for coexistence. Historically speaking, for instance, America 
felt relieved from British interference when the British Empire eventually 
understood that America was different, that she wanted to pursue her own way. 
Now the question is why the idea of separation failed or has proved to be 
insufficient. I think the reason is its narrow rationality. Separation would admit 
of no views based on faith. We can understand that “voluntary consent” was 
important for Locke in the same manner as it was important for the American 
founders. At the same time, however, we may have doubts whether this 
“consent” must be justified in the way that any rational person can admit. In its 
true essence religion does transcend any civil order, therefore to claim toleration 
and at the same time separation must of necessity end up in contradiction. If 
something transcends a given order, it cannot be ultimately evaluated by that 
order, and cannot be limited in its attempts to penetrate this order. Now 
penetration can be approved of because, and especially when, it is carried out in 
a different dimension. If I were to give an example by way of illustration,  
I would say that religion resembles a kind of radiation for which solid bodies are 
no obstacles. That is why not only does it have a right, but often even a duty, to 
assess political decisions, social issues, civil actions. And it does so on the basis 
of its own inherent nature. 
Now the question arises whether these charges have any historical grounds, 
whether indeed human liberty and reason, its only ordering factor, are sufficient 
“for the great end of society” and for “the best good of the whole” (Adams 1963, 
p. 177. If the latter two aims are the only ones, then naturally we have the right 
to ask: what is the great end of society? And: what is best good of the whole? 
Who is to provide the great end and the best good? If it is the State, how does  
it know what the great and the best good are? If the citizens themselves, can then 
unanimously arrive at a common decision as to their great end and best good?  
I think it seems only prudent that man, as being both individual and social, 
political and civil, has to go beyond his political system in order to arrive at the 
right definition of what his great end and best good are. He has to transcend his 
political order. And such transcendence is often provided by religion, assuming 
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that it has not absorbed by the political order itself, that it remains transcendent. 
And if it remains transcendent, it has the right to develop in its own individual 
way. Ultimately, we arrive at a conclusion that the aforementioned charges are 
groundless. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Toleration is a strong theme in contemporary debates. Seventeenth-century 
thinkers dealt “only” with divisions within one religion, namely, a divided Chris-
tianity. Nowadays Europe has to come to grips with interreligious divisions, due 
to the growing number of Islamic groups. When considering the state-Church 
relationship, Locke's empiricist approach proposed separation. I have opted for 
distinction throughout this paper. If European toleration was born as a result of 
modern philosophy, with its attendant ideas of unified rationality, it seems only 
right to appeal to distinction.    
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MINORITIES IN PROTECTED AREAS  
THEORETICAL APPROACH  
AND POLITICAL VISIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In political geography and in the wider context of ethnic studies, numerous 
empirical studies on the situation and role of ethnic minorities were conducted in 
the last few decades. Geographical characteristics of settlement and functional 
space play an important role in this subject. Minorities are predominantly settled 
in the border regions of countries. Border regions are mostly peripheral, with 
numerous economic weaknesses, poor infrastructure, and regressive population 
movements (Klemenčič and Bufon 1991, p. 98). Study of borders, from political 
to culture, from historical to cultural, represents one of the central themes of 
modern political geographies. Minorities and borders are a “classic” issue of our 
geographic discipline, as they discuss two subjects (space and population) of  
a state and its political manifestation (Bufon 2008, pp. 9–29). On the other hand, 
tendencies for the protection of minorities, their language, culture, and identity 
are evident. Due to bilateral relationships and international circumstances, most 
minorities now have at least minimal protections in Europe, which in some cases 
explicitly refers to their settlement space. True territorial autonomies of regions, 
in which minorities had a significant or even main role, i.e. minorities being the 
implicit reason and subject of regional autonomy, are much rarer. Subjectivity of 
minorities is being recognised – a characteristics that can only be realised under 
circumstances of a certain political participation of the minority community 
(Bufon et al. 2014, p. 13). More progressive visions of minority policies assume 
an actually leading role of minorities in, for instance, promotion of cross-border 
communication and establishment of international relationships. In these cases, 
minorities are the object of political and geographical analysis by themselves, as 
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a subject and supporting element of border area (Zupančič 2005, pp. 34–38). The 
third form of territorial protection are protected areas. Political geography rarely 
– or marginally – studies such areas. This is not the central focus of our 
discipline. However, we should not overlook the fact that the act of establishing 
a protected area is by its very nature a distinctly political move: a measure that 
establishes in the national, or even international, space a new form of border, 
thereby directly and indirectly causing a number of consequences. Within the 
framework of EU, their scope is increasing due to increasing awareness of 
vulnerability of habitats for certain plant and animal species (Der neue Fischer 
Weltalmanach 2017, pp. 9–10). Preservation of biodiversity is a declared 
European value and objective. Preservation of geodiversity is also increasingly 
emphasised, intended for protecting in situ locations of varied, interesting, and 
exceptional elements of abiotic nature (geological, geomorphological, and 
hydrological phenomena) (Stepišnik 2017). It is interesting that preserved 
localities of biodiversity and geodiversity are situated in remote areas, away 
from the largest agglomerations with high population concentrations, industrial 
capacities, and transport and technical infrastructure (Protected planet 2015). It 
is logical that valuable natural features are better preserved in peripheral areas of 
countries. However, it is also expected that national countries have an interest in 
controlling the border regions due to completely different, predominantly 
cultural and political, as well as security-based reasons. Especially when the 
border region of a state is settled by ethnic minorities (Zupančič 2017, p. 472).  
The article discusses the subject of ethnic minorities in protected areas of 
European countries. It thereby attempts to determine, based on a comparative 
analysis, the relationship between protected areas and minorities living in such 
areas. Minorities and protected areas are subject to national preservation and 
protection policies. The article is part of a wider interdisciplinary study of mino-
rities' situation1 in Europe and the effects on them. It is not possible to make 
definite conclusions mid study, but preliminary results indicate a high likelihood 
of confirmation of the hypothesis that protection measures in settlement areas of 
minorities are a form of state control over minorities; such measures actually 
replace the control of state borders after the suspension of military, police, and 
customs control of borders within the context of European integration processes. 
                          
1 The research is emphasizing the political, formal (or juridical), linguistical and 
socioeconomic position of minorities in Europe as a comparative study. There was 
author s idea to put particular attention to these disputed issues about the protected areas, 
when noticed that the case of Slovenes in Porabje (Hungary) in Ӧrszeg National Park 
(hung. Ӧrszegi Nemzeti Park) is far to be the only case.  
Minorities in protected areas... 
 
27 
The other important study question addresses the approaches to development 
initiatives of minorities in protected areas.    
Due to limited space, protected areas in Europe can only be briefly discussed 
in this article. This is otherwise a very wise multi-disciplinary subject. Most 
attention is focused on territorial interconnectedness and on cause-effect rela-
tionship of two key variables: minorities (and protection of minorities) and pro-
tected areas. Discussions on minorities in protected areas and specific problems 
of minorities have so far been quite rare, and covered the issues mostly as an 
actual situation and not as part of national border- and minority policies.  
2. THEORETICAL DISCOURSE OF PROTECTION 
Protection of areas due to any reason is the exclusive right or privilege and, 
on the other hand, primary obligation of a state. A mature nation employs pro-
tection measures to ensure an area for a long term, because it values it as ex-
ceptional and nationally important. Above all, protection is a measure of limiting 
encroachments on one hand and increasing the symbolic values of landscape 
elements on the other hand. Protection is first a measure of spatial policy, since 
it sets limits and conditions for the scope, methods, and forms of permitted 
human activity in protected areas. Established regulations has a predominantly 
limiting character for residents, who can continue to exploit their existing resi-
dential and functional space only within certain limits and under certain condi-
tions, and receive as compensation substitute or compensatory measures, such as 
annuities for maintenance of cultural landscape in limited geographical condi-
tions, relocations of business activities to border areas outside protected areas, 
financial compensations, and similar measures (Zupančič 2017). Simultaneously, 
forms of park arrangements increase the flow of visitors, especially in national 
and regional parks. Tourism becomes the main activity, with its form adapted to 
protection regimes. For visitors, this is an organised area of demonstration and 
symbolisation. Natural and cultural heritage objects are by acts declared as 
nationally important, and, together with their location, become more visible and 
recognisable, and the interpretation of the object is modified as well. Justification 
for national protection and defining an area as a subject of national importance 
presupposes territorial and frequently also ethnic association with the majority 
population. While this causes almost no significant changes2 in settlement areas 
                          
2 Regarding the ethnic or/ and cultural dimensions of local life.  
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of minorities, this measure represents a significant qualitative change in the set-
tlement areas of ethnic minorities.  
A certain political consensus regarding protection is first required to establish 
protection of certain areas. Expert interpretations can have a significant role, but 
that is not always necessary. Frequently, expert justifications follow the political 
decision. The first national park in the world, Yellowstone in the US, was 
declared in 1872 in the spirit of growing economic and political power of the 
US, after over a century of unrestrained exploitation of natural resources and 
destruction of the biosphere (under the assumption that such resources are 
almost unlimited in this vast country), when the number of some species of 
typical American fauna decreased to critically low levels (Zupančič 2013). The 
national park immediately became the pride of the US and a role model followed 
by other countries. It is characteristic that countries had a political need to 
protect a part of their territory. Almost all countries throughout the world have 
national parks (Protected planet 2016). The uniqueness of biosphere or geo-
sphere elements is measures within national borders; these areas had been 
declared protected because they have prestigious characteristics within the na-
tional borders. International importance is an additional element that strengthens 
the national significance of protected areas as well. Furthermore, a park's pres-
tige also reflects well on the state that owns and manages the park (Protected 
areas in Europe 2012). National parks are a state's prestige, brand, symbolic and 
public (national) space. It is therefore in a state's almost “natural” interest to 
establish park protection over certain parts of the national territory, even if the 
uniqueness of individual objects or the whole is not fully justified by expert 
opinion.    
The uniqueness of different valuable natural features is not the only motive 
for establishing a park regime. A comparative analysis of protection imple-
mentation shows specific trends and tempo, as well as the direction of pro-
tection. Objects and thus the reasons for protection are constantly expanding, as 
is the scope of protected areas. Behind these trends, we can detect a paradigm of 
parkization3, as a specific spatial relationship and certain government-regulated 
and directed regional policy, specifically in peripheral areas4. Implementation of 
European directives increased the interest for park protection, primarily for 
protection of wetland, coastal, island, riparian, and mountain habitats (Natura 
                          
3 The term describes the tendency, policy or even ideological or / and paradigmatic 
endeavors to put the distinct areas under some protected regime.   
4 See f.e. the areas on the whole Carpathian mountain ridges (Ruffini and Ptaček 
2009). 
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2000 Barometer 2016). However, we should not ignore the fact that larger 
protected areas are characteristically located in border region, specifically after 
1995. This matches the time of suspension of security and economic control on 
political boundaries. Some countries (e.g. Greece; similar trends can be followed 
also in Croatia) declared protection of island areas that were under threat of 
purchase by foreigners when the region joined the European Union. Such an 
example is also Slovenia. On Karst, along the Slovenian-Italian border, when the 
pressure from potential real estate buyers increased (buyers were mostly from 
Trieste in Italy), they started considering a park protection of the entire area, 
which should deter or completely prevent real estate manipulations by 
foreigners. Prices of real estate soared, which had an extremely negative effect 
on possibilities of real estate transactions by the locals. In this case, the initiative 
for park protection (which is even more extraordinary!) arose on the side of local 
residents when they also faced the negative effect of new migration pressures5.   
In the studied context of the relationship between a protected territory and  
a minority (population), we must especially highlight the changes in the local 
environment that occur after the establishment of a protection regime. Protection 
means that an object of local ownership (of residents) is transferred under the 
domain of the institution (park management), which at the same time represent 
the government. The local territory thus falls under direct governmental juris-
diction. With protection, specific internal borders of administrative and political 
character are established, which have a significant effect on the structure of 
protected area. Limiting its use on one hand and increased symbolism of the 
protected while on the other hand have a conservative effect: the area should 
retain the specific structure and appearance in order to fulfil the key function  
– long-term protection of content and their public accessibility (Zupančič 
2015a). This indirectly increases the monitorability of residents if they are 
located in protected areas. Residents frequently experience this circumstance, 
together with limitations on management, as an obstacle (Zupančič 2017). It is 
not a coincidence that residents are proud of the sights in their local town, but 
are not happy with the limitations imposed in the park. Residents are moving 
away due to the limitations and monitoring, the area is becoming empty and the 
cultural landscape is deteriorating. Protected areas increase the dependency on 
the holder and implementer of restrictive policies – the government. To a large 
extent, this matches the “classic” approach of national countries to their border 
areas.  
                          
5 According to field research in 2013, 2014, 2015 done by students; totaly 634 
questionaries both on Slovene (majority of them) and Italian side of border.  
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3. SETTLEMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF MINORITIES  
IN EUROPE: BRIEF OVERWIEV 
By rough estimates, close or even more than 30 million people fall within the 
category of various ethnic minorities in Europe (Pan and Pfeil 2000) – or even 
more (Zupančič 2015b, pp. 145–160). This represent evidently strong impact to 
national- and international politics within Europe (Rosecrance and Stein 2006). 
They differ significantly in terms on number, legal situation, and political status, 
but share some common circumstances. Most minorities are settled in border 
areas of countries. This is the logical consequence of rivalries in recent history 
of European nations, which established their own national countries during the 
19th and 20th century; this means they realized the main goal of national move-
ments (White 2004). Minorities were formed on intersections of stateforming 
nations. Border areas are consequently ethnically mixed (Bufon 2004). From the 
89 traditional minority ethnic groups compared6 in Europe, almost three-quarters 
(71%) are settled in border areas of political units (Zupančič 2015b, p. 156). 
This also considers the situations of ethnic communities within federations, as 
for instance in some federal nations within Europe as well as in the European 
part of Russia7. Internal political borders also create minority situations (Braunder 
and Lesser 1999). The general tendency is that larger minority communities are 
predominantly located along borders, while smaller communities more often 
form isolated settlement nuclei (Zupančič 2010, pp. 230–234).  
Characteristic for the Iberian Peninsula is the situation of Catalans and 
Basques. The cores of settlement are in regions with established cultural autono-
my, whereas a smaller part of the settlement area is in predominantly Castilian 
regions with the Spanish language. In France, the settlement area of Catalans 
and Basques is designated as an area of special regional languages (Pan and Pfeil 
2000). The ethnic concept of France is completely different (Haarmann 2004). In 
Italy, larger minority communities are located in the border area of the Alpine 
arc: Francophones in the Aosta Valley, German speaking population of South 
Tyrol (main part of Trentino Alto-Adige region)8, and Slovenians along east 
Italian borders (Klemenčič and Bufon 1991). Slovenian minorities are settled in 
areas of south Austria and along the borders with Croatia and Hungary. The 
                          
6 Ethnic minorities, that were included in author s research.  
7 Russia was not included in comparative research, but some situations are quite 
comaprable with European minority context. The federal units of Russian federation are 
a typical results of “divide et impera” politics.  
8 Trentino Alto-Adige is a italian province with particular regulation and autonomy.  
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Hungarian-Austrian border is also intertwined with minorities; however, in this 
location, minorities are dispersed in a wider border area (Klemenčič and 
Klemenčič 1995). The region of the Pannonian Basin generally has a lot of 
minorities, from small and dispersed to some concentrated and quite large. This 
is especially true for Hungarian communities in Serbia, Romania, Ukraine, and 
Slovakia (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998). Some are characterised by large and 
concentrated settlement nuclei (Székelrs and Transylvanian Saxons in Transyl-
vania, Romania); the gain particular organization of political life due to their size 
(Costachie 2000). The areas of Serbian Vojvodina, Romanian Banat and 
Dobruja, and further in Moldavia and south-eastern Ukraine are categorised  
as ethnically extremely heterogeneous areas with predominantly territorially 
isolated minorities (Crampton and Crampton 1996; similar as well as in: Sewan 
and Dippold 1997). Completely new minority and border situations developed 
after the ethnic wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Relocations of 
entire communities created new types of de facto minorities, at least in the local 
and regional context, despite significant language relatedness (Banac 2006,  
p. 33). This is especially true for Bosniaks, specifically because of their religious 
affiliation (they are Moslems) (Klemenčič and Žagar 2004, pp. 89–94). In Greece 
and Bulgaria, the issue of Macedonians persists, as governments do not recog-
nise their ethnic subjectivity, while they are settled across extensive border areas. 
Albanian communities are a peculiarity in all countries they live (Eberhardt 
2003). Due to the high birth rate, minority population in Montenegro, Serbia, 
Macedonia, and Greece are growing in numbers (Zupančič 2015b). Turkish 
minorities are smaller and in the form of settlement nuclei, except in Greek and 
Bulgarian Thrace, where they form a relatively compact settlement core that 
borders on Turkey (Brunner and Lemberg 1994).  
In the countries of Central Europe, minorities are extremely border-based, 
except for some ethnic groups (e.g. Sorbs and Frisians) (Klemens 1995). Their 
number and spatial distribution were significantly affected by migratory flows 
during the decade after the Second World War. The population of border area of 
the Czech Republic and Poland was largely replaced with the relocation of 
Germans and the compensatory flow of different Slavic population (Magocsi 
2002). However, after 1990 a partial revitalisation of German community 
occurred. In the region of the Baltic arc, new Russian minorities emerged in 
addition to traditional minority communities (especially Polish) with the re-
formation of statehood – the result of Russification approach from the time of 
the Soviet Union. Their situation is specific, as many do not have a citizenship 
(Zupančič 2010, p. 241). Similar circumstances are occurring in the wide belt of 
Eastern Europe, in Ukraine and Belarus. The formal minority situation of 
Jernej Zupančič 
 
 
32 
Russians is not actually such, considering the real situation of Russian in these 
areas. The north part of the Scandinavian Peninsula is settled by groups of Sami 
people (or Lapps). In the conditions of boreal subecumene of the European 
north, they preserved the nomadic and seminomadic customs (Klemens 1995, 
Haarmann 2004). A peculiarity in terms of European minorities are Swedes in 
Finland. Due to historical tradition and their relatively large numbers, they are 
not really perceived as minorities. They have a special autonomy on the Åland 
Islands (Pan and Pfeil 2000).  
We can conclude this brief review of minority situations in Europe with the 
communities of Romani and Vlachs (Haarmann 2004). The former are present in 
almost all European countries. Since the Romani people settled permanently 
very late, their territoriality is weakly expressed and specific. Some groups are 
still migrating (Zupančič 2014, pp. 23–45).  
4. MINORITIES IN PROTECTED AREAS 
Tendencies for protecting border areas are evident due to government 
interests for certain forms of control over state borders, even though they are 
promoted by very different interests. It is hard to prove that limiting norms and 
control is aimed at minorities, but it seems indicative in some cases. Parkisation 
varies in its activity, depending primarily on the protection regime (strictest  
in areas of national parks and less strict in landscape and regional parks or in 
Natura 2000 areas) (more in: Natura 2000 Barometer). Namely, landscape  
and regional parks predominantly emphasise cultural characteristics of areas and 
consequently generally include the local population to ensure the success and 
rationality of management. In certain situations, the local population can actually 
be responsible for protection norms, as it expect to benefit from this activity.  
A park regime justifies compensatory financial measures and promotes sustainable 
use of local resources. Theoretically, protected areas provide quite a few 
development options for minorities as well, under the condition, of course, that 
these minorities are accepted as a specific cultural element of this environment 
(Zupančič 2013)9. Herein frequently lies the problem. From the perspective of 
                          
9 In USA and Canada, as well as in Australia, indigenous people (Native Americans 
in North America, Aborigines in central parts of Australia) are protected by particular 
territorial protection of their natural environments – s.c. Indian-Reserves (or Reservates). 
The idea is far from any European sense of ethnic protection, but explains that the 
particular cultural aspects can strictly be incalculated into some models of minority 
protection, in fact! (Zupančič 2013, pp. 193–196).   
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ethnocentrically oriented national states and their policies, an interpretation of 
cultural characteristics of border areas represents an opportunity to cover mi-
nority characteristics with state (national) characteristics10. The minority ele-
ment, such as the local toponymy, language characteristics, cultural monuments, 
and other objects, can quickly become the object of concealment or even 
ignorance. This is just a continuation of policies less inclined towards minorities, 
which are replaced by elements of majority culture.  
From the Iberian Peninsula to the north of Scandinavia, we can monitor the 
trend of parkisation as a form of establishing protected border areas. Around 
37% of European minorities lives with a certain form of protection, which 
represents around close to half of all European border minority areas11. The 
presence of minorities along borders represents a statistically significant increase 
of likelihood of establishment of protected areas. However, minorities and 
particularly their cultural characteristics are relatively rarely the object of park 
protection. Protected areas are more often seen as an instrument of government 
policies that have a less than favourable effect on minorities. This article cannot 
systematically present all situations of minorities in protected areas. We shall 
therefore focus on cases of minorities in South Alpine arc between Aosta in Italy 
and western regions of Hungary.   
Larger minorities that achieved a certain level of autonomy and can therefore 
manage their settlement area on the local and regional level have an undisputed 
advantage. French-speaking Aosta is an Italian region in the Alpine arc that has 
a formal special position due to language and cultural characteristics. In this 
respect, language is an essential element and an object of protection by itself. 
The effects of territorial autonomy are even better expressed in South Tyrol 
(Zupančič 2010). The numerous and well-organised German-speaking com-
munity of South Tyrol also achieved the economic autonomy, which enables not 
only investments into, for instance, development of alpine agriculture, and con-
sequently preservation of settlement and cultural landscape, but is aggressively 
focusing on economically promising segment of tourism and transport. This also 
benefits the small community of Ladin people in the same region. Cultural 
characteristics are the object of economisation, which allows both minorities to 
develop their own culture and strengthen their identity (Zupančič 2005). In this 
                          
10 B. Comrie (2009) explains details of linguistic politics and the differentiation 
between countries. Further reading about the linguistic distribution in Europe in 
“Languages of Europe”, available on website. H. Haarmann (2004) or C. Pan and  
B.S. Pfeil (2000) and L. Klemens (1995) explain just basic (statistical) issues.  
11 Estimated by author; this are preliminary results, the changes are possible! 
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regard, the large scope of protected areas in the region represents a protective 
measure against migration pressures both from other parts of Italy (due to 
completely economic motives!) and other areas. This allows the two minorities 
to preserve jobs and maintain economic development, while also indirectly 
maintaining the settlement, preventing the proportion of minority population to 
decrease. The situation is different on the settlement areas of Slovenians (as well 
as Friulian people) in the east border belt of Italy (Bufon 2008). In Alpine 
valleys of Julian Alps, cultural characteristics of Slovenians are not the object of 
protection, and protection approaches do not grant the local population even the 
compensatory economic advantages in protected areas. Some valleys in Slavia 
Veneta (Beneška Slovenija) are close to be emptied. In the Austrian Carinthia, 
the Slovenian settlement core in the south border belt in the Karawanks is almost 
entirely under a specific protection regime. The Austrian minority policy was 
never favourably inclined towards the Slovenian minority and had significantly 
limited the development of bilingual topography, for instance (Klemenčič and 
Klemenčič 1995, pp. 202–206). Even though the cultural heritage of the Kara-
wanks is exclusively Slovenian, guides present it as generally South-Austrian 
(Carinthian, regional), while the language is not even mentioned. Attempts at 
Germanisation of originally Slovenian toponymies have been going on for 
decades. On the other hand, however, the protection regime implemented some 
economic advantages for farmers and the tourism sector, which provide econo-
mic compensation in less favourable mountain regions. However, the cultural 
heritage elements of the Slovenian minority did not became an explicit object of 
protection within the regional park (Bandelj et al. 2016).  
In the past, the Slovenian-Austrian-Hungarian tri-border region has always 
been a peripheral area. After the Second World War, the “iron curtain” ran 
through this area, contributing to the peripheralisation of the area. After 1990, 
the borders opened, but cross-border communication was very scarce due to the 
extremely peripheral character of the area. All three countries decided to 
promote the border triangle in the spirit of the new Europe of open borders and 
protection of natural and cultural heritage. Establishment of a protected area 
seemed an excellent pro-European idea. Austria approached in a minimalistic 
manner and employed the weakest regime to primarily protect individual 
wetland habitats. Slovenia used the concept of a landscape park in the hilly area 
of Prekmurje region to implement state economic interventionism in the least 
developed Slovenian region. According to experience, the park has so far failed 
to bring any economic advantages for the locals. Romani settlements had quite  
a few problems with the construction of municipal infrastructure due to limita-
tions of the park (Zupančič 2014, pp. 206–209). Hungary declared a national 
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park in the border area, even though Őrség (where the National Park has been 
established) has been significantly altered by the population. This is the wettest 
and most forested part of Hungary, and is declared and interpreted as such in the 
Hungarian national strategy for protected areas. Only valuable “national” 
features are interpreted and promoted, leaving practically no room for the Slove-
nian minority. The park has become a pragmatic circumstance for the Slovenian 
minority, a limitation without offered economic and cultural compensations. 
This in effect only reestablishes the measures of state control in the area of the 
former “iron curtain”. The park regime has a predominantly negative effect on 
the Slovenian minority (Šiftar 2016).  
5. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS OF MINORITIES  
IN PROTECTED AREAS 
Minorities are a politically and culturally sensitive part of European space. 
Declarative support by European institutions added a few incentives, whereas 
the political practice of most European countries indicates the deep roots of 
ethnocentric attitudes. With the liberalisation of cross-border communication, 
we can observe the trend of establishing protected areas in border regions. 
Minorities benefit only in a small number of cases, while parkisation12 quite 
often has a detrimental effect on minorities. The question of minorities' develop-
ment prospects in protected areas is therefore quite appropriate. These prospect 
can be identified in three directions: strengthening receptive capabilities of mi-
norities, implementation of compensatory measures, and development of alterna-
tive economic activities in protected areas and their borders.    
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IN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the Second World War in Europe three processes took place: 1) activa-
tion of regionalist and ethno-linguistic movements, 2) occurrence of separatist 
(independence) movements which in some cases led to emergence of new states, 
and 3) European integration (with the European Union as its most important 
institutional form), These three processes evidently shaped, among other things, 
conditions of life and activity of “borderland peoples” being the main subject of 
this volume of “Region and Regionalism”. Location and “timing” of these three 
processes were uneven in space and time: while in the western part of the 
continent two processes prevailed over the whole postwar period: that of 
activation of regionalism1 and ethno-linguistic movements and that of European 
integration, in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the cold war separatist 
(independence) tendencies came to the fore leading to disintegration of some 
states being in the moment of disintegration outside the EU. What should be 
underlined, no member state of the EU (and its predecessors) was disintegrated 
(or lost a part of its European territory) despite strong centrifugal tendencies in 
                    
1 In political sciences the term „regionalism” is used in two different meanings: as a 
movement of integration (cooperation) of states located in a given region of the world 
(such as European integration) and as a movement promoting or defending political, 
economic and/or cultural identity of regions as parts of nation states. The former can be 
called “supra-national regionalism” and the latter – “sub-national regionalism”. In this 
paper the term “regionalism” is used the latter meaning. 
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some of them. The aim of this paper is to investigate these three tendencies, in 
particular to answer the question of relationship between European integration 
and the two other processes: to what extent the European integration facilitated 
(encouraged) regionalisms and ethno-linguistic movements, what was the impact 
of European integration (and of the EU specifically) on encouraging or discour-
aging separatist (independence) tendencies in states within and outside the EU.  
Appearance of European integration after the Second World War was new  
a phenomenon in politics, mentality and even morality in Europe. It was a result 
of considerably changed perception of many ideas, such as nation and national-
ism, regionalism, internationalism, modernity, etc. To present importance of the 
“mental revolution” enabling European integration, it seems necessary to trace 
back intellectual evolution in Europe in areas related to collective identities.  
2. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: “LEGITIMATE”  
AND “ILLEGITIMATE” IDENTITIES  
AND UNIVERSALISM IN EUROPE 
Over the history some collective identities (identifications) in some eras were 
regarded as “legitimate” or “illegitimate” (or “tolerated”). The “legitimate” iden-
tities were rewarded and the “illegitimate” identities were fought against by 
those in political and/or symbolical power, using ways and means in accordance 
with the then ideologies, technology, mentality etc. The system of “legitimate” 
and “illegitimate” identities met with various reactions ranging from full accept-
ance to opposition. Three such eras can be distinguished: pre-modern, modern 
and postmodern.  
2.1. The pre-modern era: Christian universalism 
We can assume that from the point of view of identities the pre-modern era 
lasted from the beginnings (or consolidation) of Christianity until religious wars 
and emergence of modern nation states, in other words more or less over 
thousand years from 600 to 1600. Of course, it was a very differentiated period, 
full of events, but its detailed presentation is beyond the scope of this analysis.  
It should be added that this analysis considers mostly Western Europe (or more 
precisely: Western Christianity Europe), because in the eastern part of Europe 
history diverted considerably from that in Western Europe, although some simi-
larities between the two parts of Europe can be observed. 
Regionalist, ethno-linguistic and separatist/independence movements... 
 
41 
The pivotal element in the political, mental and cultural construction of 
(Western) Europe in this era was Christian universalism. It means, the Christen-
dom formed a community – civitas Dei – composed by the Pope as representa-
tive of the God in the Earth, monarchs, priests of various ranks, hierarchically 
organized social strata, and what made this set of elements a community: com-
mon faith, common Church with its centralistic structure with resulting common 
“rules of the game”, common class of rulers (the then monarchs and aristocrats 
could take thrones and possessions in places irrespective of those monarchs' and 
aristocrats' territorial origin just like present day CEOs can take positions in 
international companies irrespective of those CEOs' place of birth) as well as 
common lingua franca (Latin) and a common portion of knowledge.   
In this era the “legitimate” identities were those compatible with the domi-
nant version of Christian doctrine and with the political order centered on the 
Church.  
There were also neutral or tolerated identities. These were all territorial, 
ethnic, socio-professional and familiar identities. It is worth mentioning that out 
of these identities there would emerge future powerful national and ethnic 
identities which eventually destroy the Christian universalism. 
The “illegitimate” identities were those religious identities which were in-
compatible with the dominant version of Christian universalism (heresies).  
The arbiter of legitimacy of identities was the Church, and within it special-
ised institutions guarding doctrinal correctness. At their disposal were instru-
ments of enforcing legitimate identities: symbolical (praise or condemnation), 
institutional (acceptance or exclusion from the community), transcendental (prom-
ise of eternal salvation or condemnation) and physical (expulsion, elimination). 
There were several reactions to this system: active acceptance (and efforts to 
maintain it), passive acceptance (observance of the rules without attempts to 
“correct” behaviours of dissidents), passive rejection (emigration), and active 
rejection (intellectual, political, military). Rejection not necessarily was addres-
sed against the whole system, rather more often than not it was directed against 
some particular aspects of the system (as for instance conduct of the clergy, 
financing the Church, etc.) and its aim was not to destroy the system but to 
improve it, but the final result was erosion and collapse of the system.  
From the point of view of the present situation, the era of Christian uni-
versalism is relevant for two reasons: it was a supra-national European com-
munity that in the future was inspiration for a new kind, secular, European 
community, and secondly, the Christian universalism was compatible with 
feudalism which conserved ethno-linguistic differentiation of Europe and gave 
birth both to nationalisms and ethno-regionalisms.  
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2.2. The modern era: nationalism 
The primetime of the modern era, or the era of nationalism, was the 19th and 
the first half of the 20th century, or between Napoleonic wars and the end of the 
Second World War. (The period between the disintegration of the Christian 
universalism and the beginning of the 19th century can be regarded as a transition 
period, as “early modernity”). The main feature of this era was the primacy of 
Nation, of national community over other forms of collectivities. Nation (or 
better to say: nations) became the highest value and building a nation (“nation- 
-building”) was the highest duty. Nations were built mostly on the ground (or 
emerged from the ground) of pre-modern kingdoms, more seldom duchies and 
ethno-linguistic groups. Emergence of nations as the primary form of collectivity 
was a result and a cause of the erosion of the Christian community. Two kinds of 
nations in that era must be distinguished: state nations (or nations having their 
states) and stateless nations (or nations without their state organisation).  
Nation-building (nationalism) was tightly connected with the idea of mod-
ernisation. Modernisation, grown up to the position of a new religion, understood 
as developing industry, education, transportation systems (roads, railways), etc., 
eradication of superstitions, unification of language and culture, alphabetisation 
of the population served the goal of building (consolidating) a nation, national-
ism (or national pride) motivated for efforts for modernisation. Nations were 
condemned to compete against each other as each nation wanted more: state 
nations wanted more territory and annihilation of stateless nations within their 
boundaries, stateless nations wanted more freedom and more people, and each 
nation felt insecure and obliged to defend its territory or human substance. The 
dominant rule of the game in relations between nations was: the stronger is 
always right, and the use of military force is a legitimate way of solving 
problems. 
In such a situation the “legitimate” identity was the national identity. Other 
identities were judged depending on their contribution to the national idea.  
“Tolerated” identities were all religious identities (provided that they had no 
political implications, otherwise they fell into the category of “legitimate” or 
“illegitimate” depending on whether they strengthened or weakened the national 
identity), social-professional, familiar, local (as long as they were a source of 
folklore and did not oppose the nation-building). 
“Illegitimate” were regional, ethnic and supra-national (cosmopolitism) 
identities as opposing or hindering the process of nation-building and mod-
ernisation (or even threatening disintegration of the nation) or detracting people 
from mobilisation against internal and external menaces to the nation. A special 
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problem were ethno-linguistic (national) minorities as they presented a challenge 
to the idea of homogeneous nation, were suspected of separatism (irredentism) 
and could be used by external enemies to weaken the nation2. Only those 
regional identities were tolerated which were considered as a necessary inter-
mediary step in the transition from local identities to the national identity (“from 
peasants to citizens”).  
“The arbiters” of legitimacy of identities were national governments and 
national elites. In the case of stateless nation the “arbiters” were national elites 
composed mostly by intellectuals. 
Instruments of enforcing legitimate identities were symbolic (“symbolic 
violence”, intimidation, ridiculing), institutional (education, law, armed forces, 
etc.) and physical (expulsion, incarceration, exile, elimination, extermination). 
The concrete “mix” of instruments of diffusing (imposing, inculcating) na-
tional identities depended on political, economic, ethno-linguistic, geographical, 
etc. circumstances, and first of all, on the status of a given nationalism – whether 
it was a state nationalism or a stateless nationalism. Crucial element was edu-
cation which served eradication of illiteracy, diffusing of the knowledge of the 
national language and spreading the sense of belonging to the nation. Needless 
to say, state nationalisms had more means at their disposal to carry out the policy 
of “nationalisation” of their inhabitants in comparison with stateless national-
isms, but the latter were not absolutely deprived of such means, especially in 
central and eastern Europe where the empires (Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian) 
revealing many traits of pre-modern political organisations were too weak, too 
poor, too internally differentiated or simply not striving to transform themselves 
into nations to impose the “one state – one nation – one language” model, and 
the stateless nationalisms there were strong enough to fight back some con-
cessions in the field of education and even politics (political autonomy). 
The division into state and stales nationalisms was changeable as in the 
course of events several stateless nationalisms became state nationalisms as  
a result of unification of pre-national state formations into national states 
(Germany, Italy, Romania) and getting independence from larger empires (in the 
Balkans before the First World War and in central-eastern Europe and Ireland 
after this war). Newly established nation states usually followed the model of 
nation building, in such a way they did not change the logic of the modern era.  
                    
2 As Milan Buffon puts it: “[…] in the period of classic nationalism, autochthonous 
national minorities were perceived as some kind of a ‘foreign matter’ or ‘fifth column’ 
which needed to be physically removed or in any other way ‘disabled’ (assimilated)” 
(Bufon 2014, p. 17).  
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As regards reactions of the “illegitimate” identities, several attitudes could be 
observed: submission, emigration and resistance (peaceful and violent). Sub-
mission meant acceptance and internalisation of the idea of being a part of  
a given nation (or at least behaving as if one believed to be part of this nation 
and were “civilised” and “modern”), mastering of the national language (with 
the tendency to abandon other languages), etc. by people revealing undesirable 
identities. Large-scale migrations in defence of ethno-national identities were 
rather rare, but one of them deserves mentioning: it is migration of Jews-Zionist 
to Palestine (Eretz Israel) since the late 19th century. Resistance of the “illegiti-
mate” identities, as mentioned above, in some cases led to political and cultural 
autonomy and independence of new states.  
The logic of the era of modernity and nationalism was largely rejected after 
the Second World War giving birth to the postmodern era and a search of a new 
European universalism. Before analysing this era it is worth to research in  
a more detailed way into this part of the modern era which directly let to the 
revision of the logic of nationalism and modernity. This part of the history is the 
period of the two world wars. 
2.3. The two Big Shocks in Europe  
and the divergent conclusions 
The two world wars was an apogee of the era of nationalism and modernity. 
Both were big shocks but the conclusions drawn from them were absolutely 
divergent.  
Conclusions drawn from the First World War, especially by those who lost it 
(especially Germany, Hungary, Ukrainian nationalist movement, but also by 
other national movements), even more strengthened the existing rules of the 
game. These conclusions were: 1) nation is the highest value – our nation is the 
chosen nation and has a mission to fulfil, and therefore it has the right to use any 
means to achieve it, 2) stronger nations are always right – we must be the 
stronger (in relation to our external and internal enemies) to win the con-
frontation, 3) sub-national (regional, ethnic) identities in our country is a threat 
and in other countries is an opportunity – we must intensify the fight against 
them in our country and support them in other countries to undermine our 
enemies, 4) supranational identities blur the boundaries between nations and 
weaken national mobilization – they must be fought against. 
The idea that our nation must be strong, unified and free of undesirable 
elements, combined with the theory of Darwinism and inequality of human races 
led on the one hand to rejection of democracy (as a system hindering unification 
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of the nation), and on the other hand to the radical anti-Semitism, and other 
forms of racism and inter-ethnic hatred.  
The final result was the birth and spread of fascism (Nazism) and the 
outbreak of the Second World War with millions of dead, the holocaust, inter-
ethnic pogroms, mass deportations and forced migrations and sufferings on the 
scale not registered before in the history of humankind. 
The conclusions drawn from the Second World War were radically different 
and implied a change of the rules of the game: 1) nation is not the highest value, 
nationalism must be reduced not to threaten peace and human rights, 2) stronger 
nations are not always right, rights of smaller nations must be protected, 
confrontation between (European) nations must not be the way of doing inter-
national politics, 3) minority (regional, ethnic) groups in our country need not to 
be a threat and in other countries must not be an opportunity, 4) supranational 
European identity weaken nationalisms and enables peaceful cooperation 
benefitting all nations and peoples. The Cold War division of Europe made that 
these conclusions led to different situations in both parts of Europe, but the idea 
of peaceful coexistence of nations and discrediting of nationalism was common 
to both parts.   
2.4. The postmodern (late modern) era: in search  
of a European universalism 
The postmodern or late modern way of thinking stemmed from the rejection 
of the ideology that led to world wars. Its main characteristic was the 
“shrinking” of the nation which left space to both supranational and sub-national 
identities. At the same time modernity (modernisation) in the sense of improving 
material conditions of life, was decoupled from the idea of nationalism: nation-
state no longer had the monopoly for modernisation.  
As regards the space for supra-national identities, one can speak of appear-
ance of a kind of a new European universalism with European integration (and 
the EU as its main form) and “European” values as its manifestations. As in other 
eras, there are “legitimate” and “illegitimate” identities, arbiters, instruments and 
reactions (fig. 1).  
“Legitimate” identities encompass a broad range of identities: supra-national, 
national, local, ethnic, religious and other (all of them provided that they can be 
accommodated in democratic-legal ways).  
“Illegitimate” are racial, nationalistic, xenophobic, etc. identities denying 
peaceful coexistence of peoples, equality of rights and democracy.  
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Fig. 1. “Legitimate” identities in (Western) Europe before and after 1945 
Source: own elaboration 
“The arbiters” of legitimacy are undefined European elites and defined insti-
tutions like European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe with its Venice 
Commission, etc.  
Instruments of enforcing legitimate identities include moral (condemnation), 
institutional and physical actions. These actions are mostly undertaken on the 
level of each nation state, in accordance with its internal law, which, otherwise, 
must be compatible with European standards. There are also attempts at insti-
tutionalisation of instruments at the EU level.  
As to reactions of the “illegitimate” identities, these entail submission and 
resistance (peaceful and violent) in the form of Euro-sceptical, xenophobic, 
racist movements and attitudes.  
Summing up the discussion on “legitimate” and “illegitimate” identities, the 
following figure presents “legitimate” identities in Europe before and after the 
end of the Second World War.  
3. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND ETHNO-REGIONALISM 
AND SEPARATISM IN WESTERN EUROPE AFTER 1945 
The postmodern era facilitated both European integration and activation of 
sub-national identities in the form or ethno-regionalist and separatist move-
ments. Summing up the general relationship between European integration and 
sub-national movements it can be said that: 
1) European integration was parallel to, and interrelated with, the process of 
activation of ethno-regionalist movements,  
2) European integration preserved territorial integrity of states participating 
in the process of integration.  
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Both European integration and activation of ethno-regionalist movements 
were a result of the weakening of nationalism, which opened room for legiti-
misation of both sub-national and supra-national identities. At the same time 
European integration confirmed the principle of intangibility of national borders 
and eliminated the threat that ethno-regional minorities could be used to sub-
versive activities by other states. Therefore, ethno-regional movements ceased to 
be regarded as a threat to national unity. Also the idea of decentralisation and 
regionalisation promoted by the European Union created favourable atmosphere 
for expression of regional identities. The relationship between the European 
Union and regionalism and regionalisation was confirmed by several institutions 
and actions, such as the Committee of the Regions (a consultative body of the 
EU), EU's funds (mainly dedicated to regional development) benefitting regional 
government and encouraging regionalisation of member states, etc. There ap-
peared even a conviction of “symbiosis” between the EU and regions, whose 
expression was the idea of “Europe of regions” (Applegate 1999, Biscoe 2001, 
Mathias 2006, Cabada 2009). 
There were also other factors favourable for demonstration of ethno-
regionalist and ethno-linguistic identities: paradoxically it was their weakness. 
After decades or centuries of homogenising policies these identities and ethno- 
-linguistic and ethno-regional communities behind them were generally weak 
enough not to present a real challenge to stability of states. Additionally, 
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, the spread of mass media usually 
presenting unified national culture as well as market rewarding cultural mass 
production for the national audience (in national languages) rather than for small 
regional audiences (in regional languages) further eroded ethno-linguistic and 
ethno-regional groups so that central governments and national elites could 
afford to be generous towards them. What is more, in the atmosphere of post- 
modernism diversity (be it biological or cultural and linguistic) became a value. 
In such circumstances ethno-regionalist and ethno-linguistic movements received 
another legitimisation. 
Apart from the general tendency for activation of ethno-regionalist move-
ments there were country-specific conditions conducive to these movements, 
e.g.: in Germany the federalisation was imposed by the occupying powers after 
the war as a measure to weaken German nationalism, in Italy a form of autono-
my was given to some regions to assuage separatist and irredentist tendencies 
(Alto Adige/South Tyrol, Val d'Aosta, Sicily, Sardinia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia), in 
the United Kingdom the demise of the British empire weakened the British and 
strengthened Scottish and Welsh identities, in Spain democratisation after the 
end of Franco regime activated “frozen” ethno-regionalist and nationalist move-
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ments, in Belgium there was a continuing process of emancipation of Flemings, 
reinforced by the economic strengthening of Flanders in relation to the southern 
regions, resulted in federalization of the Belgian state (in the early 1990s).  
It must be underlined that despite the above mentioned examples of region-
alism and separatism no one state participating in the process of European 
integration (members of the European Union and its predecessors) was dis-
membered or lost a part of its European territory (losses of non-European 
territories as a result of decolonisation, e.g. the loss of Algeria by France, were 
unrelated to European integration)  
This is due to two factors to which European integration contributed in-
directly or directly:  
a) long lasting economic prosperity which reduced the sharpness of economic 
conflicts within individual countries, acceptance of intangibility of national 
borders and refrain from supporting separatist tendencies in other states as rules 
of conduct of participants in European integration,  
b) active discouragement by the EU of separatist/independence demands in 
some countries or the threat that leaving an EU member state would mean 
leaving the EU (Flanders in the early 1990s, Scotland 2014, Catalonia in recent 
decades).  
Summing up the discussion of the relationship between the EU and region-
alism and separatist (independence) movements in EU members states, it can be 
said that the EU was favourable towards regionalisms, expressing ethno-regional 
identities as long as they did not threaten territorial integrity of member states. 
This is not surprising given that the EU is an intergovernmental inter-state 
organisation and safeguarding territorial integrity is the highest duty of any 
sovereign state.   
4. ETHNO-REGIONALIST AND SEPARATIST/INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE (IN COUNTRIES 
BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN UNION) 
Ethno-regionalist and separatist/independence movements in Western Euro-
pean EU member states represent a very rich a differentiated set of phenomena 
that cannot be described in details in a paper lake this. Therefore the aim of the 
beneath presentation is only to point out to the very existence of them as illustra-
tion of the above thesis that in the era of postmodernity European integration is 
parallel to the activation of sub-national identities. 
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United Kingdom can be regarded as a “nation of nations”, in which Scot-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland are “nations within a nation”. Therefore it is 
hard to speak of Scotland and Wales as of typical examples of ethno-regionalist 
movements. Nevertheless, given that the UK is a nation state, Scotland and 
Wales can be considered as its regions. 
 
 
Fig. 2. United Kingdom 
Source: based on https://www.google.pl/search?q=united+kingdom 
Scotland and Wales deserve attention for their strong identity, and for the 
movement for recognition of this identity and for getting autonomy.  
Scottish identity can be termed as “civic nationalism”, in which every 
inhabitant of Scotland is regarded as a Scot, and the main aims of autonomy 
movement is getting more say in deciding on Scottish affaires and make 
Scotland visible abroad as a “European nation” (“Scotland – equal among equals 
in Europe”) (Keating 2001). Ethno-linguistic factor in Scottish identity plays  
a marginal factor, although the two local languages – Scottish Gaelic and Scots 
play a role of symbol of Scottish identity. 
Welsh identity has a stronger ethno-linguistic component as the Welsh 
language, spoken by a 20% minority but regarded as ancestral language by more 
Welshmen, is considered as symbol of national identity of Wales, and its 
safeguarding is an important aim of the Welsh movement.  
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Movements for autonomy of Scotland and Wales underwent a significant 
evolution in the post-Second World War. At the beginning of the 1980s in both 
regions referenda were held on granting them autonomy. In both cases the result 
was negative. The mood changed after conservative governments in the UK and 
by the end of the 1990s in new referenda on autonomy in both regions the result 
was positive. In 1999, in the framework of the so called “devolution” both 
Scotland and Wales received a kind of home rule, greater for Scotland and 
smaller for Wales. Also Northern Ireland received autonomy, but it was rather  
a compromise between the two opposing parties (Protestant unionists and 
Catholic irredentists) rather than an aim of a would-be Northern Irish autonomy 
movement.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Brexit: results of the referendum 
Source: based on https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/ 
2016-brexit-referendum/ 
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In Scotland Scottish National Party (SNP), representing Scottish pro-Euro-
pean civic nationalism and declaring independence of Scotland as its goal, came 
to power. As a result of agreement between the Scottish government (of Alex 
Salmond) and the British government (of David Cameron), in September 2014 
referendum on independence of Scotland was held. One of reasons to vote no for 
independence, raised during the referendum campaign, was that leaving the UK 
would automatically mean leaving the EU, and most Scots would like to remain 
in the European Union. The result of the referendum was 45% yes (in favour) 
and 55% no. The Scottish referendum was the most serious challenge to 
territorial unity of a member state of the EU. It can be assumed that, to some 
extent, the desire to remain in the EU discouraged Scottish voters and secured 
unity of the United Kingdom3.  
Scottish desire to remain in the EU was confirmed at the referendum on 
Brexit (leaving the EU by Britain) in June 2016. While British voters as a whole 
voted for Brexit (52% to 48%), the overwhelming majority of Scots (62%) voted 
for remaining in the EU, and what more, for remaining in the EU were all 
Scottish constituencies (fig. 3).  
Spain is another country of Western Europe with strong ethno-regionalist 
and separatist (independence) tendencies. They are a product of long history 
dating back to the period of reconquista in early middle ages. During the 
Spanish nation-building they were subdued, especially during Franco regime 
after the civil war. The end of this regime in mid 1970s opened the way for 
democratisation and for regionalisation of Spain. Undoubtedly, the desire to join 
the European Economic Community encouraged undertaking democratic 
reforms, and vice versa, democratisation of Spain facilitated its road to “Europe” 
(the EEC). The democratisation and regionalisation released frozen ethno- 
-regionalist and separatist identities and movements.   
Regions with the most vivid ethno-regionalist or nationalist identities and 
aspirations are Basque Country and Catalonia. Among other things, distinc-
tiveness of these regions is manifested in the fact that they have two official 
languages: Spanish (Castilian) and Basque or Catalan. What perhaps deserves 
more attention than objective differences between Catalans and (the rest of) 
Spaniards is the growing emotional aversion dividing them (Grau 2015). In these 
two regions radical wings of ethno-regionalist movements strive for breaking 
                    
3 This opinion is confirmed by the present leader of the Scottish National Party and 
First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon who said to a SNP conference in October 
2016: “Some who voted No believed that staying in the UK offered greater economic 
security, a stronger voice in the world and a guaranteed place in the EU” (Sturgeon 2016). 
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away from Spain and establish independent states. In recent years separatist 
(independence) tendency is especially strong in Catalonia, where this tendency is 
represented not only by radicals but also by the regional government. In 
November 2014 it organised an independence referendum (considered illegal 
and invalid by the Constitutional Court of Spain). Majority of voters, which 
however represented minority of inhabitants of the region, voted for independ-
ence4. The present regional government in office since December 2015 an-
nounced its will to declare independence of Catalonia in 18 months (or by mid- 
-2017) (fig. 4).   
 
 
Fig. 4. Spain 
Source: based on https://www.google.pl/search?q=spain+regions  
It should be underlined that both in Basque Country and Catalonia most 
regionalist (nationalist) leaders, like Scottish nationalists, declare desire that 
their regions (independent countries after independence) remain in the European 
Union. This creates unfavourable conditions for realisation of independence 
                    
4 On November 9, 2014 Catalan government organised an unofficial referendum 
called “public opinion investigation” in which most participants (80%) voted for 
independence but the turnout was well below 50%, see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-29982960. 
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aspirations as it is unlike that the EU, which is after all an intergovernmental 
organisation, would recognise unilaterally declared independence of regions 
belonging to its member states5.  
Other regions with strong ethno-regionalist identities are Galicia, Balearic 
Islands, Valencia (all of them have two official languages) and Canary Islands.  
It should be added that also other regions have their cultural specificity distin-
guishing them from the rest of Spain although with relatively weak ethno-region-
alist movements. 
Belgium. For historical reasons Belgium is a country composed by two big 
ethno-linguistic groups: Flemish (Dutch)-speaking and French-speaking, plus  
a small German-speaking group (fig. 5).  
 
 
Fig. 5. Belgium: ethno-linguistic groups  
Source: based on http://kids.britannica.com/elementary/art-750/ 
The-ethnic-and-linguistic-composition-of-Belgium 
                    
5 See: Brussels says an independent Catalonia would need to leave EU: http://www. 
euractiv.com/video/brussels-independent-catalonia-n-530496. 
Roman Szul 
 
54 
Additionally, what makes the situation even more complicated, the capital 
city Brussels, predominantly French-speaking, is located within the Flemish- 
-speaking territory. After its creation in 1830 Belgium was dominated by French 
speakers, both in political and socio-economic terms (French as the only official 
language of the state and the dominant language of education, culture, business, 
etc.). Flemish speakers were under multiple domination: political, linguistic- 
-cultural and socio-economic as they were predominantly peasants. This multiple 
domination and the feeling of discrimination triggered emancipation and cen-
trifugal tendencies among the Flemings. These resulted in transformation of 
Belgium in the 1990s into a complicated federation composed by three regions: 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, and three linguistic communities: Flemish 
(Dutch), French and German. (Flanders and the Flemish Community have com-
mon government, its headquarters are located in Brussels). The most radical 
demands, especially by Flemish separatists (independentists) encountered an 
insurmountable obstacle: Brussels. Flemish nationalists could not resign from 
Brussels, but at the same time they could not absorb this big French speaking 
city, not mentioning the possible opposition by the French-speaking community 
and inhabitants of Brussels themselves. 
An important role in discouraging tendencies to divide Belgium was the 
attitude of the European Union which warned that in the case of the division and 
the probable conflict around the fate of Brussels, it would withdraw its offices 
from this city (Rossel 1997).   
Italy is a country with relatively strong ethno-regional and linguistic dif-
ferentiation expressed in ethno-regional identities and movements, in some cases 
even in separatist tendencies. This situation has its roots in the complicated 
history of this country, especially in the lack of Italian statehood until the late 
19th century, a statehood which could not culturally and linguistically homo-
genise regions and ethno-linguistic communities which had developed their 
identities during centuries of independent evolution.  
Of special importance is the region Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol with its 
sizable German-speaking population which in the early post-Second World War 
period revealed strong irredentist tendencies. An agreement between Italy and 
Austria (regarded as a kind of protector of interests of German-speaking 
population in this region) and the far reaching autonomy, especially in matters 
related to language and culture, as well as a specific organization of the socio- 
-political life in the region in the form of parallel societies (German-speaking 
and Italian-speaking) put an end to separatism in this region.  
Similar tendencies, although on a smaller scale, were also present in Valle 
d'Aosta whose population claimed to be ethnic French and revealed a desire to 
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be attached to France. Also in this case the autonomy, including recognition of 
French as co-official language of the region, assuaged the situation. Autonomist 
or ethno-regionalist tendencies appeared in other regions too, such as Sicily, 
Sardinia and Friuli-Venezia Giulia resulting in granting formal autonomy to 
these regions and recognition, to some extent, of regional languages (Friulian, 
Sardinian) as well as recognition of Slovenian minority. In recent decades, 
especially in the 1990s, a regionalist movement (alternatively called “Lega 
Nord” or “Padania”) representing socio-economic (and to a lesser extent cultural) 
interests of northern regions, got a salience becoming a considerable element in 
the political life of Italy (fig. 6).  
 
 
Fig. 6. Italy – regions in 2103 
Source: based on http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/ 
lgcolor/itregions.htm 
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It can be said that “Europeanisation” of Italy after the Second World War on 
the one hand instigated regionalist and ethno-regionalist movements, and on the 
other hand helped to channel separatist tendencies into manageable regionalisms. 
In such a way European integration contributed to safeguarding territorial integ-
rity of Italy.  
France is known for its centralism and “Jacobinism” meaning disrespect for 
cultures, languages and identities in French boundaries other than the standard 
Paris-based culture and language and all-national French identity (fig. 7). One of 
results of this is the far advanced process of cultural and linguistic assimilation 
of ethno-regional groups into the French standard. After the Second World War 
ethno-linguistic diversity of France was officially recognised as enriching France. 
In such a way ethno-regionalist movements were legitimised.  
 
 
Fig. 7. France – regional languages  
Source: based on https://www.google.pl/search?q=langue+d% 27oil 
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There appeared several ethno-regionalist movements engaged in protection of 
regional languages and cultures. One can mention Occitan, Breton, Basque, 
Alsatian, Corsican and other movements in continental France (including 
Corsica). One of their expressions is establishment of schools in which regional 
languages are taught (although the number of children in these schools represent 
only a small fraction of school children in these regions). In one case, namely of 
Corsica, the movement took a more radical form of separatism combined with 
criminal activities, before it faded out squeezed by security forces and a lack of 
wide-spread support by the Corsican population.  
Other Western European EU member countries. Ethno-regionalist iden-
tities and movements, stronger or weaker, exist practically in all Western Euro-
pean countries. For instance, in Germany we can mention Bavaria with its strong 
regional identity and a specific folk culture, a multi-regional movement for 
safeguarding the Low German language (Plattdeutsch) in the north of Germany, 
as well as the two recognised national minorities: Danish in Schleswig-Holstein 
and Sorbian in Saxony and Brandenburg. In the Netherland Friesland distin-
guishes itself for having two official languages: the regional Friesian language 
apart from the all-national Dutch language. We can also speak of a Limburger 
ethno-regionalism given the official recognition of its idiom as a regional 
language. In Sweden extreme regions: Scania in the south and Lapland in the 
north differ from the rest of Sweden for their specific languages and identities. 
Lapland or Sami region stretches over the other Nordic countries: Norway and 
Finland. In Finland Swedish speaking areas in Aland Islands and in the continent 
enjoy a special status. Even in the ethnically homogeneous Portugal a regional 
idiom was recognised as a “regional language” (Mirandés, in the north-east, 
around the town of Miranda do Douro). Denmark represents a peculiar case of 
an EU member state whose parts: Greenland and Faroe Islands enjoy autonomy 
to the extent that they have left the EU (without leaving Denmark). In the 
Republic of Ireland there are, still shrinking, areas called Gaeltacht, meant to 
protect the Irish language. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, West European countries are 
characterised by presence, and even rise in the postwar period, of ethno-region-
alist identities and movements. In some cases they have grown to separatist or 
independence movements, like in Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque Country or 
Flanders. Nowhere, however, this has led to disintegration of a state. This can be 
attributed, among other things, to European integration and to the EU itself. 
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5. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
OF EUROPEAN STATES OUTSIDE THE EU 
When analysing the relationship between the European Union (as the main 
manifestation of European integration) and the fates of non-EU European states, 
especially from central-eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War6, one can 
draw two conclusions: 
– the EU (as an organisation) undertook conscious actions (not always 
successful) for maintenance of territorial integrity of states  
– the EU (more as an idea than as an organisation) exerted unconscious and 
unplanned influence leading to disintegration of some states (tearing effects of 
the attraction force of the EU). 
Disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union until its disintegration 
was a federation composed by a number of “republics”, with Russia being the 
biggest and politically the strongest, stretching from central Europe to Caucasus, 
Central Asia and Far East (fig. 8). It was not only a vast territory but also,  
a multi-cultural (multi-civilisational) area. Among differences between republics- 
-members of the USSR of crucial importance were: the feeling of belonging to 
the Western (European) civilisation or the lack thereof, and the intensity of 
national identity in relation to the all-Soviet identity. Of relevance was also the 
geographical location of republics, but it was highly correlated with the two 
above characteristics. 
 
 
Fig. 8. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 
Source: based on https://www.google.pl/search?q=soviet+union&clien 
                    
6 An in-depth analysis of changes of state territories in Central and Eastern Europe 
after 1989 and before the 2014 crisis in Ukraine is presented by M. Sobczyński (2013). 
His analysis, however, does not touch directly the role of the European Union. 
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Three republics located in the western part of the USSR, at the Baltic Sea: 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, distinguished themselves from the rest of the 
USSR by the two characteristics: strong feeling of belonging to the Western 
civilisation (in contrast to predominantly Christian-Orthodox or Muslim repub-
lics of the rest of the USSR, these three were mostly Catholic or Protestant), and 
by strong national identity and weak (if not negative) Soviet identity. These 
characteristics made them wishing to leave the Soviet Union and join “Europe” 
(the European Union) when the “window of opportunity” opened with the 
glasnost and perestroika in mid-1980s. National emancipation and independence 
movements in these three republics disproportionately highly contributed to the 
final disintegration of the USSR. In such a way, the European Union, as an idea, 
unconsciously and indirectly contributed to the breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
Yugoslavia. The case of Yugoslavia is similar to that of the Soviet Union in 
that in both cases there were federal multi-cultural states with a part of “repub-
lics” (members of federations) defining themselves as belonging to western 
civilisation and considering that leaving the federation would enable them to 
fulfill their pro-European aspirations (fig. 9). In the case of Yugoslavia these 
were Slovenia and Croatia. The declaration of independence in 1991 of these 
two republics started the process of disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. 
One of elements which encouraged leaders of these two republics to leave 
Yugoslavia were rules of the game in the integrating Europe (in the European 
Union) which excluded territorial claims. What in the past, during the estab-
lishment of the “first Yugoslavia” after the First World War, and then of the 
“second Yugoslavia” after the Second World War, pushed Slovenians and 
Croats to ally with Serbs to form Yugoslavia, were to strengthen their position in 
conflicts over territories with their neighbours, especially with Italia over Istria 
and Adriatic Sea coast.  
Sometimes the aim of Slovenians and Croats was to gain the contested 
territory, sometimes to defend it. Given that almost the whole disputed territory 
after the Second World War belonged to Slovenia/Croatia, these republics had 
practically nothing to gain and their principle aim was to secure the status quo. 
Rules of the game in the EU eliminating territorial claims of one member state 
against another assuaged fears of Slovenians and Croats, and made their alliance 
with Serbs useless. (It can be said that the same rules dispelled Polish fears when 
breaking away from the Soviet block and joining the UE). Given the political 
situation in Yugoslavia at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s this alliance was more 
than useless, it was a burden. In such a way the European Union indirectly (and 
some EU countries directly by diplomatic support for Slovenia and Croatia) 
encouraged these two republics to break away from Yugoslavia. Unlike most of 
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the post-Soviet states, most post-Yugoslav states does express desire to join the 
EU, so the attitude towards the EU was not so strong factor tearing apart Yugo-
slavia. The problem was, however, that the readiness of individual republics to 
join “Europe” was different, and the two most ready did not want to wait for the 
others. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991  
Source: based on http://www.icty.org/sid/321 
Of course, disintegration of Yugoslavia was a complicated phenomenon that 
cannot be reduced to just one factor – the passive role of the European Union. 
The aim of the above discussion was only to point out to existence of this factor, 
as one of more ones.  
Czechoslovakia. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia, which came into 
effect in 1993 and was negotiated earlier, deserves a special comment as it 
strongly differed from the two above cases (fig. 10)7. One can hardly speak of 
cultural differences and different attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks towards 
Europe. What is more, the vast majority of Czechs and Slovaks were against 
                    
7 An interesting analysis of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia is presented by Belgian 
scholar H. Rossel (1997), who compared cases of Czechoslovakia and Belgium in times 
when events in Czechoslovakia were closely watched in Belgium as many Belgians 
expected (feared) that Belgium would follow Czechoslovakia. 
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dissolution of their common state, Czechoslovakia. (For this reason, there was 
no referendum on dissolution of the federation, and the decision was confirmed 
by the parliament only). The driving force behind the dissolution of Czecho-
slovakia were personal ambitions of two politicians – Czech Václav Klaus and 
Slovak Vladimír Mečiar, heading two parties active in their respective republics, 
and their diverging views how to run the economy (Klaus advocated free market 
liberal model while Mečiar social-democratic approach). Being leaders of the 
two most successful parties they decided to divide the federation. This decision 
was pushed through the parliament. The European Union, as an organisation by 
its diplomats, unsuccessfully tried to dissuade the two men from dividing 
Czechoslovakia.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Czechoslovakia, 1969–1990  
Source: based on https://www.google.pl/search?q=czechoslovakia+map 
The European Union could not, or did not want to, use its most convincing 
argument: the threat that dividing Czechoslovakia would block the way to the 
EU for the successor states. The European Union, unwittingly, alleviated the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia offering a model of inter-state relations in which 
national borders are not obstacles for free movement of peoples (apart from 
goods, capitals, etc.). The promise of openness of the future Czech-Slovak 
border and equal treatment of Czechs and Slovaks in both states (including the 
treatment of the Czech language in Slovakia and Slovak in Czechia as the local 
language without any test of language competencies) were enough convincing 
that possible opponents to the dissolution did not undertake actions to stop the 
dissolution.  
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Serbia-Montenegro. The role of the European Union in the dissolution of 
the federal state of Serbia and Montenegro (2006) consisted, on the one hand, in 
unintentional contributing to separation of Montenegro from Serbia, and, on the 
other hand, in intentional attempts either to stop this dissolution or to make it 
“civilised”. For the small Montenegro, independence was a way of getting rid of 
links with Serbia undergoing hardships after the collapse of Yugoslavia and 
suffering from sanctions imposed by Western powers for its activities in Kosovo. 
As independent state Montenegro had more chances to profit from contacts with 
the EU. One of evidences of cooperation of Montenegro with the EU was adop-
tion by Montenegro (still being member of the Serbia-Montenegro federation) of 
the euro, tolerated by the EU. Independence would even further enlarge chances 
for profitable relations with the EU. As to the final dissolution of Serbia-
Montenegro, EU diplomacy required that the dissolution had to be confirmed in 
referendum in Montenegro by a “clear majority” of at least 55% of voters. By 
setting this threshold, instead of usual simple majority, the EU in a way 
discouraged Montenegrins from secession, but, at the same time, by promising 
to recognise independence of Montenegro after the referendum, the EU paved 
the way for Montenegro's independence. The final result of the referendum was 
slightly more than 55% for independence. 
Macedonia. The inter-ethnic conflict in the post-Yugoslav republic of Ma-
cedonia in the early 2000s, between Macedonians and Albanians, threaten 
territorial integrity of this multi-ethnic state. Radical Albanian irredentists, 
encouraged by successes of Albanian separatist in the neighbouring Kosovo, 
supported by a part of the Albanian population claiming discrimination by 
Macedonian authorities, started a guerrilla war against Macedonia. The direct 
involvement of EU diplomacy (its “special envoy” Javier Solana) helped to find 
a solution accepted by the two parties which enlarged rights of the Albanian 
minority while retaining predominantly Macedonian character of the state. One 
of elements of this agreement was to avoid “cantonisation” of the country 
(division into ethnic cantons).  
Secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Events that led to the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo from Serbia (2008) were largely beyond the control of 
the European Union, and unlike other cases, possible joining of the EU by the 
secession country was not a meaningful reason of the secession. As regards the 
role of the EU in this secession, it can be only mentioned the failed attempt by  
a European diplomat to negotiate an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Consequently, the EU turned out to be too weak or not willing to influence the 
situation in one of European countries outside its boundaries. On the contrary, 
separation of Kosovo has some impact on the EU revealing differences among 
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EU members towards the issue of unilateral declaration of independence by  
a region of a state8.  
Ukraine represents the most complicated case of the role of the European 
Union in unintentional encouraging separatist tendencies and in intentional 
efforts to safe territorial integrity of a state (fig. 11).  
 
 
Fig. 11. Ukraine (before 2014) 
Source: based on https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethnolingusitic_ 
map_of_ukraine.png 
There have been at least three crucial moments in the latest history of 
Ukraine where territorial integrity of this state was under threat and in which the 
EU played an important role. The first was the so called “orange revolution” in 
2004/2005 where, following presidential election, there was a serious conflict 
between the two camps representing two presidential candidates and more 
importantly, two parts of this ethnically mixed country. Mediation of the then 
Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, together with former president of the 
European parliament, Pat Cox, helped to reach a compromise and end the 
conflict. It is worth underlining that the mission of Kwaśniewski – Cox was 
officially backed by the European Union. Consequently, it can be said that in 
                    
8 A detailed comparison of the cases of Kosovo's (2008) and Crimea's (2014) 
independence declarations and inconsistent reactions to these two cases internationally is 
presented by A. Violante (2014).  
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that case the EU played an active and intentional role in protecting peace and 
maybe territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
The second moment was in November – December 2013 and at the beginning 
of 2014. In 2013 Ukraine negotiated association agreement with the EU. At the 
same time Russia offered Ukraine “stick and carrot” to dissuade it from 
association with the EU. Conditions offered to Ukraine by the EU were far from 
being satisfactory for Ukrainian president Yanukovych (especially when one 
takes into consideration Russian threats of economic sanctions in the case of 
signing agreement with the EU). One can suppose that EU’s restraint in offering 
Ukraine better conditions was motivated by the desire not to antagonise Russia, 
and not to waste money in the hopelessly inefficient and corrupted Ukrainian 
economy. In such circumstances president Yanukovych refused to sign the 
association agreement. This decision was regarded by a part of Ukrainians, 
especially in western regions, as rejection by the president of association with 
the European Union and, in general, as breaking links with Europe. This 
triggered protests centered in the prolonged confrontation between protesters and 
government forces in Kiev Independence Square (Maidan in Ukrainian) which 
culminated in bloody clashes and toppling down of president Yanukovych at the 
beginning of 2014. The main demand of protesters was to force Ukrainian 
authorities to take pro-European course. Protesters were also encouraged by 
politicians from EU countries coming to Maidan and creating impression that 
the European Union would welcome Ukraine. The direct result of events in Kiev 
was the secession of Crimea and its incorporation/annexation by Russia, and the 
revolt in the eastern-most regions of Ukraine – Luhansk and Donetsk. 
Considering the role of the European Union in these events it can be said, first, 
that the EU as the idea divided the Ukrainian society – one part of it wanted to 
join (associate with) Europe while the other preferred integration with Russia, 
and second, that the EU as an institution was partly responsible for the crisis by 
not offering conditions of association that would offset the Russian offer, as well 
as for not correcting the false illusions made by some politicians from EU 
countries as if the EU supported the anti-government protests. It can be added 
that EU diplomacy failed to peacefully settle the conflict at Maidan. In such  
a way, the EU, unwittingly, contributed to the (partial) disintegration of Ukraine.  
The third moment came immediately after the second. The secession of 
Crimea, revolt in Luhansk and Donetsk together with a pressure from Russia and 
the pro-Russian sentiments in the east of the country made that Ukraine was 
faced with a threat of losing further regions or even with a total collapse. In this 
critical moment the European Union demonstrated its solidarity and support for 
Ukraine. Among its expressions were sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, 
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extraordinary supplies of natural gas to Ukraine and diplomatic mediation (the 
so called Minsk negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France) 
which meant that Ukraine was not left alone. Although the leading role was 
played by some EU countries (especially Germany), but the fact that the EU as  
a whole supported these activities can be interpreted as an EU action. In such  
a way, the EU as an institution consciously help Ukraine to defend its existence 
and to stop the process of unraveling the country. 
6. FINAL REMARKS 
Summing up the previous discussions it can be said that the European Union: 
– favours regionalisms in its member states but only until the moment when 
they transform themselves into separatist/independence movements,  
– successfully stabilizes situation within member states. 
Outside its boundaries it acts in an ambiguous way:  
– unconsciously contributes to disintegration of non-member states,  
– consciously tries to preserve territorial integrity, with various results, as 
sometimes it lacks real will or lacks effective instruments to influence behav-
iours of political actors. 
An interesting test of the role of the European Union in relation to in-
dependence/separatist tendencies will the fate of Scotland after Brexit. In 2014, 
when United Kingdom was still member of the EU, the perspective of leaving 
the UK which maybe would have meant leaving the EU, discouraged some 
Scotts in the referendum from voting for independence and thus saved unity of 
the United Kingdom. After Brexit, the attraction force of the EU will act against 
unity of the UK and for independence of Scotland. In such a situation several 
scenarios can be imagined: “business as usual” (no change in the place of 
Scotland in the UK), “devomax” (or maximal devolution of power of the UK 
central government towards the devolved Scottish government) without formal 
representation of Scotland in the EU, “devomax” with a formal representation of 
Scotland in the EU, independence of Scotland and its UE membership. The least 
probable scenario seems to be the “business as usual”, and the main question 
seems to be weather Scotland will gain a form of presence in the EU9.  
                    
9 Scottish First Minister and leader of Scottish National Party Nicola Sturgeon 
(Sturgeon 2016b) in a speech to an SNP conference left no doubt: if conditions of Brexit 
are disadvantageous for Scotland, Scottish government will exploit any way to secure 
Scotland's interests in the EU, including demanding powers to strike international deals: 
“As well as Parliamentary action, over the next few weeks we will table specific 
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proposals to protect Scotland's interests in Europe and keep us in the single market  
– even if the rest of the UK decides to leave. [...] So the Scottish Government will set out  
a plan for Scotland. [...] We will seek to make this plan a key element of the UK's 
Article 50 negotiation. It will require substantial additional powers for the Scottish 
Parliament. All the powers in our areas of responsibility that currently lie with the EU  
– and significant new powers too. Powers to strike international deals. And greater 
powers over immigration. Powers not just to protect our economy, but also our values”. 
Antonio VIOLANTE 
Department of Cultural Heritage and Environment 
University of Milan, ITALY 
No. 13 
THE NEW BALKAN ANTEMURALE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the second half of the 2015 an all the way into the first three months of 
2016 the number of those exiled1 coming from Turkey towards Europe and in 
need of international protection has grown exponentially compared to previous 
periods. According to the data provided by UNHCR, during 2015 there were 
856,723 registered arrivals from the sea, while since January 1st to May 2016 
there were 154,914; around 49% of the arrivals have been from Syria, 26% from 
Afghanistan and 16% from Iraq2. The most frequently used itinerary was the  
so-called Balkan route, from Turkey towards Greece and then Macedonia, 
Serbia. From there the asylum seekers have tried to re-enter the Schengen space 
by reaching Hungary, or alternatively, Croatia then Slovenia, in order to reach 
their ultimate target, the countries of north and central Europe. The elevated 
percentage of women (21%) and children (37%) – whereas men were 41% – 
                        
1 There is a base of uncertainty in Europe over how to name those who are part of the 
anthropic movement in Asia, running from wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. They are 
defined migrants, extra-communitarians, refugees, asylum seekers, runaways, often 
using one or the other term carelessly, as if they were synonyms. However, the meaning 
differences are profound: “migrants” is a generic term that does not describe the reality 
of those running from wars in their countries; “extra-communitarians” now is a deroga-
tory term, despite the fact that half of the world population that does not have a citizen-
ship of one of the 28 European countries can respond to that name; “refugees” involves 
the recognition of a “status” that gives the right to protection, that however those who 
have entered Europe still have not obtained. Therefore, we could agree on the term 
suggested by Paolo Rumiz: “exiled” (Rumiz 2016, p. 5) despite the fact that the media or 
publications regarding this issue do not seem to use it. 
2 Refugee/Migrants Emergency Response – Greece, 3 May 2016 (http://data.unhcr. 
org/mediterranean).  
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documented by the UNHCR proves that these were refugees in need of inter-
national protection and not economic migrations3.  
The EU structure, the single states' governments and the citizens of the 
countries involved were unprepared for the size of these migratory phenomena, 
unprecedented in the history of Europe, ever since the Cold War. Yet in that age 
those running away from communist Europe were welcomed benevolently in the 
West, at first as a welcome guest and then rapidly introduced into the society of 
the Country chosen as new home by the refugee. In those years the western 
world accepted on its territory those coming from society with failing systems, 
feeling as the depositary of a way of life that was so “right” and exuding wealth 
that it could allow generosity acts of accepting without any reserve those who 
were unlucky enough to live oppressed by “wrong” political regimes. Even in 
front of the waves of refugees running from ex-Yugoslav civil wars during the 
1990s, the rest of the continent accepted those new refugees without discrimina-
tion over their nationality and religion. On the other hand, in 2015 and 2016, those 
asking for asylum and running from current wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan 
were considered an issue of public order to be eliminated as soon as possible; the 
priority of European governments was to contrast the phenomena and close – or 
at least control – the state borders despite the Schengen regime4, instead of 
attempting to ensure satisfying humanitarian conditions to the refugees.  
2. THE BALKAN ROUTE 
In particular, since 2015 the xenophobe political parties and those putting the 
migrants issue at the top of their program lists are gaining credibility in the 
continent. There is the will to stop the affluence, especially of Muslims and 
                        
3 http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 (accessed September 2016).  
4 The control of borders is done following criteria whose rules are variable according 
to the current situation. The author's experience – in September 2016 – saw that during 
the passage between Italy and Switzerland, even without documents control (that the 
Schengen agreement excludes for the adhering countries) the Swiss police looks 
carefully the vehicles coming from Italy, while there is nobody doing the same on the 
opposite route from Switzerland to Italy, lacking in any sort of control. Obviously mere 
looks are inadequate to establish anyone's identity yet are sufficient to see if there are 
people of colour aboard, or anyway people with non-European traits: if found, those 
corresponding to that description would have been immediately checked. Such an 
“asymmetric” procedure could be explained by the fact that Italy is a country of arrival 
for migrants and refugees and has a persistent anthropic movement towards central and 
northern Europe, while there is no such phenomena from Switzerland to Italy. 
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without making the distinction between economic migrants and those asking for 
asylum because they are running from wars or various discriminations (political, 
religious, sexual, etc). On the contrary, the idea that the increase of immigration 
and manifestations of Islamic terrorism are related is gaining consent5.  
Aside from Brussels' institutional intentions, Europe is shifting from “conti-
nent without borders” with free movement of people (and goods) to a group of 
states more and more oriented to guard their own borders. The proof of this 
theory is the construction or the mere announcement of the intention to make 
interior barriers that were almost completely gone after the end of the cold war, 
and the reinstating of border controls that will prevent the free circulation 
between states, even inside the Schengen area. These new measures are not the 
result of decisions shared between various countries. They are not instated by 
countries at southern and south-east borders of Europe that do absorb the 
immediate impact of the arrivals (Italy and Greece). On the contrary, they are 
wanted by the “intermediate” countries that lay between outside EU borders and 
that are the main destination target of the migrants and asylum seekers. A part of 
the ruling political class in these countries induces the public opinion to fear that 
such an anthropic flux will bring: 1) upturn of the existent social order; 2) costs 
that are impossible to sustain in their economies if there were to be assistance 
measures for the migrants, even if they are just passing through; 3) a reduction 
of work offer for the locals in favour of the newcomers; 4) the terrorists that 
could be mixed in the migrants’ masses could convey Islamic Jihad. 
                        
5 A humanitarian shelter to anyone who is in need of it does not require the 
knowledge of the religion of the person. Consequently, there is the belief that those 
asking for asylum in Europe are only masses of Muslims, possibly bringing religious 
fanaticism. But in reality, Iraq and especially Syria were inhabited by millions of laical 
middle-class citizens with a large component of Christians. Anyway, the proposal of  
a selective shelter based on religion arrived even from highest institutions. The Slovak 
Prime minister Robert Fico expressed his opinion in 2015 in regard to Europe being 
menaced by an onslaught of migrants: he claimed that if his country accepted forced 
distribution of asylum-seekers under an EU quota system, “we will wake up one day and 
have 100,000 people from the Arab world and that is a problem I would not like 
Slovakia to have” (Cameron 2015). The fact that he had used the term “Arabs” as 
synonym of “Muslims” is obvious from his availability announced soon after to give 
shelter to 200 Christians in Slovakia. The Czech President Miloš Zeman in 2011 had 
defined Islam as the “enemy of Euro-Atlantic civilisation”. “Calling someone a moderate 
Muslim is like calling someone a moderate Nazi” (Cameron 2015). Furthermore, at the 
beginning of September 2011 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Cyprus, Socratis 
Hasikos, declared that his Country would accept 300 refugees of Christian-Orthodox 
religion (Franco 2016, p. 78).  
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Therefore a reset of the controls inside the Schengen area or of physical 
barriers were announced, projected or produced in France (close to the Italian 
border nearby Ventimiglia), Austria (Brenner), Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary (next 
to the border with Serbia), Bulgaria. The building of these “walls” is opposed by 
those states where those anthropic masses are just passing by, aiming to establish 
themselves elsewhere. These “transit” countries do not intend to register the 
migrants and asylum seekers in their own territories, and they demand that they 
cross the territory in shortest time possible and without leaving traces of their 
passage, in order not to have to take care of the asylum demands and humani-
tarian assistance that the refugees are entitled to according to international 
norms, in accordance with the Dublin Regulation6. 
This way the interests of those states coincide with those of the migrants who 
wish not to register themselves on the territory of the countries they first reach or 
transit through. In fact, they aspire to an identification in their definitive 
                        
6 Dublin III Regulation, aligned with the principles of the 1951 Geneva UN Refugee 
Convention, has been adopted by the EU and also by non-member countries such as 
Switzerland and Norway, valid since July 19th 2013. It prohibits the requests of asylum 
in more than one country, and the request has to be examined in the state the applicant 
entered first. The Dublin Regulation has been criticized by the European Council  
on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and by the United Nations High Commissioner  
for Refugees (UNHCR) (http://www.refworld.org/decid/49c0ca922.html, accessed Sep-
tember 2016), since the system cannot guarantee reasonable timeframes of examination 
of the asylum seekers' requests, sometimes solved only after years of waiting: further-
more this norm does not consider the needs of family reunifications, and it weighs 
heavily on southern EU countries such as Italy and Greece, being these two the main 
entrance to the continent. According to the Dublin Regulation, if those who present 
requests of asylum in one EU country enter another, they need to be sent back to the 
former country. Consequently, in 2015 Hungary was overwhelmed by asylum requests 
by refugees of Asian origin, and since June 23rd of the same year has denied those 
entering from Serbia after passing through other EU countries. On the other hand, since 
August 24th of this year decided not to apply the Dublin Regulation to Syrian refugees, 
preferring to examine on its own territory their asylum requests. Other member states 
such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary itself denied their availability 
to discuss the contents of the Dublin Regulation, and on the other hand they refused to 
introduce quotas of refugees to be accepted that were decided within the Community  
(in regard to this: Migrant crisis: Hungary migrants start walk to border – BBC News,  
on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34155701, accessed on September 2016). 
Therefore, in front of this anthropic movement whose impact upon Europe could not 
have been foreseen, the EU countries consider it a public order emergency and therefore 
do not apply the currently valid international treaties, or have refused to introduce 
common measures, preferring to protect national interests. 
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destination countries and not those who give them immediate refuge, in order 
not to be forced to remain there.  
This situation has led to a “rebordering” of the interstate borders inside EU, 
especially those inside the Schengen space that were de facto declassed (prior  
to the 2015 migratory crisis) to mere administrative boundaries. But this 
rebordering that again re-stiffened the borders after the end of the cold war and 
brought back walls inside the continent, is really the result of unilateral decisions 
of single states, both against the Schengen norms and the will of the country on 
the other side of the wall. Such initiatives not only interrupt the Schengen free 
circulation, but obviously slow down also the circulation of goods both on roads 
and rails because of the reinstatement of inter-border controls, resulting in an 
increase of costs of transport and damage to the economy. These “unilateral” 
walls are built or are announced to be built all over Europe: in Calais between 
France and UK, Brenner between Austria and Italy, and on the passage between 
Denmark and Sweden. But they are visible especially on roads and in the 
branches of the so-called “Balkan route”.  
FYROM has built a barrier on the Greek border next to Idomeni, considering 
that Greece does not have any interest in keeping migrants and refugees coming 
from Turkey on its territory7. Also, the Budapest government has opposed 
entrance to those who are incoming from Serbia, in front of the possibility of the 
migrants taking residence in Hungary. For this reason, this country – first among 
the Schengen states – has built a barbed wire wall next to the Serbian border 
between August and September 2015. Its government, lead by Viktor Orbán, has 
opposed the plan for displacement of quotas of 160,000 migrants between the 
EU countries, located mostly in Greece and Italy, announced in September 2015 
by the European Commission. The Hungarian Prime minister challenged 
Brussels over the displacements, declaring that “it is not possible to redesign the 
cultural and religious identities of Europe”. He held a referendum on October 2nd 
2016 against the European plan of quotas displacement where the xenophobe 
                        
7 The informal Idomeni camp has been forcibly removed by the Greek police in the 
last week of May 2016, when it had over 8.000 refugees trying to reach the heart of 
Europe. Over one of the tents there someone had wrote “We want to go to Germany”, 
which speaks volumes as to the intentions of the asylum seekers (Greek police move to 
shut down Idomeni refugee camp, 25 May 2016, on http://www.aljazeera.com/news 
/2016/05/greece-begins-idomeni-refugee-camp-evacuation-160524051404401.html, ac-
cessed September 2016). Their destiny was probably different from that wishful 
thinking: after the transfer to government camps, and following an identification, there 
was no transfer to Germany or another country of the so-called rich Europe, but an 
asylum in Greece or an expulsion in Turkey.  
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imprint is immediately visible in the way the question was posed: “Do you wish 
for the EU to prescribe the forced displacement of non-Hungarian citizens in 
Hungary without the approval of the Hungarian parliament?”8. Prior to vote, 
Orbán covered the streets of the country with posters inviting citizens to rebel to 
the EU. Furthermore, he declared that Hungary was in war with two entities at 
the same time: migrants and Brussels9.Other xenophobe initiatives have been put 
in place by Croatia, Slovenia and Austria, that in front of a possible deviation of 
the migration flux towards their territories have announced or actuated measures 
that would “seal” their borders, in order to take back control of them: such an 
initiative was not legal for Slovenia and Austria who adhere to Schengen, that 
allows free circulation of people with limited interruptions only in case of 
exceptional events. 
These re-examinations of controls on interstate borders are sometimes ac-
companied by political overturns that were unimaginable prior to the intensi-
fication of migrations, especially along the Balkan route, caused mainly by 
waves of Syrian refugees that were no longer accepted in Turkey since 2015. In 
fact, Austria saw the xenophobe party lead by Haider win the first electoral turn: 
he set his whole campaign upon the defence of national borders from the 
migrants' menace.  
3. THE EXTRA-COMMUNITY BALKANS  
AND THE SCHENGEN EUROPE 
After the political elections in spring of 2016, Serbia saw the Serbian 
Progressive Party (SNS) win the majority of parliament seats in Belgrade, lead 
by the prime minister Aleksandar Vučić. This politician had started his career in 
the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) lead by Vojislav Šešelj, a fervent nationalist, 
promoter of the “Great Serbia” political project and party companion of Vučić 
until 2008. The current prime minister has changed his positions afterwards to 
moderate and pro-European, opposed to those of the nationalist right wing lead 
                        
8 As it was easily predictable, the overwhelming majority of voters – 98% – have 
voted against the foreigners and against EU. However, this referendum, irrelevant to the 
European institutions, has not produced any effects upon Hungarian laws because it 
failed to reach its quorum. In fact, according to the local Constitution, the only valid 
referendums are those who see at least half plus one of the votes among those who have 
the right to vote, while in this case there were only 43%. 
9 Information from Z. Hajdu, who discusses this situation in this volume. 
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by Šešelj and pursuing a EU-hostile policy, oriented towards a closer friendship 
with Putin's Russia, united by an anti-western vision. 
In regard to this topic, it is significant to examine the reactions of Russia and 
of the USA after the Serbian Progressive Party's win. While the congratulations 
extended by the Russian prime minister Dimitry Medvedev to his colleague 
Vučić were merely formal, inside the limits of diplomatic courtesy, the USA 
secretary of state John Kerry touched tangible issues, functional to a significant 
encouragement of Serbia's getting closer to the USA and generally to the West. 
In fact, Kerry's message mentioned America's availability to sustain Serbia in the 
promotion of rights, the fight against corruption, economy development and 
above all, wishes for Serbia to “normalise their relationship with Kosovo” 
(Janjić 2016). When we translate from the diplomatic language the latter, this 
means soliciting Serbia to recognise Kosovo's independence and that up to 2016 
still had not been accepted, in order to conform Belgrade's position to the one 
upheld by almost all Western countries.  
These signals of Serbia's approach to the West indicate Serbia's full will to 
integrate into “the important Europe”, if Belgrade works on contrasting migra-
tory fluxes that march along the “Balkan route”. This does not come without  
a do ut des: it comes with a prospective of a more rapid admission into the EU, 
perceived as a club of the privileged whose membership is really a social 
upgrade. Therefore, Serbia as “guardian” at the doorstep of the rich West, whose 
role is to control the entrance doors in front of masses of foreigners that push 
Europe's borders in the attempt to take part in its wealth. Such a myth of being 
antemurale against the menace of an external invasion, is well known in Europe 
and studied by the Norwegian Pål Kolstø who described its characteristics:  
The murus, or “wall”, is of course the ultimate boundary metaphor, the last 
line of defence of cosmos or order, against the forces of chaos or disorder. The 
antemurale myth, then, stresses not only that the group as an integral part of the 
true civilization, but also that it represents i t s  very outpost . As this “wall” 
throughout history has been assailed time and again by the dark forces of the 
other side, the group has been chosen by divine providence to sacrifice itself in 
order to save the larger civilization of which it is a part (Kolstø 2005, p. 20). 
In particular, according to P. Kolstø's (2005, p. 25) reflections, “some Ortho-
dox peoples, such as the Serbs, may find themselves the last bastion, ante-
murale, in relation to Islamic world”. We could safely conclude that Serbia is 
looking to assume the role of Western Europe's bulwark in front of a Muslim 
invasion coming from the East, as it happened in past centuries even if it is in  
a not purely dramatic context (for the defenders), in the so-called Balkan route 
of Muslim population running from 2015 and 2016 wars. Such a value of  
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a western antemurale is particularly felt in the Serbian mentality, as it showed, 
and is a part of this nation's identity. Such value had been lost momentarily with 
the wars at the end of the 20th century that culminated in the conflict between 
Serbia and the NATO, with the latter perceived as the armed arm of the West, 
relegating the Balkan state among its enemies. But even then the ruling class 
prior to Milošević's fall characterised Yugoslavia as the strongest and most 
relentless European barrier against the menace of the USA colonialism10. 
However, this new anti-American position did not stop the then Yugoslav 
president Vojislav Koštunica from proposing his country to the West as the new 
antemurale against global terrorism immediately after the 9/11 (Antić 2005,  
p. 202)11. On the other hand, with the new migrations coming from Asia, Serbia 
can reclaim its previous function of the defender of the West, like in the past 
centuries facing the Ottoman menace and also during the Cold War with the 
Soviet threat. 
We can perceive a signal of this intention to change in Serbia's attitude in the 
closure of the aid centre for the refugees in Belgrade that was built in August 
2015. It was situated in the Mostarska street 5 and called “Refugee Aid 
Miksalište”, and founded by a group of volunteers that wanted to assist the 
transiting refugees. Even after the Balkan route was closed in March 2016, the 
centre still helped hundreds of refugees that were blocked in the city. This 
initiative was supported by public and private institutions, such as the Swiss 
Embassy in Serbia, Caritas, other religious associations and NGO-s. However, 
the municipal council had decreed that the centre situated between the right 
Sava’s shore and some old unused railways should be dismantled in order to 
make space to a controversial project named “Beograd na vodi”, tendered to  
a private company from the UAE, contrasted by the local civil society but 
supported by the prime minister's party (Corridore 2016). 
                        
10 This refers to a speech given by Milošević in Berane, Montenegro, in September 
2000, as A. Antić (2005, p. 198) Reminds. According to the author, back “the media 
loyal to the regime warned the US colonialism was threatening Europe's integrity and 
humanistic value system, its civilisational and political traditions and its independent 
decision-making role in the world affairs” (Antić 2005, p. 198).  
11 This new availability of the ruling class, especially the Serbian one, was not 
entirely shared by the remaining public opinion, which was fiercely anti-American even 
after 9/11 (Violante 2013). Without claiming that the author’s opinion on such topic has 
any statistic value, he remembers that while at the university of Belgrade in 2001 where 
he was teaching at the Philology Faculty, there was no solidarity towards the Americans 
in the comments that followed the attack, nor there was any satisfaction in offers of 
collaboration: on the contrary, the comments were quite poisonous over the fact that 
after the 1999 bombings against Yugoslavia, the USA deserved what happened to them.  
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This is a new role for Serbia: instead of favouring the outflow of refugees 
towards Croatia and Hungary, as it should happen if Serbia chose to pursue 
uniquely its own national interests, they are trying to keep them on their territory 
despite the impossibility to offer comfort and complete assistance. Therefore, 
Serbia is now “at EU's service” trying to contain human masses that are pushing 
her borders, exactly as in the past when Serbia was a bulwark against the eastern 
invasions. Consequently, the situation created is even more of a paradox: in front 
of an internally divided European Union that is incapable of expressing  
a common line of action because it is overwhelmed by nationalistic egoisms  
of its member states, Serbia is stepping up as the containment barrier, “the bot-
tleneck” along with FYROM for the masses of asylum seekers that arrive in 
Schengen Hungary in minimum measure. This is certainly not an entirely self-
less availability to conform to the Union’s needs, but it aims to favour a more 
rapid annexion into the EU.  
Since the 2016 spring the vigilance at the Albanian border with Greece has 
been increased because of the possibility of the refugees' flux towards the 
Schengen area could pass through Albania and then the Strait of Otranto, since 
the itinerary across FYROM and Serbia had been closed. 
Yet such prospective is seen by the Albanian government with ill-concealed 
satisfaction, more than being a possible source of worry. In fact, Albania faces 
the eventuality of the end of those times where Albanians were pushing the 
Western Europe's borders at first in order to escape the oppression of a totali-
tarian state and then as economic migrants looking for a better future. This was 
happening while both the neighbouring Italy and the European institutions were 
trying to contrast that phenomenon by making the visas requirements difficult if 
not impossible to satisfy, along with other bureaucratic measures aiming to 
discourage immigration.  
Yet today Albania's vigilance on the Greek borders, monitoring a possible 
incoming flux of refugees and Asian migrants, appears to put the country on the 
other side of the wall, the privileged and wealthy one, where it is important to 
stay vigil and avoid others' intrusions aiming to share such wealth. This situation 
stands despite the fact that Albania, not differently from FYROM and Serbia, 
can assume only the role of the transit periphery towards the heart of the 
continent and most certainly not that of a destination country. 
In such context, Albania asks for an “au pair” collaboration with the EU, 
giving its availability to perform also a humanitarian role towards the refugees 
and Asian migrants. Such a helping hand towards Bruxelles does not come 
without strings attached: it gives Tirana a further push towards the goal, which is 
joining the EU.  
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Therefore, in spring 2016 the most monitored border is the Greek one, 
especially near Kapshticë. In regard to this issue, the March 2016 declaration of 
the minister of internal affairs of Albania Saimir Tahiri is quite clear: “it is 
human that, when it happens, without a common solution there will be problems 
not only for Albania, but for the whole of Europe”. Albania's government has 
cleared that the country will not shut down its borders in front of a refugees flux, 
but in exchange it will expect European support in order to manage the people 
traffic, that will not be able to stay on Albanian territory if not for a short period 
of time (Vale 2016).  
4. NEW WALLS AND NEW MINORITIES  
INSIDE EUROPE 
When the German chancellor Angela Merkel announced in August 2015 that 
Germany would welcome hundreds of thousands of Syrians coming from Greece 
and other Balkan states, she de facto cancelled in a single moment the Dublin 
Regulation that imposed to the refugees the request for asylum to be made only 
in the first country they reached while entering Europe. This opening has had 
severe consequences for Merkel12 in terms of politics, provoking chain reactions 
that altered the continental balance: on one hand the “Balkan route” was opened 
by the asylum seekers who were trying to reach Germany through Turkey and 
Greece and other Balkan countries, while on the other – as mentioned before – 
there were sparks of hostility towards the refugees from governments and 
national public opinions, inducing the building of walls, barriers and suspension 
of free circulation guaranteed by Schengen. Such initiatives arrived as a con-
sequence of a flux of almost million people who arrived in Europe after 
Merkel’s declarations, along an itinerary that started at the border between 
Greece and Turkey. It is safe to say that the policy of opening that Germany 
presented was not particularly appreciated by the neighbouring countries where 
there was no solidarity, resulting in a “political avalanche… bringing a dan-
gerously high potential to dismember the European Union” (author's translation, 
Guérot 2016, p. 165). Such a movement of people through the Balkan route that 
was – as mentioned – perceived in single states as a threat to public order has 
stopped since March 18th 2016 after the agreement between the EU and Turkey. 
The agreement saw Turkey getting six billion euro from Brussels, the abolition 
                        
12 During the vote in the Berlin land in September 2016, the CDU (the Chancellor's 
party) went from 23.3% to 17.6% compared to 2011.  
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of Schengen entrance visas for Turkish citizens and the renewal of negotiations 
for a rapid admission into the EU, and in exchange it would guard the European 
borders. In order to manage this, Turkey would have kept inside its territory two 
million of Middle Eastern refugees, stopping them from entering Greece. 
Furthermore, following the agreement, for every refugee Europe would send 
back to Turkey, Turkey would send as Syrian in Greece following priorities 
dictated by humanitarian emergencies: non-accompanied minors, women with 
children, sick in need of cures. This statement was stipulated by the Council of 
the European Union and it shows a dose of hypocrisy along some narrow-
mindedness. In fact, it was created “in order to break the business model of the 
smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk”13: 
therefore it was supposedly inspired by humanitarian reasons and not a will to 
expel out of the EU borders masses of asylum seekers. But there is more: the 
article 3 says that “Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea 
or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU”, throwing 
another layer of hypocrisy over the true motivations behind this treaty. In fact, 
on one hand it uses the generic term “migrants” instead of “refugees” or “asylum 
seekers”, in order to declass the whole emergency to a mere issue of illegal 
immigration, as if it were a problem of public safety14; then it hides the non-
existence of a “legal” possibility for the Syrians to migrate from Turkey to the 
EU. This is quite some narrow-mind thinking, as S. Liberti (2016) has remarked, 
considering the mandate given to Turkey by the EU to guard its borders in 
exchange for money. This statement is even more radically critiqued by the 
geopolitical magazine Limes through the words of one of its authors, Fabrizio 
Maronta, who sees the “mechanism of repatriation contemplated by the 
agreement…. as a prospective juridical and logistical nightmare that is difficult 
to get away from” (Maronta 2016, p. 122). In regard to this, Maronta observed 
how the Geneva 1951 Refugee Convention (that the EU adheres to) prohibits the 
possibility of sending back “asylum seekers in Countries that do not guarantee 
their adequate protection, assistance and integration prospectives” (Maronta 
2016, p. 122): these guarantees are not available in Turkey. According to 
Maronta, Turkey could deport masses of people who would risk their lives in 
their countries of origin, violating the European principle of non-refoulement 
(Maronta 2016, p. 124). After March 2016 the “Balkan route” was drastically 
                        
13 The text of the statement is available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ 
press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ (accessed September 2016).   
14 Among other things, in the Article 1 of the statement: “… restore public order” 
(ibidem). 
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reduced, as mentioned above, yet however was not entirely closed. In fact, on 
one hand the arrivals in Greece have stopped almost completely, except for  
a slight upswing after the attempted Turkish coup in July15; on the other the 
anthropic movement left residues that are not entirely absorbed, prisoners of 
borders difficult to cross and making new minorities, i l lega l but never t-
heless not less rea l, as if they were pools of water that the ground – now 
waterproof – cannot absorb. The country that maintains the highest numbers of 
asylum seekers is Greece: according to UNHCR sources reported by S. Maraone 
(2016) in august 2016 there were 57.115 of them trapped in 55 camps, most of 
them controlled by the military. Europe prefers maintaining a low profile over 
the issue of the exiled, kept along the “dead end” from Greece to Hungary 
passing across FYROM and Serbia16 as intermediary countries that are not in 
demand for asylum because they are “outside Schengen”. This serves to avoid 
waves of xenophobia such as the ones seen anyway in Hungary which were 
alimented by the government itself. 
The refugees were de facto divided in watertight compartments, separated by 
barriers that Europe thought long gone. This happened not only at the external 
borders of the “European fortress” near Ceuta and Melilla in Spain, along the 
eastern Polish borders, in sea between Lampedusa and African shores and in the 
Aegean sea between Greek islands and Turkey; since 2015 the walls were back 
even inside the continent where they were once destroyed after the Cold War 
and after the abolition of the visas regime in 2009/2010 towards Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM and Albania. Inside these 
renewed barriers, the new “nations of borderlands” that were named by Massimo 
                        
15 According to S. Maraone (2016), someone who knows the “Balkan route” from her 
own personal experience, afterwards the arrivals to the islands of Lesbos and Chios have 
reached around 200 per day. The author has personally visited a refugee camp in the 
Chios capital which was run by UNHCR and in august 2016 it had around 1000 people 
awaiting registration which could have three possible outcomes: family reunification in  
a European locality, asylum in Greece or return to Turkey. The medium afflux was 
around 40–50 people per day coming from the nearby Turkish shores. The treatment to 
its “guests” was acceptable: they were free to leave the camp, differently from those in  
a government camp in the centre of the island which was presided by the military. What 
weighed heavily on the life conditions of the Chios refugee were however three negative 
elements: 1) the refusal of contact with them by the local population; 2) the forced 
inactivity for men and especially women, forced to do nothing for months and months 
(better were the conditions of children, “animated” by international volunteers); 3) fights 
that sometimes became physical between refugees of different nationalities. 
16 Through two holes open in barbwire between Serbia and Hungary the passage is 
allowed for 30 refugees per day as per Hungary's government orders.  
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Franco “The Fifth World” (2016, p. 101–114)17, the population lives without  
– sometimes by choice – its original identity and without being censed or 
recognised by the states they entered. These refugees, people on the run and the 
stateless, were more than 60 million already in 2014 and therefore prior to the 
great 2015 exodus, according to the UNHCR (Cattaruzza and Sintès 2016,  
p. 83–84, Franco 2016, p. 104): “nation” without territory18 that nevertheless 
occupies marginal spaces at the states’ borders and sometimes also central places 
such as train and bus stations. They are not perceived by “host” EU countries as 
a humanitarian emergency to be faced with shared efforts, but as a problem of 
public safety where the only victims are their citizens19. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
There is the paradox situation of the migrants coming through Greece into 
Schengen Europe, but however trying to get out of it only to get back into 
Schengen by arriving into Italy, Hungary or Slovenia. The building of walls of 
the mere announcement of intention to produce them results in continuous 
conflicts between countries20: Italy against France at Ventimiglia prior to the 
Balkan route; France against UK at Dover; Italy against Austria at the Brenner; 
Slovenia against Croatia; Serbia against Hungary; Greece against FYROM. In 
front of refugees coming from Asia – mainly Muslims – and after having exited 
the humiliating visas regime that pushed it almost into a non-European world, 
Serbia can feel almost back into the West, finally at the “right” side of the 
barricade. The new function of FYROM and Serbian citizens as “guard dogs” of 
EU that they hope to join soon.  Furthermore, Albanians are aspiring to this too, 
hoping that because of the “walls” built by Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia, the 
                        
17 Such definition follows those of: First World that coincides with the rich one lead 
by the USA and western Europe; the Second World meaning communist states guided 
by Soviets, symmetrically opposing the First one; the Third World, or the developing 
Countries and/or not aligned to any of the two superpowers during the Cold War; the 
Fourth World, or the poorest countries of the planet, without concrete possibilities of 
development and forced to depend upon international humanitarian help.  
18 It is in fact a nation, since its members share the political project of recognition 
hoping to exit an ambiguous illegality, that is however not shared by the rest of the 
world. 
19 An example of this are the posters placed by the Hungarian government warning 
the population about the illnesses brought by migrants, who were almost gone in 2016 
because they went elsewhere.  
20 In regard to this, M. Franco (2016, pp. 32–34). 
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refugees' flux will turn from Greece to Albania, chosen as transit country 
towards Schengen Italy. 
Europe has gone from wealthy land whose citizens could freely move inside 
the Union without inter-states barriers which were typical in the 20th century to  
a continent dominated by the inhabitants' fears to lose the elevated way of life 
they reached. It is easily perceived that it is the rest of the non-Western world 
that who threatens said wealth. Yet while attempting not to lose it, not only they 
tried to “seal” the external EU borders from possible unwanted intrusions21, but 
because the states did not trust each other anymore they closed their borders to 
the free circulation of people once again.  
Inside such a context that has rapidly deteriorated in 2015, the Aegean island 
of Chios can be chosen as the symbolic eastern border of Europe, but in the 
wrong way. In the hundred years that passed between the famous 1822 massacre 
and the Greek-Turkish conflict that culminated in 1922, just like the rest of the 
Eastern world this island could have been called a melting pot between the west 
and the east22. Today this border is no longer a place of conflict or even meeting, 
but it sure is one of closure and isolation: on one side there are the Europeans 
and on the other the Asians running from their war-thorn countries, separated 
just by few meters but not anymore for cultural and economic exchange that 
suited everyone. What poses a halt to this is a wall made of fear on both sides: 
those who want to enter because they are terrified to return to the horrors they 
came from, and those who are afraid they will be forced to share what remains 
of the wealth corroded by the advancing of a world that is more and more 
interconnected and certainly not favourable to Europe.  
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INVISIBLE EXCLAVES  
SLOVAK AND CZECH MINORITY  
IN SERBIA 
“The transformation process in Serbia is not yet finished  
and people from this country spend their life 
inside this process, without understanding its phases. 
Now, expectations and hopes are slowly disappearing 
and people are starting to accept 
 the void time they live in. 
Maybe this period will bring new challenges, but  
these fading expectations and this silent acceptance  
are themselves the difference between 
 the past and the present in Serbia. 
I do not see ideals that could drive us towards 
a better future, we should only hope in something 
 that is not worse than the absolute worst” 
Vladimir Valentik 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ethnic composition in Vojvodina is beyond comparison if we take 
Western Europe into account. The northernmost region of Serbia, the most 
developed area of the entire country, is inhabited by more than twenty ethnic 
groups, with as many as six official languages. Each national minority in Serbia 
has a special Parliament (Nacionalni Savet Nacionalnih Manjina) and most of 
them have their headquarter in Vojvodina (fifteen out of a total of twenty-one). 
Among them, there are many peculiar cases. As a matter of fact, Vojvodina is 
home to one of the most interesting example concerning the concept of exclaves. 
Several ethnic groups, whose nationalities are included within the European 
Union ones live in this area. These are Hungarian, Croatian, Romanian, Czech 
and Slovak. 
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They might also be further divided into two groups, using the Rogers 
Brubaker's definition that takes into account the distance from their respective 
national homeland. Hungarians, Croatians and Romanians are closer to their 
“external national homelands”, whereas Czechs and Slovaks are farther away 
from theirs. My article will focus on the second group, namely Slovak and 
Czech villages, in order to understand what it means to feel culturally part of  
a nation which in turn is part of the European Union, but at the same time live 
outside of it. 
Within the “metropolitan corridors”, as defined by Karl Schlögel, namely 
amongst Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Strasbourg, these exclaves are invisible 
territories, to which the right to be part of the European Union is denied on the 
grounds that they are already part of a non-member country, as is currently the 
case with Serbia. 
In this age of clashes between different civilisations, my aim is to analyse, 
through archival research and interviews, this paradigmatic case of the clash 
within a single civilisation or nationality. 
2. SLOVAKS IN SERBIA 
The Slovak minority comprises less than fifty thousand people. We may 
further divide the Slovak community into two different groups. The first group 
includes Slovaks from Pivnice and Selenča. They came from West Slovakia, 
around the towns of Myjava and Nitra; their dialect is different from those 
spoken by Slovaks in Serbia. They were Catholics, but many of them changed 
their religion so as to become Lutheran Evangelical Protestants. The second 
group is made up by the Slovaks from all the others villages. They arrived from 
the central part of Slovakia, around Banská Bistrica and Zvolen; from eastern 
Slovakia, around Poprad, Jelšava and Málinec; from Northen Hungary, around 
Balassagyarmat. They were and still are Lutheran Evangelicals. 
Vojvodina is divided into three areas, according to the shape of Tisza and 
Danube rivers (fig. 1). 
The first group of Slovaks arrived in Bačka1 between 1745 and 1773. They 
later occupied Stara Pazova and few other villages in Syrmia2 in 1770. Then, 
                      
1 Years of foundation of the most important Slovak towns in Bačka: Bački Petrovac 
and Kulpin in 1745, Gložan in 1756, Selenča in 1758, Kisač in 1773, Pivnice and Lalić 
in 1790. 
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around 1786, a few families moved to Banat3, in Aradac, near Zrenjanin. Finally, 
between the years 1802 and 1826, they settled in various villages of South 
Banat. 
  
Fig. 1. Vojvodina 
Source: based on http://www.istockphoto.com/pl/wektor/serbia-polityczne-mapy 
A turning point in the history of these communities came with the Treaty of 
Passarowitz, signed on July 21, 1718. As a result of this treaty, the Ottoman 
Empire definitively lost Banat and part of Syrmia. This area remained quite 
uninhabited. 
In the spring of 1744, a farmer called Matej Čanji left his land near Málinec, 
in the centre of Slovakia, and arrived to potentially cultivable lands between 
Bački Petrovac, Futog and Glozan. Since these lands were largely unpopulated, 
the landowner (named Čarnojević) and the farmer found an agreement: 
Čarnojević needed vassals and Čanji promised to supply them in exchange for 
his freedom. Čanji came back the following year, 1745, with one hundred and 
twenty-nine families (the man was not married himself), forty-five bulls, one 
hundred and thirteen horses, fifty-three cows (a cow could not have calves), ten 
pigs, fifteen sheep and several plants. He became a free man and he and the 
Slovak families he brought along started to work those lands. 
                      
2 Years of foundation of the most relevant Slovak towns in Syrmia: Stara Pazova in 
1770, Bingula in 1859, Erdevik in 1860, Lug in 1902. 
3 Years of foundation of the biggest Slovak towns in Banat: Aradać in 1786, 
Kovačica in 1802, Padina in 1806, Janošik in 1823, Hajdučica in 1826 and Belo Blato in 
1883. 
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However, these kind of migrations were not allowed in the Austro- 
-Hungarian empire under the administration of the Archduchess Maria Theresa 
of Austria. Therefore, the first migrants were forced to get back to Slovakia 
every winter. During that period, one of Maria Theresa's bigger concerns was 
how to effectively protect the borders against the Ottoman Empire. She did not 
want Serbian people to be the only ones to protect these borders, since she feared 
they would soon feel as the rightful owners of those lands. Moreover, this area 
had two major drawbacks: it suffered from a shortage of drinkable water, due to 
the difficulties in building deep wells, and it was also lacking enough trees. 
Hence, it was becoming a barren area, no longer suitable for agriculture. The 
Archduchess prompted the reclamation of this territory, through the construction 
of channels and wells. 
So, a solution had already been outlined by the Slovaks themselves. Thus, 
Maria Theresa decided to move Slovaks as well as Hungarians, Romanians, 
Germans, Basques (some Basque surnames are still present in the Kikinda area) 
towards the borderlands. 
To sum up, there are three main reasons behind this migration. Firstly, an 
economic reason: life in Serbia was much better than in Slovakia, where they 
lived in mountainous areas. Secondly, a military reason: Maria Theresa needed 
them as a defence alongside the border. Thirdly, a religious one: there were 
many small strifes between Catholics and Protestants in Slovakia. Protestants 
were the minority, therefore some families decided to leave. 
Many interviewees remarked that the Slovak minority of Vojvodina is the 
one that has best-preserved their traditions and culture as compared to all the 
other Slovak minorities across the world. That was possible due to several 
reasons:  
1. Their religion was different. They were the only Protestant group in 
Vojvodina at the time they migrated. 
2. They used to mainly marry each other, within Slovaks families. 
3. They started building a school and a church in every village as soon as 
they settled down. The first school was built in Bački Petrovac in 1745 and the 
first church in Glozan in 1789. Teachers and priests followed promptly. 
4. They built libraries. 
5. They also created three High Schools throughout the 20th century, in 
Kovačica, Bački Petrovac and Stara Pazova. 
6. They have set up several publishing houses. The first one, HL Print, was 
founded in Bački Petrovac in 1918. 
Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1880–1918), the main problem was 
Magyarisation. The relationships between Hungarians and Slovaks were trouble-
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some, primarily due to religious differences. Hungarians insisted on Hungarian 
liturgy and on education being exclusively in Hungarian language, to which 
Slovaks responded by setting up vehement protests and insurrections. This 
resolute Hungarian chauvinism had the paradoxical result of strengthening 
relationships between the Slavic people, namely between Slovaks and Serbs. 
At the end of the First World War, the role of Slovaks increased, since in 
1918, there were also Slovaks representatives in the Assembly that decided the 
annexation of Vojvodina into the Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1918 
–1929). Under this Kingdom and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia4 (1929–1945) the 
situation was remarkably better for Slovak people. They started to feel free to 
publicly speak their own language and education began to be planned in Slovak. 
In 1932, Ján Bulik set up an organisation called Matica Slovačka in Serbia, 
which ended up being a big step towards the preservation of Slovak culture, 
language and traditions. 
Tito was deemed to be a great leader by many interviewees, since in socialist 
Yugoslavia, Slovaks were allowed to organise everything in their own language: 
schools, documents, associations. As Marci, an old man from Padina, told me, 
«here, in my village, there is a school where every subject is taught in Slovak. 
This is democracy! In which country could it happen? The European Union 
should come here, in Kovačica, to understand how we live». Slovaks felt 
protected in socialist Jugoslavia; they were part of a large country, but they felt 
like they belonged there. They were proud to be part of Jugoslavia: «it was  
a perfect country», «teachers taught us to be part of this country», «Jugoslavia 
was actually more advanced than many countries that have entered the European 
Union a few years ago», «now Serbia is now definitely underdeveloped if com-
pared with what Jugoslavia was thirty years ago». These are some sentences that 
several Slovak interviewees told me about that period. According to that, it 
seems reasonable to affirm that Yugonostalgia is indeed present among this 
community. 
Although it may be true that life under Tito was in some respects better than 
now, since life standards were actually higher (as many scholars interviewed 
agreed upon), and that they were already living in a «sort of European Union» of 
their own, academics' interviews did not show the same level of nostalgia. 
Vladimir Valentik explained me that «if you didn’t want responsibilities, 
Jugoslavia was the best country for you, but if you had responsibilities, you were 
not in the right country. Jugoslavia looked after its citizens, but they could not 
                      
4 From now on, written Jugoslavia instead of Yugoslavia due to coherence with 
Serbian quotations and names. 
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look after themselves». For instance, organisations such as Matica Slovačka 
were prohibited in socialist Jugoslavia: it was reestablished in 1990, during the 
renaissance of nationalism. 
During Milošević's leadership something started to change. Nationalism 
became the most important aspect in everyday life. Serbs gave Slovaks a bad 
nickname (“totica”, “totovi”) and Vojislav Šešelj, a Serbian politician, stated 
during an interview that Vojvodina was a region for Serbian people, adding that 
«we should give a sandwich to Hungarians and two sandwiches to Slovaks for 
their coming back home». Nevertheless, there were no violent episodes, nor any 
actual discrimination towards Slovaks. Many Slovaks even defended Milošević 
during the interviews I collected. According to them, someone else (namely The 
European Union and the United States) had decided that Jugoslavia had to 
disappear, since it was the demonstration that a different kind of society, a non- 
-capitalistic one, was a practicable alternative; therefore, they needed to elimi 
nate the very possibility of that. 
Many young Slovaks fought for JNA (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) 
during the war, but other Slovaks could also be found on the opposite side, 
fighting for the Croatian Army. I was told many stories of Slovak soldiers that 
saved each other's lives by speaking their own language. 
As far as religion is concerned, the majority of Slovaks in Serbia are Evan-
gelical Lutherans; that is rather curious since in Slovakia Catholics outnumber 
Lutherans. Many interviewees declared that they feel spiritually closer to 
Swedish, Norwegian, Danish or German people than to Slovaks; they even 
connected their religion to their professional abilities: working is one of the most 
relevant aspect of their lives and earning money is considered a righteous 
activity. 
There are just twenty-two to twenty-four Slovak priests per twenty-eight 
churches. As a result, someone has to manage more than one church. That means 
that in some villages liturgy cannot be regularly celebrated every Sunday. For 
this reason, substitutes are sometimes needed, including women. Liturgies are 
more frequently attended by elderly people than young ones. According to the 
Lutheran priest in Selenča, Vladimir Valenta, «the Lutheran Slovak Church was 
born in contrast to the German one and the Hungarian one. There is no 
difference between them in the liturgy, only the language is different». 
There are no Slovak Calvinists, but there are indeed Slovak Catholics, 
although only in the village of Selenča. The reason is simple: the only 
inhabitants of this village are Slovaks, and they have always celebrated liturgy in 
their own language. Relationships between Protestants and Catholics in this 
village were really troublesome: there were no mixed weddings; the two 
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communities were completely divided between Protestant East Selenča and 
Catholic West Selenča. The border ran in the middle of the village; the fact that 
it passed right through the main square was a particularly intense source of 
strifes between factions. There were separate restaurants and schools, where they 
also had different teachers. In the sixties, under Tito's regime, his Socialist Party 
decided to build a new school and to establish classes of mixed faiths. As  
a result, relationships improved, even though during the Balkan wars of the 
nineties a Catholic priest stated that it would have been better to fight with the 
Croats against the Serbs; he died a few years later, leaving no tension between 
the two factions. It was this kind of situation that permitted Slovak Catholics to 
survive and maintain their religion and their nationality. 
All of the Slovak Catholics, except for those in Selenča, have been assimi-
lated into Croat or Hungarian communities in the last two centuries. In some 
villages in Vojvodina, including Temerin and Bačka Topola, there are many 
people that consider themselves Hungarian, despite bearing Slovak surnames. 
This kind of assimilation was virtually immediate: they even considered 
themselves Hungarians as far back as at the beginning of 19th century, only a few 
decades after their arrival in Vojvodina. Religious assimilation can also be found 
among Lutherans: approximately five hundred people became Hungarians 
during the last two centuries, either in their own interest or because of the forced 
Magyarisation under the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1880–1918)5. 
I came upon several unusual religious movements in every Slovak village  
I visited; they managed to survive thanks to the funds they receive from 
European or American branches of the same movements. I also noticed that their 
presence is often connected with Protestant faith. They can be found especially 
in Protestant villages and in Protestant families when the village is ethnically 
mixed. Adam Jonas, a historian from Belo Blato, explained it this way: «if you 
are Protestant, you are more inclined to protest and to create an alternative 
religion». These movements are: Baptists, Spirituals, Nazarenes (very similar to 
Amish), Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Modrý 
Kríž followers, Methodist. The most important Methodist church in Serbia is in 
a Slovak village named Kisač. Ana, pastor of this church, told me that the first 
Methodists were actually German people, who arrived in Vojvodina in 1898 to 
spread their faith, and that Kisač is the capital of the Serbian Methodist church. 
                      
5 There was also a peculiar example of assimilation in Ostojićevo. Approximately 
300 people declared themselves Slovaks until discovering in the last two decades their 
Polish traditions. Now they declare themselves Polish. 
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The two strongest religious movements are the Baptists and the Spirituals. 
There are many Baptist churches all over Vojvodina, among which Bački 
Petrovac church is especially noteworthy. It is one of the broadest: this village is 
home to the largest Baptist community in Vojvodina, for a total amount of one 
hundred and sixty members. Baptists are divided into Northern Union (Vojvo-
dina and Belgrade) and Southern Union (Šumadija, the Serbian region with Niš); 
one of their goals is to actually spread their religious message to the Southern 
Union. The Baptist church arrived in Vojvodina in the last two decades of the 
19th century, brought by missionaries from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
The first presence of the Spiritual church6 in this region dates back to 1924, 
when a missionary named Adam Valenta came back from the United States with 
the task to spread their religious message. In 1925 Ján Balca decided to organise 
a tour covering many villages in Vojvodina with the goal of popularising the 
Holy Bible, translated into Slovak for the first time in that area. The largest 
Spiritual community is located in Padina, with more than two hundred and fifty 
people; there are approximately fifty churches.  
Finally, Nazarenes are remarkably similar to Amish: they are really private 
and reserved people, who started to use modern technology within the last 
generation. Nazarene women are also easily recognisable for wearing thin veils 
on their heads. 
I visited the following villages7: Syrmia (Lug, Ljuba, Slankamenački Vino-
gradi), Banat (Kovačica, Padina, Hajdučica, Belo Blato, Janošik), Bačka (Bački 
Petrovac, Gložan, Kulpin, Pivnice, Selenča, Lalić, Kisač). Bački Petrovac's 
municipality is the only municipality in Serbia where Slovaks are the absolute 
majority. Pivnice, Lalić and Selenča are really close to each other, but when Tito 
had to decide about the shape of those municipalities, he chose to assign these 
villages to three different municipalities. By doing so, he created three small 
minorities in each municipality, according to his precise socio-political view. 
In every Slovak village the following associations can be found: 
– Matica Slovačka. It is an apolitical, civil and non-religious organisation, 
with twenty thousand members divided into thirty departments; 
                      
6 They called themselves Duhovni, from duh, which means spirit in Serbian. 
7 Syrmia: Lug is in the municipality of Beočin, Ljuba is in the Šid's one and 
Slankamenački Vinogradi is in Inđija's one. Banat: Kovačica and Padina are inside the 
municipality of Kovačica, Janošik is in the municipality of Alibunar, Hajdučica is inside 
the municipality of Plandište, Belo Blato is in Zrenjanin's one. Bačka: Bački Petrovac, 
Kulpin and Gložan are inside the municipality of Bački Petrovac, Kisač is in the 
municipality of Novi Sad, Pivnice is inside the municipality of Bačka Palanka, Selenča 
in the Bač's one and Lalić in the Odžaci's one. 
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– Kulturno Umetničko Društvo, a cultural association that organises many 
events; 
– Udruženja Žene (women's association); 
– In addition, the former Svetozar Milentić organisation is worth mention-
ing. It used to actively oppose Germanisation and Magyarisation. 
The only Slovak institution in Serbia, Nacionalni savet slovačke nacionalne 
manjine, the National Council of the Slovak minority, is located in Novi Sad.  
It was created in 2003 and it consists of a president, Ana Tomanova-Makanova, 
and twenty-eight members. Only Slovaks registered on a special list are allowed 
to vote for the Council, but every Slovak may register. The Slovak Council pur-
sues four aims: to preserve the language and culture, and to provide education 
and information. 
Many interviewees pointed out that national political parties are entering the 
Nacionalni Savet: there are five parties for less than fifty thousand people. 
Problems have arisen from the fact that some political parties are indeed Serbian 
and not Slovak. The most important of them is the recently founded Slovaci 
Napred: its name refers to the party of the First Prime Minister, Aleksandar 
Vučić. It is undoubtedly the strongest party in Serbia, trying to use its power to 
influence the choices and political drive of the Nacionalni Savet, especially since 
the president of Slovački Nacionalni Savet – Ana Tomanova Makarova – is 
connected with the opposition party, Demokratska Stranka, whose most famous 
representative is Boris Tadić. The president of Matica Slovačka, Katarina 
Melegova-Melihova, told me that «the politicisation of the Slovak Council is 
objectively one of our biggest mistakes, it should not have happened». 
Insofar as Belgrade Parliament is concerned, it is almost impossible to have 
even a single Slovak representative elected, since it was calculated that it would 
require sixteen thousand votes: that means a third of the Slovak community 
would have to agree upon the same representative, but as many interviewees 
pointed out, that would be an extremely complicated goal to achieve. 
Assimilation is the most serious issue affecting every minority. Slovaks have 
tackled it by creating elementary schools with classes only held in Slovak (with 
Serbian as secondary language) for eight years in the villages of Bački Petrovac, 
Kulpin, Gložan8, Kisač, Padina, Selenča, Pivnice. Lug and Lalić only teach the 
first four years in Slovak. In their three “High Schools” in Kovačica, Bački 
Petrovac and Stara Pazova, they try to preserve their language and maintain the 
                      
8 In Gložan, there is a strange situation since many Serbian children and youngsters 
choose to study Slovak language at school and are members of Slovak associations. The 
percentage of Serbian people in Gložan is less than 5%. 
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study of their literature. There is also a “Medical High School” in Novi Sad that 
offers the possibility to study in Slovak. Finally, at the universities of Belgrade 
and Novi Sad, it is possible to get a degree in Slovak literature. Slovak 
associations are also fighting against the disappearance of their language by 
creating and printing books in Slovak language. One rather peculiar effect of 
their effort is that their Slovak is purer than the one spoken in Slovakia, which is 
full of Anglicisms and Germanisms. Slovački Nacionalni Savet will shortly have 
to face the challenge of complying with a current law which requires school 
classes to have a minimum of fifteen children. Slovak villages are currently 
bypassing the law by creating classes with children of different ages, thus 
avoiding the problem. Nevertheless, they will have to find a different solution in 
the near future. 
Slovački Nacionalni Savet has two other significant problems. The govern-
ment is cutting time from television and radio channels that deal with national 
minorities. The government justifies these cuts with insufficient funds, but many 
interviewees said that they believe it to be a political move instead. Moreover, 
when the Serbian state organised the foundation of the Assemblies for national 
minorities, it did not create a Ministry of national minorities: that was a mistake, 
according to several representatives of the Slovak community. Many minor 
problems could be more successfully dealt with by a national political entity 
with a general supervising task that would easily connect all the Nacionalni 
Savet to the Serb Government. Problems reported by interviewees included in 
many situations great complications in getting documents in their languages (not 
only Czechs and Slovaks, but several minorities have the same problem) due  
to the fact that Serbian employees of the City Hall often use different excuses to 
only print them in Serbian. Another issue that was pointed out is that concerning 
the status of the language: in Inđija municipality, for instance, Slovak inhabitants 
are still waiting for the Slovak language to become an official language, albeit 
there is one Slovak village, Slankamenački Vinogradi, in this municipality.  
3. CZECHS IN SERBIA 
The Czech minority is quite small, there are only one thousand eight hundred 
twenty-four of them. Many Czechs prefer to declare themselves Serbian, 
especially after a mixed wedding9. The Czech community can be divided into 
                      
9 After a wedding, sons and daughters of a couple usually take up the nationality and 
religion of their father. There is only one particular case, regarding families with  
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two groups: Czechs from Veliko Središte and the ones from the other villages. 
The group from Veliko Središte came directly from Czech Republic; they were 
and still are Protestants, members of the Reformed Hussite Church10. These 
families came from South Moravia, more specifically from the areas of Brno, 
Jihlava and Klobouky u Brna.  
Other Czechs in Serbia first moved to Romanian Banat around 1760. There 
are still some Czech villages (from seven to nine) in that area (Garnic and 
Eibentahl being the largest). They later moved from Romanian Banat to Serbian 
Banat around 1820; according to some sources, the first Czechs arrived in Vršac 
back in 1822. They tried to settle down in Jasenovo, but native Serbian families 
were not welcoming towards them, which included giving Czechs a negative 
nickname, Pemci. As a consequence, they decided to move towards Bela Crkva 
and Kruščica, across the Danube. The first Czechs were carpenters, blacksmiths, 
miners and soldiers. These families came from Bohemia, around Plzeň and 
Kutnà Hora, and they already were or eventually became Catholic. We can say 
that this Czech minority coming from Serbia and the one coming from Romania 
belong to one family, as they tend to point out. 
This migration was driven by economic reasons, since life in Serbia was 
easier than it was in Czech Republic or in Romanian Banat11 owing to more 
cultivable lands and civil rights; by military reasons, because the Austro- 
-Hungarian Empire employed them as a defence force to deploy alongside the 
threatened border with the Ottoman Empire; by religious reason, since the 
majority of Czechs were Hussites, running away from the Catholic areas in 
Bohemia. There was a second migration towards Gaj, Dobričevo, Vršac and 
Veliko Središte in the second half of the 19th century, especially caused by 
women seeking marriage opportunities.  
There are also Czech families in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Zrenjanin, Kragujevac, 
and in other Serbian towns. They moved to Serbia via different means than the 
ones aforementioned: they usually moved family by family, outside of any or-
ganised migration flow. They were academics (lawyers, engineers, musicians...) 
and most of them ended up converting to the Orthodox faith. 
                      
a Catholic mother in the Slovak village of Selenča where it might be possible that sons 
and daughters become Catholic since the Catholic church in this village is very 
demanding and their influence over Catholic families is substantial. 
10 Reformed Hussites Church was founded by Jan Hus (1372–1415). He was a pre-
decessor of Protestantism, since he preceded both Luther and Calvin. This church is 
different from the Slovak Lutheran Evangelical one. 
11 In this area Czechs used to live in zemunica, something that is more or less like  
a cave. 
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Throughout their history, the major problem the Czech minority had to face 
was Magyarisation, especially between 1880 and 1918, when Hungarian influ-
ences increased. Many Czechs became Hungarian and (probably) also Catholics 
during that period. Under Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1918–1929) and 
the Kingdom of Jugoslavia (1929–1945) many teachers and priests came from 
Czech Republic. In that period, they tried to preserve Czech language, but, 
regarding religion, Catholicisation continued and Protestantism within the Czech 
minority slowly disappeared. During the Second World War, many Czech 
soldiers helped Tito's Partisans. Socialist Jugoslavia was regarded by many 
interviewees as the best period of their lives, a period of relative wealth and 
social rights. Some scholars disagree, and argue that some problems arose 
instead. Nevertheless, nobody believed that the Czech minority was at that time 
discriminated against. One actual problem was that it was impossible to maintain 
relationships with relatives in socialist Czechoslovakia from the fifties to the 
seventies. During the Balkan wars of the nineties, Czech soldiers fought for 
Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (JNA), the Jugoslav Army. Generally speaking, 
that was not cause of any relevant clash, with the exception of Belgrade, where  
a few tense encounters were reported during Catholic liturgies, as the priest was 
in fact Croatian. Czechs were afraid that the Serbs would think they were 
Croatian and not Czech. In the nineties, owing to the war between Serbia and 
Croatia, Czechs from Serbia lost contact with Czechs from Croatia12. Before the 
war, there were no problems between these two communities, but that changed 
after the war. Now, thanks to the newborn Czech Republic, their relationships 
resumed in recent years. As a peculiar side effect, it seems that the war between 
Croatia and Serbia helped restore relations between Czechs themselves. 
Inasmuch as religion is concerned, one noteworthy aspect is that many 
interviewees stated that most people within the Czech minority are actually 
atheists, exactly as it is in Czech Republic. 
Aside from that, in the community of the believers, one significant issue is 
that Czech minorities in Serbia lack Catholic priests (this is a problem for Czech 
Republic as well, since nowadays many priests who work in Czech Republic 
come from Poland). Their priests are in fact Hungarian, but they have to read in 
Czech, although they are often unfamiliar with this language to the extent of not 
being able to pronounce it correctly, or even not knowing the meaning of what 
they are reading aloud. This obviously leaves the people attending the liturgy 
very displeased, as many interviewees admitted. Moreover, these priests usually 
visit every village just once a month. 
                      
12 The biggest Czechs communities in Croatia are around Darovar and Bjelovar. 
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Fig. 1. The Hussite Church  
in Veliko Središte 
Source: author's photo 
In Gaj, Catholic liturgies are attended by Czechs, Hungarians and Croats. 
Since the Czech minority is larger than the Hungarian one, the liturgy is always 
held in Czech language, even when the priest is Hungarian himself; the same is 
true during weddings between Hungarian people and baptisms of Hungarian 
children, when the liturgy must be held in both languages, even if all the guests 
are Hungarians. 
The situation in the Protestant community is a little different: the Hussite 
pastor goes to Veliko Središte four times per year, but he comes directly from 
Czech Republic.  
This is the Hussite Church in Veliko Središte (fig. 1). 
I visited the following Czech villages: Bela 
Crkva, Kruščica and Češko Selo in the muni-
cipality of Bela Crkva, Gaj in the municipality 
of Kovin, Vršac and Veliko Središte in the 
municipality of Vršac and Belgrade.  
There is only one village with a Czech ma-
jority, namely Češko Selo; there are thirty-eight 
inhabitants, and only three are Serbs. Czech is 
the official language only in Bela Crkva, its 
municipality. Until 1972, there was a school 
where subjects were taught in Czech language; 
but it was forced to close because there were no 
children to attend it. Nowadays there are only 
three children in this village. There is an amus-
ing legend about Češko Selo: Czech Republic 
did not know about the existence of a Czech 
minority in this area of Serbia, but in 1996, the Czech ambassador of Serbia, 
Ivan Bušniak, planned a visit to some Czech villages in Romania; on his way to 
the Romanian border, his driver took a wrong turn. He passed by Crvena Crkva, 
where he saw a road sign: Češko Selo. He followed it, and that is how Czech 
Republic found out about it. From that moment, economic help from Czech Re-
public has been arriving directly in these villages, without passing through Croatia.  
Kruščica seems to be the village that received the most economic assistance 
from Czech Republic, but that comes as no surprise since this village has the 
largest Czech community (except for the one in Bela Crkva, which is indeed 
larger, though the overall percentage is smaller). Czechs arrived in Kruščica in 
1826 and the population has not changed since, staying at approximately two 
hundred. In recent years, they have built a soccer field and provided the area 
with a new canalisation system and a modern trash collection system, all owing 
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to these funds. They are currently building a Czech Etnokuća, which is a sort of 
museum that shows the interior of a typical Czech house and what daily life was 
like in the past. 
There are no Czech political parties. There have been attempts to establish 
them over the last decades, but they were all unsuccessful, even in local 
elections. There are two Czech associations in every Czech village: Matica 
Češka and Češka Beseda, although not that many people have showed actual 
interest in these associations, which basically share the same members. Each 
Češka Beseda section is completely independent: it organises its events by 
applying to Češki Nacionalni Savet for funding. The main goal of Češka Beseda 
is the preservation of Czech language and Czech culture and the protection of 
Czech traditions. Finally, Udruženja Žene, a women's association, can be found 
in every Serbian village; among its members there are several Czech women. 
Czech minority has also its own council, the Nacionalni Savet Češke 
Nacionalne Manjine. It consists of a president, Jože Sivaček, and fourteen 
members. It was established in 2010, when Serbia created these small Councils 
(Nacionalni Savet) for every national minority. Only Czechs included in a spe-
cial list can vote for Parliament, though every Czech may register.   
One of the biggest problem for Czechs is assimilation. People from small 
villages are often forced to find a partner of a different nationality; the alterna-
tive would be to marry a relative.  
According to Jože Sivaček, there are only two ways to preserve the Czech 
minority: to maintain Czech traditions and to preserve Czech language through 
national associations and institutions. Češki Nacionalni Savet reached its 
linguistic goal a few years ago, and now Czech can be studied in four state 
schools: two elementary schools in Bela Crkva, one in Kruščica and one in Gaj; 
lessons held in Czech were in fact suppressed in Serbia in 1974, only to be 
resumed in 2011. Approximately between sixty and seventy children are study-
ing Czech (among them there are also a few Serbian ones). Moreover, there is 
now a teacher that teaches two hours per week in every village where Czechs 
live, all organised by Češka Beseda. There are no Czech High Schools in Serbia, 
but the Belgrade University offers the possibility to study Czech literature. 
4. TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
The way the European Union is regarded by Czech minorities is not homo-
geneous. On the one hand, elderly and middle-aged Czechs and Slovaks do not 
want to join the European Union, since different regulations and restrictions 
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would bring about many changes to the way they work, cultivate, raise animals 
and sell their products, as well as the way they prepare their rakija. On the other 
hand, young people do not care much about the European Union, even though 
many of them wish to travel to Europe and, especially, to Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. The role of young people is obviously crucial in this argument since 
their commitment is the only way to preserve the language, culture and tra-
ditions; unfortunately, they are not interested in it as they are also leaving Serbia. 
In the last year, one hundred thirty youngsters and forty teenagers went to 
Slovakia to attend university or high school there. It was partially the same in the 
past: many Slovak people went to study to Slovakia, but they came back when 
their studies were finished; instead, now they tend not to come back and to 
remain in their motherland. The consequence is that the death rate is higher than 
the birth rate. As Rastislav Surovy, former president of Matica Slovačka, said: 
«against assimilation we can fight; against migration, we will lose».  
What seemed to annoy my interviewees the most, is that they cannot under-
stand why Czech Republic and Slovakia consider them second-class citizens; but 
this way of thinking is also one of their main reasons many are planning a future 
outside of Serbia. 
Slovakia has a special system to deal with Slovaks from Serbia. It gives them 
a document, Krajanski Preukaz, which allows Slovaks to work, live and have  
a health insurance in Slovakia for a period of ten years, although they cannot do 
the same in any other European Union countries. After those ten years, their 
chance to obtain Slovakian citizenship is substantially higher. Many young 
people are moving to Slovakia and, as soon as they find a good job there, their 
parents and their kids are bound to join them in Slovakia as well. Entire families 
left Serbia in the last five years. Someone said the figure amounts to roughly two 
thousand people every year. 
With regards to Czech Republic, obtaining a Czech citizenship is not at all 
simple: applying requires to demonstrate that at least one grandparent is Czech 
and entails a lot of documents, yet it is possible to work in the motherland for  
a period of up to ten years with a hope of meeting all the requirements. The 
president of Češki Nacionalni Savet, Jože Sivaček, reminded me that as soon as 
Romania entered in the European Union, Romanian Czechs fled to Czech Re-
public; now those villages are emptying out. Sivaček thinks that the Czech mino-
rity in Serbia will face a similar future, since this process has already started. 
The way to obtain a Hungarian or Romanian citizenship is actually less 
intricate. In order to get the Hungarian document, one only has to pass a special 
exam in Hungarian language and have at least one grandparent born within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire; therefore, the success rate of such applications is 
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considerably higher. In Romania, things are even simpler: one only has to do 
anything on behalf of the Romanian country, even something as seemingly petty 
as playing in a Romanian football team.  
In conclusion, I would like to end my article in the same way I opened it, 
with a few words from the editor of HL Print publishing house Vladimir 
Valentik: «there is nothing patriotic in this coming back home, just economic 
reasons. There is no poetry, there is poverty». 
 
English verification by Jarosław Sawiuk 
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No. 13 
CYPRUS AS THE BORDERLAND OF NATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cyprus is an island in the north-east part of the Mediterranean Sea (35°N, 
33°E), near the coast of Turkey. It is a small country (ranked 171 by territory, 
and 161 by population in the world), just 9,251 km2 (of which 3,355 km2 are in 
North Cyprus)1. The population of the Republic of Cyprus is 1,205,575 (July 
2016 est., official 98.8% Greek)2, while that of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is 313,626 (2014)3.  
The population of the Republic of Cyprus is concentrated in central Lefkosia 
(Nicosia) and in the major cities to the south: Paphos, Lemessos (Limassol), and 
Larnaca. Mount Olympus (1,951 m) is the highest point of the island. 
2. POLITICAL HISTORY OF CYPRUS 
From antiquity to today, Cyprus has been home to various nations. As a stra-
tegic location in the Middle East, it was subsequently occupied by several major 
powers. Before 1191, the island was under the influence of Greek, Roman and 
Byzantine cultures, with a mainly Greek population. In 1191 it was occupied by 
the crusaders, and in 1570 the island was conquered by the Turks, which led to 
the arrival of the Turkish population. Greek and Turkish cultures coexist peace-
fully, gradually intermingling. The descendants of the crusaders and representa-
tives of the Republic of Venice had to leave the island or face persecution 
                    
1 www.cia.gov 
2 www.cia.gov 
3 www.devplan.org 
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(Adamczyk 2002, pp. 25–31). Cyprus was placed under British administration 
(as a side effect of the Turkish-Russian war) based on the Cyprus Convention in 
1878, and was formally annexed by Britain in 1914. Until 1914, Britain tended 
to support Turkey and the Turks in Cyprus. From 1878, the Enosis movement 
was developing, which sought to join the island to Greece. Since 1915, the 
Entente promised Greece annexation of Cyprus, but in 1925 it became a British 
colony (Adamczyk 2002, pp. 68–82).  
After the Second World War, the aspirations for independence were growing 
in Cyprus. In order to regain autonomy, in 1952 the Greeks founded an under-
ground army of the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), while 
also conducting political activities. At the same time, the Turks strove to 
maintain the status quo. Under agreements in Zurich (1959) and in London 
(1959), the clashes ceased, with the island finally being granted sovereignty on 
19 February 1960. The form of government was to take into account the interests 
of both the Greeks and the Turks (fig. 1).  
 
 
Fig. 1. Ethnographic distribution in Cyprus in 1960 
Source: based on pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypr#/media/File:Ethnographic 
_distribution_in_Cyprus_1960.jpg (20.3.2017) 
The first president was Archbishop Makarios III, and the vice-president was 
Dr Fazıl Küçük. Extraterritorial British military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) 
remained in place. Soon there were aspirations to join Cyprus to Greece. This 
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caused an armed conflict between the Greek and Turkish population. Bloody 
clashes lasted until 1974. As a result, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
was established (proclaimed independence in 1983), but it is not recognised by 
the international community. Between the two parts of the island a buffer zone 
was established, under the control of UN troops (UNFICYP). 
There were resettlements of the Turkish population to the north and the 
Greek population to the south. Both nations shared deep hostility. In 2004, the 
Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union, and in 2008 it 
adopted the euro. This reduced the tension between the two parts of the island. 
3. CURRENT SITUATION 
In 1974, Cyprus was divided into the southern Greek part and the northern 
Turkish part. The result was a mass displacement of people and the growing 
hostility between Greeks and Turks. The island has been separated by a buffer 
zone supervised by UN forces that cannot be crossed (fig. 2) (Kałuski 2017,  
p. 235). The 2003 agreement made it possible to create several border crossings. 
Two of them are in Nicosia (Ledra Street and Ledra Palace), only for pedes-
trians. Crossing Astroetiris–Zodeia is intended for cars only. Crossings Ayios 
Dhometios–Metehan, Pyla–Pergamos, Agios Nikolaos–Strovilia and Limnitis 
where you can cross by foot and car. 
The buffer zone is varied in width, from a few dozen metres in Nicosia to  
a few kilometres outside the city. The situation in Nicosia is reminiscent of that 
of Berlin before it was united – the buffer zone is fenced by walls, or by the 
blind walls of the buildings. In the country areas, the buffer zone is substantially 
free of vegetation. Traffic through the buffer zone is small, a significant portion 
are tourists, not only from EU countries, but also many Russians or East Asian 
arrivals. Border control is meticulous, and in relation to the people of the two 
parts of Cyprus it is rigorous. Traffic is difficult because vehicle insurance is not 
mutually recognised, it is not even possible to drive a assistance vehicle in the 
event of an accident. 
There are still strong tendencies to include the Republic of Cyprus as part of 
Greece – there are Greek flags hanging on the buildings everywhere (Cypriot 
flags are much less visible!) A similar situation occurs in Northern Cyprus  
– where authority is held there by groups de facto headed from Turkey. 
Negotiations for unification, or at least the normalisation of relations, have 
been running for 40 years without any results. In recent years, there have been 
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signs of agreement, but the current political situation in Turkey can have  
a negative impact. Negotiations have again been delayed in the fall of 2016 
(Zszywanie 2017). 
 
 
Fig. 2. The political division of Cyprus Island 
Source: M. Sobczyński (2006, p. 233) 
An important factor in Cyprus are the two large British military bases, with 
the status of extraterritoriality. Both Cypriots and tourists can visit these areas, 
though some parts are barbed off and strictly guarded. British Army vehicles are 
often found on the highways, and aircraft and ships are also visible. 
A separate factor may be the number of immigration of Russians and the 
Chinese, settling in Cyprus. Due to exceptionally favourable tax regulations,  
a large number of prosperous Russians or Chinese are seeking the right of 
permanent residence in the Republic of Cyprus, and often receive it. It depends 
on the investment of significant amounts (half million euro). In order to obtain 
citizenship, the required amounts are much higher (several million euro). 
Moving to Cyprus gives these people security because of the authoritarian nature 
of their country of origin, as well as financial benefits. There are also many 
people of various nationalities, both retirees and employees of the tourism 
industry. One of the signs of this can be seen in the signage round the island, 
with signs and information, etc. in different languages – in addition to Greek it is 
English, Russian, Chinese, and sometimes also Arabic. 
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One of the most important sectors of the economy is tourism. The island is 
visited by several million tourists a year, development opportunities are still 
significant – in the period outside the main tourist season, there are still large 
reserves for accommodation, and the weather conditions are favourable almost 
all year round. The second important sector of the economy is shipping – Cyprus 
is home to a significant portion of the world's freight fleet, due to exceptionally 
favourable regulations and very low taxation. 
Also in Northern Cyprus, tourism is an important part of the economy  
(21% GDP – Economic... 2015). Northern Cyprus trying to develop the industry, 
but without a clear success. 
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SRI LANKA AS THE BORDERLAND OF NATIONS 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
Situated on the island of Ceylon, Sri Lanka is characterised by geographical 
isolation constituting a certain barrier to migration. This isolation is not absolute, 
though, as it is separated from the Indian subcontinent by a 55-km-wide Palk 
Strait, which includes an archipelago (Adam's Bridge), which serves as a natural 
connection between Ceylon and the continent, facilitating the migration of waves 
of population from India and thus considerably shaping the variation of political 
entities on the island (Sri Lanka 2006, p. 38).  
The terrain of the island does not pose any significant barriers to migration 
either. While the central and southern parts of Ceylon include a mountain range 
culminating in Pidurutalagala (2524 m above sea level), in practice the moun-
tains, cut by river valleys and depressions, do not constitute a significant 
obstacle to communication (Sri Lanka Map 2015).  
The small area of the island (65,268 km2) results in all rivers flowing from 
the central range in all directions to be small (the longest one, Mahaweli, is only 
334 km long) and, as such, not a communication barrier either (Rotter 2006,  
p. 251). One curious thing in Ceylon is the absence of natural bodies of water. 
All of them are anthropogenic (Rivers ...2004).  
Despite its small area, Ceylon is highly diverse in climate, with the southern 
part in the equatorial climate zone, while the northern part is in the tropical zone. 
The climate, especially rainfall, is determined by monsoon winds. North, east 
and south-east of the island lie in a dry zone that encompasses more than 58% of 
Ceylon. The south-western fragment is the wet zone (encompassing just 20% of 
the island), with an arching, narrow transitional zone stretching between them 
(and taking up 22% of the island) (fig. 1) (Rotter 2006, p. 251). The diversity of 
climate, soil and plants in Ceylon has had a clear impact on land use and its 
alimentary potential, as well as on the formation of nations on the island. 
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Fig. 1. The climate zones in Ceylon 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
Ministry of Mahaweli Development and 
Environment, http://www.climatechange.lk/ 
Climate_Profile.html (3.03.2016) 
2. ORIGINS OF POPULATION, HISTORY OF SETTLEMENT  
IN CEYLON AND FIRST MIGRATIONS 
A Sri Lankan legend says that Ceylon was where paradise, where Adam and 
Eve gave birth to the humankind, was located. A trace of his foot can even be 
found on Adam's Peak (Bonifat'eva and Sučkov 1985, p. 19). In fact, however, 
the island was not the cradle of humanoids. They came to Ceylon from the Indian 
subcontinent via Adam's Bridge. This happened about 500 thousand years ago.   
The Balangoda culture, created by cave-dwellers that used fire and farmed, 
dates back to the Mesolithic times. The collapse of this culture is associated with 
the first historically documented wave of immigrants from India, which flowed 
in the 5th century BC. In the Sabaragamuwa Mountains, the culture has survived 
up to approx. 1000 AD (Kusio 2002, p. 254).  
The Veddas are considered to be the indigenous people of Ceylon, although 
modern representatives of this tribe are in fact a mix of indigenous and immi-
grant populations (Seligmann and Seligmann 1911, p. 26, Shukri 1990, p. 261). 
Anthropologists associate the Vedda people with both primitive South African 
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Khoisan family, which also includes the San people, as well as with Australian 
Aboriginals (Perera 1990, p. 148, Lord and Bell 2007, p. 61). The current 
population of approximately 400 lives in eastern Sri Lanka, in villages near 
Mahiyangana (Attanapola and Lund 2013, p. 175). 
Both Vedda people and later Sinhalese derive their origin from the local myth-
ology, recorded in epic Mahawamsa (Great Chronicle), referred to as a chronicle 
of the island (The Mahāvaṃsa... 1912). Prince Vijaya, who came from north- 
-western India to marry Kuveni of the Veddic tribe of Yaksha (Kusio 2002,  
p. 254, Bandara and Tisdell 2005, p. 1, Lord and Bell 2007, p. 61).  
The influx of Sinhalese people from the north of the Indian Peninsula 
occurred in the 5th century BC. According to the Mahawamsa this ethnic group 
stems from Prince Vijaya of the Kshatriya caste (Perera 1988, p. 5). The founders 
of the people was to be the grandmother of the prince, Suppadevi, who was the 
daughter of the king of Vanga (Bengal) and the princess of Kalinga (Odisha). 
Suppadevi ran away from the family home to the country Lada (Gujarat), and 
married a lion (sinha), hence the name Sinhala people (children of a lion). At 
age 16, her son Sinhabahu with his mother and sister moved to a more densely 
populated region and the lion, in search of his family, devastated the area, but 
was killed by the son. After the death of the king of Vanga, Sinhbahu was named 
his successor, but he shortly left the kingdom and founded the city of Sinhapura 
in the Lada. He married his sister, with whom he had 16 sons. The eldest son 
Vijaya was a brawler and his father had to drive him out of town. Vijaya set sail 
with 700 companions to Tambappanni (Sanskrit name of Ceylon), where they 
arrived on the day of Buddha's death (between 563 and 483 BC) (Codrington 
1926, p. 11, Lord and Bell 2007, p. 63). This place is defined as located on the 
southern bank of the estuary Malvathu River (Seneviratna 1987, p. 8). The 
relationship between Vijaya and a Yakshi spirit (Kuveni) gave the world a girl 
and a boy, the first Vedda people. Vijaya, with the help of Kuveni, defeated 
other demons inhabiting Sirivatthu and Lannapura (today Laygale and Laggala 
hills) (Upham 1833, vol. 2, p. 172). According to some messages, “Yaksha” and 
snake demons “Naga” are fairy creatures (Perera 1988, p. 4), but the pre-
dominant theories claim that these names signify primitive Veddic tribes, which 
should be backed by the fact that they mated with the invaders and gave them 
offspring.  
Finally, Vijaya brought a wife from the Indian subcontinent, a Pandu prin-
cess, but had no children. In order to perpetuate the power of the family, he 
wanted to bring his younger brother from Gujarat, but he did not come, but sent 
his youngest son Panduvasdeva, who took over power from Vijaya. 
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This myth is deeply rooted in Sri Lankan historiography, as it explains the 
early relations between the Sinhalese and the Vedda. The arrival of Pandu-
vasdeva is associated with the second wave of settlement from India, this time 
from Bengal and Odisha (Kusio 2002, p. 254).  
The Sinhalese (Sinhala) dominated the population of the island and estab-
lished the first state in the north-western part of Ceylon (Rajarata), which existed 
from the 4th century BC to 10th century AD, with a capital in Anuradhapura.  
After the colonisation of the island by Sinhalese, it started to be called the 
Sinhala Dwipa (the island of the Sinhala). The ancient Greeks imported pearls 
from Ceylon and called the island Taprobane (Taprobanam) and later Palaisi-
mundu, as noted by the explorer and historian Megasthenes around 300 BC in 
Indika (Lord and Bell 2007, pp. 15, 22). Arabs used the name Serendib, which 
was a stripped Singhalese name of the island (Kusio 2002, p. 254). The Chinese, 
who knew Ceylon earlier than the Europeans, called it Si-lan. This name was 
used to coin the Portuguese name Celão, Dutch Zeylan and English Ceylon. 
Sinhalese called their homeland Lanka. When the colonial name was abandoned 
in 1972, the country was named Sri Lanka (Holy or Beautiful Lanka). 
First settlers from India were probably followers of Hinduism, but in the 
years 273–236 BC Indian emperor Ashoka the Great of the Mauryan dynasty, 
sent missionaries in all directions with the task of spreading Buddhism. He 
treated Ceylon in a special way by sending his own son (or brother, according to 
other sources), prince Mahinda Bhikku (Mahendra). As the story goes, he met 
the king Tissa of Anuradhapura (who reigned between 250 and 210 BC) while 
hunting near Mihintale. The stranger asked the king for mango and during the 
conversation persuaded him to accept the new faith, for which the monarch 
received the title of Devanampiya (Beloved of the Gods) (Obeyesekere 1911,  
p. 16). The mission was continued by Mahinda's sister, Princess Sanghamitta, 
who brought relics from India (the collarbone of Buddha and his begging bowl) 
and a branch of the sacred tree Bo (Kusio 2002, pp. 254–255, Lord and Bell 2007,  
pp. 26, 77). The ficus which grew out of the branch is considered the oldest tree 
in the world and is now a place of worship in Anuradhapura (fig. 2), while the 
nearby Thuparamaja temple holds the remaining relics of Buddha (Cave 1904,  
p. 51). According to the Sinhalese, Buddha himself visited Ceylon four times 
(Obeyesekere 1911, pp. 2, 17) and, even though this cannot be proven in any 
historical sources, the places related to the supposed visits are considered to be 
sacred. The texts brought to the island by Mahinda were translated into Pali, 
from which contemporary Sinhalese writing derives. Ceylon became a centre of 
the Buddhist Pali canon. Here, in Aluvihara, the Tripitaka was written, the 
sacred text of the Theravada, while Kandy hosts the biggest Buddhist relic – the 
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tooth of Buddha. Buddhism became the state religion in Ceylon (Kusio 2002,  
p. 254) and the stupas became a permanent feature of the landscape of Ceylon, 
and today the main architectural tourist attraction (Elkanidze 1990, p. 53, Rana-
weera 2004). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Sacred Bo tree in Anuradhapura 
Source: author's photo 
The main Tamil settlement wave did not come to the island until the 10th cen-
tury, but already in the 3rd century BC the people, or its Dravidian predecessors, 
came from the Indian subcontinent by land via Adam's Bridge (Kusio 2002,  
p. 255, Lord and Bell 2007, p. 66). Archaeological sites in the north-west of 
Ceylon show the similarities between the cultures and the megalithic findings in 
southern India (Bopearachchi 2004a, b). Tamil invaders often sat on the throne in 
Anuradhapura and they finally conquered it in the 10th century. In 145 BC, 
Tamil general from Kola named Elara conquered Anuradhapura and ruled it  
for 44 years, as stated in the Mahavamsa (The Mahāvaṃsa... 1912, pp. XXI, 20, 
13). Tamils ruled the northern part of Ceylon twice more, in 1st century BC and 
5th century AD (Kusio 2002, p. 255).  
Until the 4th century AD, Tamils also professed Buddhism, and the coex-
istence with Sinhalese was peaceful. The ethnic and religious division of the 
island started late, in 14th century, when the Tamil north and Sinhalese south 
diverged religiously and linguistically.  
The third ethnic and religious group of Ceylon, the Muslims, are the descend-
ants of Arab merchants who explored the Indian Ocean. First contacts were 
made in ancient times, when Arabs had their own street in Anuradhapura, where 
Marek Sobczyński 
 
112 
they traded horses and spices (Zulkiple and Jazeel 2013, p. 183). Back then, 
though, they were not followers of Islam yet, as it spread in the west coast from 
Galle to Jaffna in the 7th century. Arabs monopolised European trade with 
Ceylon until the Portuguese came to the island. After the occupation the coast 
they were living along, the Muslims sought refuge in the Kingdom of Kandy, in 
the interior, populating the towns of Gampola, Mawanella, Welimada and 
Akuressa, where they still live (Lord and Bell 2007, p. 71). During the Dutch 
and British colonisation, Indonesian and Malay workers, also Muslim, were 
brought to the plantations (Zulkiple and Jazeel 2013, p. 185). The British also 
brought Indian Muslims from the Kush Peninsula.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Spatial differentiation  
of occurrence of ethnically-dominated  
areas in Ceylon (2012) 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_ 
of_Sri_Lanka#/ media/File:Sri_Lanka_-
_Ethnicity_2012.png (4.04.2016) 
 
The dominant population of Sri Lanka according to the 2011 census are 
Buddhist Sinhalese, constituting 75% of the population and populating over  
77% of the island (fig. 3). The second largest ethnic and religious group are 
mostly Hinduist Tamils, divided into two groups: indigenous Lankan Tamils and 
Indian Tamils who came from the subcontinent relatively recently (during the 
British colonisation). The first group represents 11% of the population and 
dominates in almost 17% of the island in the north and east of the island, while 
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the Indian Tamils brought to work in plantations constitute little more than  
4% and live in various places, even though their domination can only be seen in 
three enclaves of the Central Massif that constitute as little as 2% of the island. 
Muslims (ethnically descendent from Arabs, Malays, Bengals), known here as 
Moors, are a significant group in the ethnic and religious structure, with 9% of 
the population and dominating in several enclaves constituting less than 4% of 
the island on both coasts. Less than 1% of Sri Lanka are mixed areas, where no 
ethnic group predominates.  
The European population appeared in Ceylon as late as the 16th century. The 
relationships between Portuguese and Dutch colonists with local population, 
both Sinhalese and Tamil, lead to the formation of a small mixed community, 
which feels Dutch in origin and dubs themselves Burghers or Dutch Burghers 
(Boxer 1980, pp. 226–227, Lord and Bell 2007, p. 73). According to the 2011 
census, there is less that 40 thousand Burghers (or 0.19% of the population). 
The spread of the Christian faith on the island is attributed to St. Thomas the 
Apostle, who arrived in 52 AD with the mission to the Indian Kerala, and the 
faith spread through him to Ceylon in 72 AD, which was proven by a crucifix 
found archeologists in Anuradhapura (Elias 2004, p. 203). However, a more 
significant influx of Christians involved European colonisation, first Portuguese 
started in 1505 (Catholicism), then Dutch from 1656 (Calvinism), then British 
from 1796 (Anglicanism). 
3. NATIONAL GENESIS OF PRE-COLONIAL  
COUNTRIES IN CEYLON 
The beginnings of the history of political and territorial structures in Sri 
Lanka not only are lost in the mists of time but, even worse, are intertwined with 
fables, legends and stories closely related to the beginning of Buddhism on the 
island. It is therefore difficult to discern which structures and characters were 
historical and which were legendary, which is not facilitated by Sri Lankan 
historiography, biased by religious ideology. It seems that the ethnic structure 
already existing before the Sinhalese came to the island became interwoven with 
the founding myth. The same myth is intertwined with the structures that, as 
historical studies show us, were created after the 543 BC. Mahavamsa, the main 
source of knowledge about the island's history, informs us almost solely about 
Sinhalese rulers, with only incidental mentions of Tamil settlement. There is no 
doubt, though, that Sri Lanka has been a multiethnic country since time im-
memorial (Ross and Matles 1990, p. 5). 
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As the tribes of Yaksha and Naga are considered to be the first population, 
they are attributed with creating the initial territorial structures. The Naga tribe 
probably created Nagapida and Kelaniya (fig. 4). The problem is that the genesis 
of this people is still disputed by historians. The Nagas (Nayinaar) came from 
the Tamil kingdom of Chera located in the Indian subcontinent, where they 
watched borders, defense walls and borderland fortresses. Ptolemy described the 
Nagas as a Dravidian people, who spoke Tamil (Seneviratna 1987, p. 6). There 
are also views that the Nagas were not Tamils, but a separate people (Holt 2011, 
p. 74). It is therefore difficult to say unambiguously whether the first territorial 
structures in Ceylon were created by Veddas, Yakshas, who surely were such  
a people, but did not form any lasting structures, or a people of Tamil origin, 
maybe Nagas.  
The Kingdom of Nagadipa included the northern part of Ceylon, with the 
rulers seat situated on the island of Nainativu in the Palk Strait. According to 
Mahavamsa, during his second visit to Ceylon in the 6th century BC, Buddha had 
to resolve a dispute between the rulers of Nagadipa Kelaniya concerning a richly 
decorated throne (The Mahāvaṃsa... 1912, p. 7). 
The Kingdom of Kelaniya included the western part of Ceylon, and the seat 
of the ruler was in Kelaniya (now a suburb of Colombo) (Weerakoon 2002). 
Newer studies show, however, that Kelaniya stretched over the river Heda, on 
the east coast, on the Gulf of Arugam, which is contrary to its previous location, 
and was built much later, in 237 BC. 
The founder of the first Sinhalese political-territorial structure of Ceylon was 
Prince Vijaya, who in 543 BC settled on the west coast between the modern 
towns of Chilaw and Mannar. The capital was located in Nuwara Tamm, near 
the modern Puttalam (Upham 1833, vol. 2, p. 176). The country, like the whole 
island, was called Tambapanni (fig. 4). Vijaya's leaders were pushing inland, 
expanding the territory in the north-western part of Ceylon, and founded more 
cities between the rivers of Malwathu and Kala (Perera 1988, p. 5). The eco-
nomy was based on the cultivation of rice, that needed relatively even ground 
and the ability to irrigate easily using canals (Ross and Matles 1990, p. 10).  
After the death of Prince Vijaya in 505 BC, the capital was moved to 
Upatissa Nuwara (also called Vijtapura, located near today's Mannar). In 504 
BC, the nephew of Vijaya Panduvasa came from India to marry the daughter of 
Buddha's cousin Sakya Pandu (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 8). His six brothers-in-law 
founded cities that they ruled over: Anuradhapura, Uruvela, Dighayu, Vijitagama 
and Ramagona Rohana (now Mahāgãma in Hambantota district) (Codrington 
1926, p. 12, Seneviratna 1987, p. 8). At that time, the historic division of Ceylon 
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into three great provinces happened. Rajarata (also called Pihiti) is a part of the 
island located north of the rivers Mahaweli Ganga and Deduru, with major 
centers in Anuradhapura (the capital) and Polonnaruwa where Sinhalese domina-
tion was indisputable. This province occupied 28,750 km2, or nearly 44% of the 
island. To the south of these rivers, on the west coast of Ceylon was Maya (also 
called Dakkhinadesa), cut off in the south by Kalu Ganga, with its capital in 
Dedigama, also dominated by the Sinhalese. It occupied an area of almost  
11 thousand km2, which represents less than 17% of the island. South of the 
Mahaweli Ganga and the Kalu Ganga was the Rohana province, including  
a central massif known as Malaya (Blaze 1933, p. 12, Kusio 2002, p. 255). 
This province, with the seat of the ruler in Magama, Kataragama, and later in 
Tissamaharama, covered an area of nearly 26 thousand km2 or less than 40% of 
the island. The reign of Sinhalese there was illusory for a long time, as there 
were still strong structures of the indigenous Veddic population (fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Ceylon in pre-state times and  
the historical regions of the island 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
Kusio (2002, p. 256); 
https://sirimunasiha.files.wordpress.com/ 
2011/08/ancient-map.jpg; 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_ 
of_Sri_Lanka (3.03.2016) 
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Fig. 5. Political division of the Kingdom  
of Anuradhapura 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Anuradhapura_Kingdom (3.03.2016) 
 
Pandukabhai (reigned 437–367 BC) is considered to be the first historical 
king, who ended clan conflicts among the Sinhalese and initiated the political 
state, making deep social transformations (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 12). This ruler 
organised efficient administration, built water reservoirs and irrigation systems, 
cared for the poor and the religious life. Unfortunately, the story of his reign is 
also hard to discern from myths and legends. The very origin of the ruler is 
unclear. Some sources indicate Aryan origin (The Mahāvaṃsa...1912, p. 67), 
while others claim that the king came from the Tamil kingdom of Pandya 
(Caldwell 1881, p. 14). Pandukabhaya's reign lasted up to 70 years, and his most 
important achievement was to transfer the capital of the country in 377 BC to 
Anuradhapura (Codrington 1926, p. 12). The city remained the capital of the 
Sinhala state for over 100 years. At the apex of its development, it was believed 
to have approx. 2 million inhabitants and covered an area of 40 km2 (Banda-
ranayake 1994, p. 4, Lord and Bell 2007, p. 221). 
Initially rulers controlled only the northern part of Ceylon, but it was not 
absolute dominion. Periodically, independent political-territorial structure 
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emerged, especially in the final period of the Kingdom of Anuradhapura  
(in the 10th and 11th centuries). During this reign, from king Devanampyia Tissa  
(307–287 BC), Buddhism was implemented and strengthened on the island.  
After the death of the charismatic ruler, a period of destabilisation started in 
Ceylon, which involved both internal divisions in the Sinhalese state, periodic 
elimination of their power to the indigenous rulers in the south but, above all, 
more and more frequent occupation by rulers from the south of the subcontinent 
(Tamils). 
This happened for the first time in 237 BC, after king Suratissa of Anuradha-
pura, the last in Vijaya's dynasty was dethroned by Tamil horse merchants who 
came from southern India – Sena and Guttgaka, who ruled for another 22 years 
(Obeyesekere 1911, p. 23). Murdering the usurpers did not result in political 
normalisation, the Sinhalese regained the throne for just one decade (215–205 BC) 
and were succeeded for the next 44 years in Anuradhapura by Elara, the Tamil 
leader of the Chola. He divided the country into feudal governorships, ruled by 
the Sinhalese, who styled themselves kings of their countries (Lord and Bell 
2007, p. 27). The Sinhalese ruler of Rohana, Dutugemunu started an armed 
uprising against Tamil reign by organising a north-bound expedition to take 
power from the Tamil invaders using an offensive elephant named Kandula 
(Obeyesekere 1911, p. 26, Codrington 
1926, p. 16). He conquered 32 local 
kingdoms to finally defeat Elara in an 
elephant duel. In 161 BC, this ruler of 
Anuradhapura provided the Sinhalese 
with power over the whole island for 
the first time. 
Under Dutugemunu (161–137 BC), 
Anuradhapura has been significantly ex-
panded. Great temples were built in vast 
parks, including Ruwanwelisaya (the 
Grand Stupa) (Codrington 1926, p. 17) 
(fig. 6). Dutugemunu is recognised in 
Sri Lanka as a great ruler, and Mahava-
msa devotes almost 30% of its chapters 
to descriptions of his achievements. His 
role in strengthening Buddhism and 
founding monasteries is especially ap-
preciated.  
 
Fig. 6. Great Stupa (Ruwanwelisaya)  
in Anuradhapura 
Source: author's photo 
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King Dutugemunu did not establish clear rules of inheritance and the rule of 
dozens of his successors was a period of great fluctuations on the throne (with 
the average term of below one year), dynastic murders, civil wars and dethron-
ing (Lord and Bell 2007, p. 28). Between 103 and 89 BC Tamil kings ruled 
Anuradhapura. 
The Vijaya dynasty expired in the 1st century AD, and the Kingdom of 
Anuradhapura was swept in the rivalry of two families: Sinhalese Lambakanna 
and probably Hindu Moriya. The victorious Vasabha gave rise to the Lamba-
kanna dynasty that ruled until the death of king Mittasena in 436 (Obeyesekere 
1911, p. 55, Kusio 2002, p. 255).  
The subsequent period in the history of the Kingdom of Anuradhapura was 
characterised by strong internal tensions and the raids of Tamils from the Indian 
subcontinent. The area under Sinhalese control was limited to the south-eastern 
part of the island – Rohana. Anuradhapura was finally liberated from foreign 
domination by king Dhatusena Moriya, the builder of the largest water reservoir 
in the capital (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 77, Pieris and Naish 1920, p. 11, Codrington 
1926, p. 21).  
Further fate of the Sinhalese Kingdom of Anuradhapura were tightly connect-
ed to the growing influence or invasions of the Tamil rules from India. While 
trying to move away from the enemy, the Sinhalese moved their capital south-
wards several times, always placing it in the centre of the island, and not on the 
coast. 
The first relocation took place after the assassination of Dhatusena by his son 
Kashyapa who, fearing retaliation from his brother Mogallana, who fled to India, 
in 477 moved from Anuradhapura to Sigiriya, a rock towering 200 m over the 
plain (Cave 1904, p. 122, Obeyesekere 1911, pp. 80–82, Codrington 1926, p. 21, 
Seneviratna 1987, p. 26, Bandaranayake 1994, p. 7). The place, decorated with 
over 500 frescoes, is now protected by UNESCO and is one of the symbols of 
Sri Lanka (fig. 7).  
Moggallana regained the throne in 495 and returned the capital to Anuradha-
pura, but the country became the fief of the rules of Tamil Indian kingdoms, who 
manned the throne with their puppet kings (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 85). Formally 
the Sinhalese Kingdom of Anuradhapura fell into decline and was the object of 
frequent invasions of the Chola Empire, which ended in 933 with king Mahinda V 
losing power and being exiled to the south of the island and, later in 1017, being 
deported to India (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 131, Codrington 1926, p. 26, Senevi-
ratna 1987, pp. 28–29) (fig. 8).  
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Fig. 7. Sigiriya – temporary seat of the king of Anuradhapura – Kashyapa, included  
in the UNESCO protection of the world cultural and natural heritage 
Source: author's photo 
 
 
Fig. 8. The spatial extent of the Chola Empire in 10th–11th centuries 
Source: author's elaboration according to: http://www.leisuretravelsrilanka. 
com/-blog/Anuradhapura (4.04.2016) 
Formally, the Kingdom of Anuradhapura under the Tamil rule survived until 
1070. By then, the Chola Empire reached the Malay Archipelago, and its regres-
sion ended the 1500 years of independent Ceylon. 
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Despite only a 75 year period of Tamil occupation Anuradhapura, whose 
buildings spread out over a distance of 25 km, was completely ruined. Tamil 
governors moved the capital to Polonnaruwa, which retained its functions even 
after the occupation ended. Anhuradhapura has never risen from recession, and 
today, despite being one of the key objects of tourism in Sri Lanka, has a popu-
lation of only 50.6 thousand (2012).  
Throughout its existence, from prince Vijaya to Mahinda the 5th (543 BC to 
1017 AD) the kingdom of Anuradhapura (Rajarata) was ruled by five dynasties: 
Vijaya (until 205 BC), whose representative Pandukabhaya founded the king-
dom of Anuradhapura, Ruhuna dynasty, related to them (until 66), Lambakanna 
(until 455), Moriya (until 684), and the second Lambakanna (until 1017). 
Rajarata was also temporarily ruled by Tamil kings from the Indian sub-
continent, or Tamil occupation in 237–215, 205–161, 103–89 BC, 436–463 and 
1017–1070 AD. Thus, the Tamil rule in the Kingdom of Rajarta with its capital 
in Anuradhapura lasted for 160 years, but we should also add the rule of the 
house of Moriya of unknown Hindu origin (462–491 or 28 years). This means 
that the Sinhalese reign lasted for 87% of the Kingdom of Auradhapura's 
existence. 
Polonnaruwa was a city located at the passage through the Mahaweli Ganga 
river and was one of five main administrative centres of Rajarata. As shown by 
archaeological research, it is older than Anuradhapura. According to local 
mythology, it was founded in 400 BC by the brother-in-law of king Panduwasa  
– Vijtha (as Vijthagama). It became the capital of the Kingdom of Anuradha-
pura, occupied by the Chola Empire, after the old capital was conquered and the 
Sinhalese statehood was removed in 1017. The Tamils dubbed it Djananatha-
mangalam.  
The Tamil reign did not include the whole island, as Sinhalese rulers kept 
control over the south part. This is where the offensive was launched from by the 
King of Ruhuna – Vijayabahu, who resided in Kataragama, which banished the 
Tamil invaders after a 17-year war. Polonnaruwa was conquered in 1070, after  
a 7-month siege, but also a civil war in the Chola Empire, when Burma and 
Panja also rose against them (Codrington 1926, p. 33). Vijayabahu founded 
another dynasty and Polonnaruwa again became the capital of the Sinhalese 
state, now called the Kingdom of Polonnaruwa. Vijayabahu reestablished 
Buddhism, weakened during the reign of Hindu Tamils. In Polonnaruwa, a new 
temple was erected to protect the tooth relic of the Buddha. Reservoir were 
rebuilt, some new ones were also constructed in order to expand the irrigation  
of the rice fields. The network of roads and shelters for pilgrims was also ex-
panded. 
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The Kingdom of Plonnaruwa was ruled alternately by two Sinhalese dynas-
ties, Vijayabahu and Kalingha, with just one year of Tamil reign. After 1211, 
however, it was ruled by just two Tamil dynasties – Pandyan and Kalinga from 
the Indian line. Of the 180 years of existence of the Kingdom of Polonnarua 
(1056–1236), Sinhalese rule lasted 157 years or 83.5%.  
The most outstanding ruler of Polonnaruwa was Parakramabahu, who took 
the throne in 1161, following a 40-year civil war (Codrington 1926, p. 33).  
It was during his reign that the city gained its most important buildings that have 
lasted to this day (Obeyesekere 1911, pp. 154–167). The lack of water has 
forced the construction of an artificial reservoir Parakrama Samudra (the Sea of 
Parakrama), with an area of 2030 ha with 11 channels to distribute water 
(Seneviratna 1987, pp. 30–31). The monarch's residences were built on the shore 
(the Palace, Baths, Summer Palace), that can compete in size and beauty with 
the later gardens of Versailles. A citadel was built, which served as a de facto 
administrative centre of the country, as well as numerous temples, including the 
famous Gal Vihara, carved in stone, with the monument of the resting Buddha 
(Senadeera 1990, p. 243) (fig. 9). The history of Ceylon from the period of the 
reign of King Parakramabachu is described in the other Sinhalese epic chronicle 
besides Mahavamsa, the Culavamsa... (1998). 
The conquest and destruction of Polonnaruwa by the Tamils caused the 
Sinhalese elites and Buddhist monks to leave the city and found new capitals, 
whose names served as the names for consecutive kingdoms (Obeyesekere 1911, 
p. 178, Casparis 1990, p. 67). The abandoned capital was taken over by the 
jungle in early 14th century, and the remains were only discovered during British 
rule by archeologist Stephen Montague Burrows in 1886 (Mitton 1917, p. 131). 
 
  
Fig. 9. Polonnaruwa – the ruins of the royal palace  
and the rock temple of Gal Vihara 
Source: author's photo 
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Until the 12th century, the Sinhalese rule in Ceylon was well-grounded and 
Tamils did not create any political entities, just occupied the island during the 
invasion of their troops from India or by imposing their kings or the fief system 
on the kingdoms of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. It was only after the 
invasion of the Jaffna Peninsula in 1215 of the ruler of Kalinga in India (today's 
Odisha state) named Magha, that the Tamil Jaffna kingdom was formed in the 
north of Ceylon with its capital in Nallura (now the northern part of Jaffna) 
(Codrington 1926, p. 38). Initially, the kingdom covered only the peninsula and 
did not exceed the area of 1330 km2 (fig. 10).  
 
 
Fig. 10. The territorial transformations  
of the Jaffna Kingdom in the years  
1215–1619 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaffna 
_kingdom#/media/File:Jaffna 
_Kingdom.jpg (4.04.2016) 
 
Tamils quickly conquered the north-eastern and north-western part of 
Ceylon, divided into a number of local monarchies (Wanni), expanding their 
territory at the expense of Sinhalese Polonnaruwa, which they ultimately ruined. 
Around 1350, the Kingdom of Jaffna controlled an area of 16.6 thousand km2. 
For a brief period after 1353, the Tamils imposed a fief system on all Sinhalese 
kingdoms in Ceylon. Only once, around 1450, the Jaffna Kingdom was invaded 
by the Sinhalese Kingdom of Kotte, which occupied the northern part of the 
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island until 1467. After the invaders were pushed out, the economic potential of 
Jaffna was rebuilt, basing it on pearl and elephant trade. Even though it was also 
feudal, the Jaffna Kingdom had a more modern system, developed Tamil litera-
ture, opened an Indian academy and strengthened Hinduism by building numer-
ous temples.  
The regression of the Jaffna Kingdom started with the arrival, in 1505, of 
Portuguese colonists, for whom the Palk Strait that connected all Tamil countries 
was strategically important. Around 1520, a stable border between Tamil and 
Sinhalese states emerged, and the Jaffna Kingdom occupied around 7.5 thou-
sand km2. In 1617, a civil war broke out in Jaffna, which the Portuguese used to 
limit the area of the kingdom and by putting their citizen Don Constantine de 
Bragança on the throne, to finally, in 1619, remove all independence of the first 
pre-colonial Tamil state in Ceylon.  
After the Jaffna invasion of Polonnaruwa, Sinhalese king Vijayabahu III 
chose Dambadeniya in western Ceylon to be his new seat and erected a fortress 
there. The Kingdom of Dambadeniya 
peaked during the reign of king Para-
kramabahu II (1236–1270), which saw 
not only economic development, but 
also the creation of significant poetic 
works, including ones penned by the 
monarch himself (Codrington 1926,  
p. 43). The ruler united three kingdoms 
in Sri Lanka, and even reclaimed Po-
lonnaruwa, where he crowned himself 
(Kusio 2000, p. 256), but the city was 
not fit to serve as a capital any more 
and was soon reclaimed by the Tamils 
from Jaffna. Another Sinhalese ruler, 
Bhuvaneka Bahu, faced with the Tamil 
invasion in 1272, moved the capital 
again, this time to Yapahuwa in the 
west coast (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 188). 
After being conquered by the Tamils, 
Yapahuwa fell into regression and 
abandoned, to be inhabited only by 
Buddhist monks. Despite the threat 
from the invaders from India, the next 
 
Fig. 11. The changing capitals  
of Sri Lanka over the ages 
Source: author's elaboration 
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ruler, Parakramabachu III (1287–1293) reclaimed Polonnaruwa again to move 
his seat there, as well as to hide the tooth of Buddha relic in a local temple 
(Obeyesekere 1911, p. 189, Codrington 1926, p. 44). In 1303, the ruler died and 
the capital of the Sinhalese state was once again moved by his successor, this 
time to Kurunegala in the south (fig. 11–12).  
Kurunegala served as the capital for over four decades, with the peak of the 
Kingdom of Kurunegala during the reign of king Parakramabahu IV (1302 
–1326), when several temples were built, including Alutnuwara Dewale in the 
capital and Asgiriya Vihara in Kandy (Codrington 1926, p. 45). For unknown 
reasons, in 1347, king Parakramabahu V started his reign in another Sinhalese 
capital, Gampola (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 190).  
 
  
Fig. 12. Kurunegala – city center, left in the background an ancient citadel hill; Kandy  
– Dalada Maligawa temple (Tooth of the Buddha), the final location of the relic 
Source: author's photo 
 
At the end of the existence of the Kingdom of Kurunegala, decentralisation 
tendencies grew in the Sinhalese state, with two concurrent centres of power. 
King Bhuwanekabahu IV resided in Gampola, while his brother Parakramabahu 
V stayed in Dedigama, 50 km away, and only moved to Gampola after inheriting 
the throne (Obeyesekere 1911, pp. 194–195) (fig. 13). At the end of the 16th cen-
tury, the house of Alagakonnara, newcomers from southern India, Hindus 
fleeing the subcontinent due to Muslim invasion, seized the throne. They effec-
tively stopped the Tamil dynasty of Arya Chakravarti, which tried to expand to 
the southern Sinhalese islands. A representative of this house, Nissanka Alagak-
konara, erected the Jayawardenepura fortress in the coast, called Kotte (meaning 
fortress in Sinhalese) (Kusio 2002, p. 257).  
The last king to rule in Gampola was Bhuvaneka Bahu V, who ruled for  
29 years. At the same time another ruler, Veerabahu II, resided in Raigama (non- 
-existent city east of today's Horana) of the Alagakkonara (Obeyesekere 1911,  
p. 196). 
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Fig. 13. Gampola – the centre of the town, now with less  
than 30 thousand inhabitants; Kandy – the city centre 
Source: author's photo 
 
In 1415, the last ruler of Gampola, Parakramabahu VI, moved his seat to 
Kotte, thus initiating another Sinhalese political and territorial structure in the 
history of Ceylon, namely the kingdom of Kotte. This was another state that 
succeeded in taking control over the whole island (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 203, 
Codrington 1926, p. 47). 
Similarly to many Sinhalese kings, the ruler of Kotte was faced with 
defending the independence against the Tamil invasion from Jaffna. In a north- 
-bound offensive, Parakramabahu IV conquered the Wanni region and suc-
ceeded in driving out the king of Jaffna. The Tamil political-territorial structure 
briefly disappeared from Ceylon making it the last time until Ceylon finally 
became independent in 1948 that the whole island was ruled by the Sinhalese. 
However, the king of Kotte had some internal troubles, as the middle part of 
Ceylon, Udarata-Kandy tried to break away. Parakramabahu VI managed to 
conquer Kandy and pacify the secession (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 198). Following 
the death of the king, a fight for the throne erupted in Kotte and the Tamils 
rebuilt the Kingdom of Jaffna. Udarata also separated as an independent Sinhala 
kingdom with its capital in Senkadagala (today's Kandy). Before the death of 
Bhuvanekabahu VI in 1477, the kingdom of Kotte occupied just the south-
western part and a small area in the north-west of Ceylon, but it survived up 
until the arrival of European colonists and was formally disbanded on May 27, 
1597 (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 204, Kusio 2002, pp. 257–258). 
The geographical location of the new Sinhala Kingdom of Udarata was very 
beneficial to its defensive function. It occupied a hard-to-reach Central Massif, 
as well as the eastern and south-eastern parts of the island, reaching the coast. 
The most important centres were located in mountain valleys. Therefore, this 
structure resisted European colonisation in Ceylon the longest and survived until 
October 1818. 
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Kandy, originally called Senkadagala or Senkadagalupara, was founded in 
the second half of the 14th century, in the Kingdom of Gampola (Codrington 
1926, p. 45) (fig. 13). The new dynasty and the kingdom of Kandy was founded 
by a member of the royal family from Kotte – Sena Sammatha Wickramabahu 
(who ruled from 1437 to 1511). He initially recognised the formal supremacy of 
Kotte, but his successors achieved full sovereignty. When Rajasingha I assumed 
power, perturbations followed, as the king left the throne of Kandy to take the 
reign of the neighbouring kingdom of Sitawaka. The normalisation of internal 
situation in Kandy came when Konappu Bandara assumed power and crowned 
himself as Vimala Dharma Suriya I. He managed to consolidate Buddhism and 
bring the tooth of Buddha to Kandy, where it stayed.   
 
 
Fig. 14. The political-territorial structures  
of Ceylon before the Portuguese  
invasion in 1505 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinhalese% 
E2%80%93 Portuguese_War (5.04.2016) 
 
Immediately before the arrival of European colonisers, Ceylon was therefore 
divided into six political-territorial units (fig. 14). The largest area in the centre, 
east and south of the island was occupied by the Sinhala kingdom of Kandy 
(Udarata). Its area was around 32 thousand km2, or more than 48% of the island. 
To the north, there was the Jaffna Kingdom, which occupied just its namesake 
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peninsula, or only 1.3 thousand km2. However, the northern part of Wanni region 
recognised the power of Jaffna as a fiefdom, so the total area of the Jaffna King-
dom was around 4.5 thousand km2 or 7% of the island. The southern part of the 
Wanni region, an area of approx. 5.7 thousand km2 (almost 9% of Ceylon), was 
occupied by independent Tamil tribal duchies. The west coast was controlled by 
the second-largest structure, the Sinhala kingdom of Kotte (13.7 thousand km2, 
almost 21% of the island). In the southern part of the borderland between Uda-
rata and Kotte, there were smaller monarchies of Sitawaka (4.6 thousand km2, 
7% of Ceylon) and Raigama (5.2 thousand km2, almost 8% of the island), that 
gradually grew more and more independent of their neighbours. 
4. ETHNIC GENESIS OF THE POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL 
STRUCTURES IN COLONIAL-ERA CEYLON 
On November 11, 1505, Portuguese fleet appeared at the coast of Ceylon, led 
by the son of the first governor of Portuguese India – Lourenço de Almeida. The 
Portuguese did not meet the local kings in peace, so they left quickly, only to 
come back in 1518 to conquer and colonise the island (Małowist 1992, p. 242). 
In 1518, the Portuguese were allowed by the king of Kotte to erect a fortress 
in Colombo for trade purposes, and to create a cinnamon monopoly to compete 
with the Muslim one. The fort was built by Lopo Soares de Albergaria (Silva 
1987, p. 475). The presence of the Portuguese complicated the political situation 
in Kotte. In 1521, the state broke apart when the ruler of Kotte, backed by the 
Portuguese, clashed with his brother, who ruled Sitawaka and was in turn sup-
ported by Udarata and the ruler of Indian Calicut (Obeyesekere 1911, pp. 211 
–215). During the conflict, which lasted until the end of the 16th century, 
Sitawaka grew in independence and Kotte fell into dependency with Portugal. 
The successor to the Kotte Kingdom's throne, Dharmapala, was a vassal of the 
Portuguese and was baptised as King John, which weakened his position among 
his own subjects (Codrington 1926, p. 52). The act of baptism was treated as 
treason and became a pretext for rulers of Sitawaka to attack Kotte. John had to 
flee to Colombo under the care of Portuguese troops. On the day of the childless 
passing of Dharmapala on May 27, 1597, the rule of the Kingdom of Kotte was 
transferred to Portugal, and the kingdom ceased to exist (Codrington 1926, p. 55, 
Kusio 2002, p. 258) (fig. 15). Administratively, Ceylon belonged to Portuguese 
India, with capital in Goa. 
Apart from colonisation, the Portuguese also started their missionary work  
by locating a Catholic mission in Mannar, which belong to Jaffna Kingdom.  
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In 1544, the Tamil army massacred the entire population, both clerics and con-
verts in the mission (Philalethes and Knox 1817, p. 226). In response, the Portu-
guese punitive expedition won Jaffna, but ultimately settled for just annexing the 
island of Mannar in 1561 (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 231). An expedition in 1591 
has led to the conquest of Jaffna and the vassalisation of its king. The formal 
annexation of the Kingdom of Jaffna to the Portuguese Ceilão took place in 1619 
(Kusio 2002, p. 259). Jaffna's lands were taken over by Portuguese owners, 
which was the only example of agrarian colonisation in the region (Silva 1987, 
p. 355). 
 
 
Fig. 15. The political and territorial  
structures in Ceylon at the beginning  
 of Portuguese colonisation around 1520 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinhalese% 
E2%80%93 Portuguese_War (5.04.2016) 
 
The Portuguese reign in Ceylon changed the political structures of the island, 
both in number and spatial range, as well as significantly altered the Sinhala- 
-Tamil relations. Tamils still living in northern Ceylon lost the sovereignty of 
their Jaffna Kingdom, while the Sinhala lost control over most of the Kingdom 
of Kotte, which nonetheless survived the Portuguese rule. In the remaining part 
of Ceylon, the Sinhalese kingdom of Udarata (Kandy) strengthened, but the 
Sinhala kingdoms of Raigama and Sitawaka also formed, which meant the  
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de facto weakening of Sinhala statehood (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 226, Codrington 
1926, p. 52). The Kingdom of Kandy was the only independent political- 
-territorial structure in the 17th-century Ceylon to preserve the Sinhalese culture, 
Buddhist religion and its relics against the invasion of Latin culture (Kusio 2002, 
p. 260) (fig. 16). 
 
 
Fig. 16. The maximum reach of 
Portuguese power in Ceylon in the 1630s 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
M. Ramerini and D. Köster (1998),  
J. Kusio (2002, p. 259), K.M. Silva (2008) 
 
A the end of their reign in Ceylon, Portugal itself became part of the Spanish 
monarchy and, before they freed themselves, they started losing property in 
Ceylon to another coloniser, the Netherlands, whose ships arrived on the island 
in 1609 (Philalethes and Knox 1817, p. 117, Silva 1987, p. 483). 
Anticipating their expansion to Ceylon, the Dutch started a relationship with 
the Kingdom of Kandy, and its ruler Rajasinha II made a treaty in 1638 against 
the Portuguese (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 247, Schrikker 2006, p. 21). The Dutch 
took over the monopoly in trading with the island, promising military support 
against Portugal in exchange. The Dutch invasion of Ceylon began from the 
eastern coast, with landings in Trincomalee on May 2, 1639, in Batticaloa – on 
May 18 and on the south coast in Galle – on March 13, 1640. The last port to be 
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taken over at this stage of the invasion was Negombo in the west coast 
(Philalethes and Knox 1817, p. 113).  
The conquered lands were called the Zeylan colony (Boxer 1980, p. 155, Kusio 
2002, p. 260). The Dutch possessions were territorially more modest compared 
to the Portuguese ones, and the Kingdom of Kandy remained sovereign and kept 
access to both coasts. The Dutch controlled the entire north of the island (Jaffna 
and Wanni), the east coast near Trincomalee and from Batticaloa through the 
south coast to Negombo in the west, but the belt they controlled was only  
a dozen or so kilometers wide. Only in the south-west, the colonists' property 
reached deeper inland to include the former Portuguese cinnamon plantations 
(the old Kotte and Sitawaki lands). The Kingdom of Udarata fully controlled the 
interior of Ceylon, including almost all the ancient capitals (fig. 17). However, 
control over almost all of the coast meant the de facto economic blockade of the 
Sinhalese state (Boxer 1980, p. 203). The hopes of Udarata rulers of taking over 
the Kotte throne have not materialised either (Kusio 2002, p. 260). 
 
 
Fig. 17. The maximum reach of Dutch 
power in Ceylon in the second half  
of the 18th century 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
M. Ramerini and D. Köster (1998),  
J. Kusio (2002, p. 260), K.M. Silva (2008)  
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The total area of Dutch Ceylon (Zeylan) directly administered by the colonial 
metropolis was just over 4 thousand km2. In addition, the areas formally belong-
ing to Udarata, but actually controlled by the Dutch occupied 15.7 thousand km2, 
which means that the Dutch reign included the area of less than 20 thousand km2 
or approx. 30% of the island. Sinhala Udarata fully controlled an area of nearly 
46 thousand km2 or 70% of Ceylon and was the only sovereign state on the 
island. 
The Dutch-Kandy relations were correct for more than 150 years, even 
though there were tensions. The Dutch invaded Kandy twice. When the Sinhala 
dynasty expired in 1739, the Nayakkars from Indian Madurai took the throne,  
a Dravi family which was foreign to the Sinhala (Schrikker 2006, p. 24). This 
resulted in numerous unrests, during which the monarchs had to be defended 
from overthrowing by Dutch military interventions. The Dutch won Kandy and 
occupied Udarata from February 19 to August 31, 1765 (Kusio 2002, p. 261, 
Schrikker 2006, p. 39). 
During the Dutch reign, there were two Calvinist seminars operating in 
Ceylon (in Colombo and Nallur near Jaffna), and a small population of both 
Sinhala and Tamils underwent conversion, but the religion did not remain in the 
island after the Dutch were driven out of it (Boxer 1980, p. 156). 
 
  
Fig. 18. Galle – Portuguese and Dutch forts 
Source: photo by A. Wosiak and K. Krupska 
 
At the end of the 18th century, in view of the significant weakening of 
Portugal and the Netherlands concentrating on their South-Western Asian 
acquisitions, there was a rivalry between two colonial powers, France and Great 
Britain, in the subcontinent, which had its repercussions in Ceylon.  
The first attempts to locate both metropolies in Ceylon took place in 1782, 
when the British occupied the port of Trincomalee in the east coast (January 8  
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– August 30), but they were driven out by the French, who took over the port 
from August 30, 1782 till January of 1784, turning it into their main naval base 
in the Indian Ocean, with the fleet of Admiral de Suffren, stronger than the 
British forces, stationed there (Philalethes and Knox 1817, p. 135, Dziewano-
wski 1996, p. 320). 
The actual invasion of the British East India Company in Ceylon occurred on 
August 2, 1795. Trincomalee was captured on August 31, Batticaloa on 
September 18, Jaffna on September 28, and finally Colombo on February 16, 
1796 (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 284). Under British rule, Ceylon was part of the 
Madras presidency. The British respected the autonomy of the Kingdom of 
Kandy and entered into a treaty with it (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 287). Ceylon was 
separated from British India, as a separate colony, on October 12, 1798. In 1802, 
under the Treaty of Amiens, the transition from Dutch administration and into 
the British Empire was sanctioned (Schrikker 2006, p. 134). Thus, the rank of 
the colony was raised on January 1, 1802 and it became the British crown colony 
(Codrington 1926, p. 28). 
After the political situation on the island stabilised, the British controlled all 
the coast, while the Sinhalese controlled the interior (fig. 19). In the first decade 
of the 19th century, British Ceylon occupied an area of over 31 thousand km2 
while the Kingdom of Kandy still controlled the territory with an area of  
34.5 thousand km2, or nearly 53% of Ceylon.  
However, the British divided the island into 5 provinces, the biggest being 
the Eastern (almost 18 thousand km2 and over 27% of the island's surface), with 
the North being close second and resembling the Tamil state of Jaffna in its 
furthest reach. The Central province was the smallest (6.7 thousand km2, slightly 
more than 10% of Ceylon), the area of the Kingdom of Kandy. The Southern 
Province recreated the old Rohana (12 thousand km2 or 18% of the island), 
while the Western region covered the area of the Kingdom of Kotte (almost  
11 thousand km2 and 17% of Ceylon).  
Like the Dutch, the British used the Sinhala's dislike of the Dravidian 
dynasty's rule in Kandy (Dziewanowski 1996, p. 334). The Dravidian king of 
Udarata was forced to sign the so-called Kandyan treaty on March 2, 1815, by 
which the kingdom became a separate British province under the control of  
a governor (Obeyesekere 1911, p. 305). The Sinhala population, dissatisfied with 
the conciliatory policy of the monarch, started an uprising in July 1817, which 
ended in defeat and the annexation of the kingdom of Udarata by the British 
crown colony of Ceylon on November 21, 1818 (Skinner 1891, p. 215, Mitton 
1917, p. 24). The last sovereign Sinhala political-territorial structure ceased to 
exist (Obeyesekere 1911, pp. 315–321).  
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Fig. 19. The British rule  
in Ceylon until 1815 
Source: author's elaboration according to: 
J. Kusio (2002, p. 261) 
 
On the conquered moutainous lands of Udarata, the British started tea, coffee 
and rubber plantations, with workforce imported from Tamil Nadu and Kerala in 
India, including a large Tamil population (Ferro 1997, p. 140). Taking advantage 
of the mild, cooler mountain climate, a climate station in Nuwara Eliya was 
built, styled after British architecture, to rest in the so-called “April season” 
(Kuprina 2007, p. 102) (fig. 20). Railways were built and ports expanded (Kusio 
2002, p. 261). 
The British governed Ceylon through their governor in Colombo, which 
served as the legislative and executive until 1833. After 1833, the legislature was 
taken over by the Legislative Council elected by the governor, but including 
three representatives from the main ethnic groups on the island (History... 2006, 
p. 18). This quasi-parliament worked until 1920. 
The people of Ceylon did not rise again, but focused on political activity 
aimed at regaining independence. Moreover, the Sinhalese sought to achieve  
a position in the administration that would reflect their population, as the British 
preferred the Tamils, even in ethnically Sinhala regions (Nayak 1996, p. 86).  
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Fig. 20. Nuwara Eliya – British mountain resort in the Central Massif 
Source: author's photo 
 
After the First World War, the economic protests intensified, erupting in 
riots, and the British made some arrests, including the Sinhala leader Stephen 
Senanayake. The idea of liberating this politician consolidated a group of 
activists, which led to the creation of the first political party in Ceylon in 1919  
– the National Congress, which united the Sinhala and Tamil organisations 
(Kusio 2002, p. 262). This organisation was headed by a Tamil – Arunachalam 
Ponnambalam (Ravindran 2009, p. 2). 
The constitutional reform in Ceylon performed by governor William Man-
ning in 1920–1924 democratised the system of the crown colony, introduced 
autonomy and general elections, which was not met with positive response from 
the local elites, that viewed this as a threat to the unity of the national movement. 
This was promptly confirmed as the Tamils joined the National Congress and in 
1921 formed their own political organisation – the Great Tamil Council (Sri-
skandarajah 2004, p. 5, Richards 2014, p. 9).  
The constitutional committee, under the direction of Lord Donoughmore, 
recognised the claims of the Sinhalese and in 1931 the constitution was changed 
(History... 2006, p. 19). Besides general election, a new body, the State Council, 
was introduced, with legislative and executive powers, created on the basis of 
territorial representation, which struck the minorities, mainly Tamils, who ini-
tially boycotted the reform (Kusio 2002, p. 263). To calm the internal situation, 
in 1943 the British announced the creation of a local government with broad 
powers, except for foreign and defense policies, that remained reserved for the 
colonial metropolis. Work on the parliamentary system of the colony were 
started in 1944 by Lord Soulbury's Commission (Jessy 2004, p. 135, History... 
2006, p. 21). At the same time, the Tamil organisation transformed into the All 
Ceylon Tamil Congress (Nayak 1996, p. 90, Richards 2014, p. 9). 
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5. POLITICAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS  
IN INDEPENDENT CEYLON 
Due to the diminishing superpower position of the United Kingdom, the war-
time political reforms had to be revised by weakening the position of the metro-
polis in post-colonial union, that the Commonwealth of Nations was becoming, 
devoid of the adjective “British”.  
British unequivocally supported the Sinhalese United National Party, led by 
Don Stephen Senanayake. The party won the parliamentary elections in 1947 
and formed a government, which was autonomous in internal affairs (Kusio 202, 
p. 263). The next step was to award, under the Constitution of February 4, 1948, 
sovereignty within the Commonwealth – the Dominion of Ceylon (Nayak 1996, 
p. 106, Kuprin 2007, p. 30). That meant the de facto independence, while main-
taining a monarch in common with the metropolis.  
The Sinhalese seizure of power that pushed other ethnic groups away, mainly 
the Tamils, favoured in the colonial period, had to spark internal conflicts. Only 
the British could see this as a chance to maintain their political influence as a 
necessary mediator in internal disputes and the inevitable confrontation with 
India, who viewed themselves as spokespeople for the Tamils, that had 60% of 
seats in colonial administration (Richards 2014, p. 9). The citizenship act of the 
new Ceylon government deprived approx. 800 thousand Tamils brought to the 
island by the colonists (Nayak 1996, p. 110, Jessy 2004, p. 79). The government 
of D.S. Senanayake led a Sinhalese settlement action in the east, where Tamils 
dominated (Veluppillai 2006, p. 102). 
The process of expanding the sovereignty of Ceylon proceeded gradually and 
intensified after the elections in 1956, won by the coalition of United People's 
Front and the Freedom Party (Ross and Matles 1990, p. xxviii). The government 
of Prime Minister Solomon Badaranaike increased activity in the international 
forum with Ceylon joining the United Nations and, in 1961, the so-called non- 
-aligned movement, which gave rise to the choice of the socialist way of deve-
lopment and economic dominance of the state in the economy (History... 2006, 
p. 22). The discrimination against minorities also became deeper. In 1956, 
Sinhalese became the only official language, and Buddhist traditions became the 
interpretation of social policy (Jessy 2004, p. 80, Gombrich 2006, p. 24).  
Tamils demanded territorial autonomy (Nayak 1996, p. 114) and took action 
of civil disobedience, which was met with a hostile reaction of the Sinhalese 
majority and the cleansings in 1958. (History... 2006, p. 23, Richards 2014,  
p. 10). The Sinhalese community did not fully accept the government policy, 
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which resulted in the 1959 murder of the prime minister, performed by Buddhist 
monk Talduwe Somarama (Votta 2007, p. 18). The government was headed by 
the prime minister's wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the first female prime minis-
ter in the world.  
In the 1960s, governments were formed alternatively by the United National 
Party (of Dudley Senanayake, the first prime minister's son) or the Freedom 
Party of Mrs. Bandaranaike. Her rule brought a sharp turn towards socialist, 
nationalisation and agricultural reform. As much as 80% of the land on the 
island is owned by the state (Baldwin 1991, p. 111). The political radicalisation 
led twice, in 1971 and 1987–1989, to an attempted coup on the island by the 
Maoist, Sinhala-dominated People's Liberation Front (JVP) (Kusio 2002, p. 264, 
Jessy 2004, p. 183).  
Left-wing political transformations made the continuation of the dominion 
state impossible, so the Republic of Sri Lanka was proclaimed on May 22, 1972, 
while maintaining membership in the Commonwealth (Kuprina 20017, p. 31). 
The name change was associated not only with the rejection of monarchy, but 
also of the colonial name of Ceylon, in favour of the Sinhalese name of the 
island – Lanka. Buddhism became the state religion (Revindran 2009, p. 3, Sri 
Lanka: Sinhala nationalism... 2007, p. 6). Tamils were gradually ousted from 
administration, with only 5% of them serving in offices in 1970 (Omvdet 1984, 
p. 25). In 1972, Tamil organisations formed the United Tamil Front, adding in 
1975 the term “Liberation” to the name (TULF) (Richards 2014, pp. 11–12). 
The 1977 elections were won by the United National Party, which followed 
the socialist way for the next 17 years, which resulted, among others, in trans-
forming the state, on August 7, 1978, into the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka (Ross and Matles 1990, p. xxix). This was followed by turning the 
system into a presidential republic, with Junius Richard Jayewardene as the head 
of state (Kusio 2002, p. 264). In 1982, some capital functions were moved from 
Colombo into the far outskirts, to the former capital of the Kingdom of Kotte, 
now known as Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte. 
The lack of solution to the Tamil problem throughout the whole independ-
ence of Ceylon – Sri Lanka escalated the conflict to the extent that made co- 
-existence of both nations in one state impossible. After the Tamil representation 
left the united National Congress, the Tamil powers became very fragmented, 
which made it easier for the Sinhala to implement their nationalist policies. The 
unification of Tamil organisations happened in 1975, as part of the Tamil United 
Liberation Front, headed by Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam. Its aim 
was to achieve territorial autonomy for the Tamils, in the former Kingdom of 
Sri Lanka as the borderland of nations  
 
137 
Jaffna (Stokke and Ryntveit 2000, p. 296). It is estimated, that Tamils populated 
an area of 19,509 km2 (Ravindran 2009, p. 2).  
The government's rejection of these claims led to the radicalisation among 
Tamils in the north and their support of the aims of armed organisation Tamil 
New Tiger, which had been active since 1975 (Richards 2014, p. 12). With the 
rise of social acceptance, this rebel army which united 37 guerilla groups, 
transformed into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil name of Ceylon), 
radicalised their political goals and demanded an independent Tamil state in 
northern Ceylon.  
In the 1970s, the fights against government troops took place mainly in the 
Jaffna Peninsula. Tamil troops were led by the charismatic leader Velupillai 
Prabhakaran. The guerrilla, which was unique worldwide, formed not only land 
forces, but also their own air force, special forces, female troops and navy, 
equipped with primitive submarines (Richards 2014, pp. 23–28).  
After the state of emergency was imposed by the Sinhala government in the 
north and the army in Jaffna was strengthened, the Tamils declared war on the 
Lankan state on November 27, 1982 (Richards 2014, p. 13). Attacks on govern-
ment facilities spread over the whole island, and the Tigers' advances to the 
south, in the Wanni region, became bigger and bigger.  
In the absence of the will to compromise among the Sinhala, on July 23, 1983 
the Tamils declared the secession of Tamil Eelam in northern Ceylon with its 
capital in Jaffna. This was the second separate Tamil state in Ceylon in history, 
related territorially to the initial Kingdom of Jaffna. The official response to that 
came in the form of a constitutional amendment on November 14, 1984 that 
gave local government powers to provinces (including those populated only by 
Tamils), but with the Tigers controlling the whole north of the island and large 
portions of both coasts, this was not enough to satisfy their demands. Both sides 
of the conflict proclaimed socialist ideology (Richards 2014, p. 39). The lack of 
will to agree made the Lankan government proclaim that the separatists were  
a terrorist organisation, though this view was not shared everywhere in the world 
(Nayak 1996, p. 286, Lunn et al. 2009, p. 15). 
The war continued for over thirty years, broken by truces for peace nego-
tiations, and a large strain on the economy. Lack of control over a large part of 
the territory weakened the Sinhalese economy, forced them to overspend on 
armaments, limited the possibility of democratic reforms, developing tourism 
and extracting resources. It also worsened the political position of Sri Lanka in 
the region, as it was viewed as an unstable and undemocratic state.  
In 1983, India joined the conflict in Ceylon. Both sides hoped to benefit, 
Tamils counted on support for their efforts, since help came from the govern-
Marek Sobczyński 
 
138 
ment of the Indian province of Tamil Nadu. The Sinhalese hoped that India 
would persuade the Tamils to limit their demand to autonomy. In 1987–1989 
Indian peace-keeping forces came to Ceylon. At the same time, Tamil civil local 
administration was formed, headed by the Secretariat of Tamil Eelam (Richards 
2014, p. 40). The Tamil Tigers also set up the International Secretariat in order 
to obtain international recognition of their statehood, but primarily for raising 
funds for the war, mainly from the Tamil diaspora. Support came from 32 coun-
tries all over the world (mainly Canada, Australia, the United States, France and 
Great Britain). Institutions to support the post-war reconstruction of Eelam were 
also established in Western countries (Richards 2014, pp. 51–52). The Tamil 
Tigers had their interest offices in 48 countries in total (Evolution... 2011, p. 3). 
The Sri Lankan government also made attempts to end the conflict. In 1988, 
they introduced the merger of two provinces into one North-Eastern Province 
with an area of almost 15 thousand km2, or almost 23& of Ceylon, under the 
shared Tamil-Muslim rule, and recognised Tamil as the second official language 
of the country (Ross and Matles 1990, p. xxxv, Kumara 2010, p. 69). However, 
these concessions were insufficient for radicalised Tamils, who were until that 
point contrasted by the neutral Muslims, but also sparked reaction from the 
Sinhalese, who created the extreme nationalist organisation – the National Lib-
eration Front (Kusio 2002, p. 265).  
Geopolitical changes in the world after 1989, and the loss of Soviet support, 
deepened the isolation of Sri Lanka. In the absence of the will to resolve the 
conflict peacefully, Indian troops left Sri Lanka in 1990 (Lunn et al. 2009,  
p. 10). Relations with India have deteriorated under president Ranasinghe Pre-
madasa, a supporter of forcible resolution to the conflict (Kuprin 2007, p. 32). 
The radicalisation could also be seen among the Tamils, the Tigers took Jaffna, 
which so far remained under government control, and started the formation of 
administrative structures of their own state. Sri Lanka replied with an economic 
sea blockade of Eelam. Tamils reached for terrorism, with suicide attacks on the 
island and beyond. There have been successful attempts on the lives of Prime 
Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 (Calvocoressi 2002, p. 538) and Sri 
Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993 (Richards 2014, p. 24, Yass 
2014, p. 68).  
The situation did not change when the daughter of two former prime minis-
ters Bandaranaike, Chandrika Kumaratunga, took power (Sriskandarajah 2004, 
p. 9). All subsequent rounds of peace talks broke down. In 1995, government 
troops launched an offensive on Jaffna, which was a victory, but at a price  
of a large number of Tamil civilians killed, with 65 thousand dead and approx. 
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500 thousand refugees. The city returned to Sri Lanka, but the guerrillas quickly 
cut its land connections with the rest of the country (Sobczyński 2006, p. 251) 
(fig. 21).  
 
  
Fig. 21. The civil war in Sri Lanka, as of 2005 and the territorial variability  
of Tamil Eelam in the years 2005–2009 
Source: author's elaboration according to: J.S. Kumara (2010, p. 70),  
J. Richards (2014), S. Yass (2014, p. 70),  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eelam_War_IV (5.04.2016) 
 
In 2005, the Tamil Eelam still controlled an area of over 8 thousand km2, 
with the Tigers partially controlling further 9 thousand km2. In total, a quarter of 
the overall area of Ceylon was somehow related to Tamil rebels. In subsequent 
years, government forces quickly conquered 71% of the island and further 
reduced the territory of Tamil Eelam. In December 2007, Eelam still covered an 
area of 3.6 thousand km2, or nearly 6% of the island. In 2008, this was only  
2.5 thousand km2, less than 4% of Ceylon. 
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The final offensive of government troops, carried out in breach of interna-
tional law, began in late 2008, and was aimed at the area of approx. 320 km2, on 
the north-eastern coast of the island that was still controlled by the Tamils and 
around the last capital of Tamil Elam – Kilinochchi. It led to the heroic death of 
Tamil leader Prabhakaran, on May 16, 2009 on the beach near Mullatitivu. 
Three days later the last troop of the Tamil Tigers was disbanded (Richards 
2014, pp. 68–69, Yass 2014, p. 70). The bunker, in which Velupillai Prabha-
karan was killed now attracts 3 thousand tourists per day (Rees 2013, p. 95). The 
state of Tamil Eelam, which in its last phase covered an area of merely 250 km2, 
ceased to exist (Parasram 2012, p. 1). The entire island once again became  
a Sinhalese country.  
The process of including the Northern Province into the Sri Lankan infra-
structure lasted several years (Silva-Ranasinghe 2010, p. 3, Hogg 2011, p. 13, 
Mittal 2015, pp. 15–22). The reconstruction of statehood was also helped by 
Tamil political organisations, mostly the Tamil National Alliance, a moderate 
party supporting the end of the civil war, but also the idea of territorial auto-
nomy, with 16 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament (Sri Lanka: Tamil politics... 
2012, p. 8). 
Since the beginning of the conflict until 2009, 284.4 thousand people had to 
leave their homes in Ceylon. In 2003, R. Wilkinson (2003, p. 6) estimated the 
number of displaced to be over a million people. In September 2010, UN 
agencies reported 230 thousand displaced persons on the island. 85 thousand 
refugees found shelter in High Security Zones created by the army. Furthermore, 
the region of Puttalam grouped over 65 thousand Muslims. This means that well 
over 300 thousand people went through a phase of internal refuge (No war ... 
2011, pp. 8, 10). The fact that Sri Lanka is not a party to the UN Convention on 
refugees is an additional problem (Migration... 2013, p. 73). 
An independence referendum was carried out among the Tamil diaspora in 
the world (Norway, Canada, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark, Italy, the UK and Australia) in 2009-2010, in which 99% of voters 
were in favour detachment of Tamil Eelam from Sri Lanka (Tamil… 2016). 
The 2011 census distinguished two categories of Tamils. Indian Tamils ac-
counted for 4.2% of the population, while the Sri Lankan Tamils for 11.2%. In 
addition, 9.2% were descendants of Arabs called Moors (Richards 2014, p. 8). 
Since 2009, there have been no ethnic incidents on the island. Tourists return 
to the country, even though the territory of Eelam are still inaccessible to them. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The whole history of territorial-political structures in Ceylon of 2,560 years is 
a struggle between two nations, Sinhalese and Tamil, for territory and domi-
nation over the opposite side. Throughout this time, the Tamils were the mi-
nority. They managed to create only two states of their own, the Jaffna Kingdom 
(13th–17th centuries) and the State of Tamil Eelam (21st century), but repeatedly 
ruled in nominally Sinhalese states, as suzerains, occupiers or even rulers. They 
also conquered the whole island a couple of times.  
Almost all sovereign political-territorial structures on the island were the 
work of the Sinhalese as well as Tamil immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. 
These were, successively, the duchy of Tambapanni founded by Vijaya, and the 
kingdoms of Upatissa Nuwara (Vijitapura), Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. 
Attacked from the north by the Tamils, the Sinhalese adopted a strategy of 
moving the capitals of their kingdoms south to protect them against invasions. 
Thus the kingdoms of Sigiraya, Rohana, Dambadeniya, Yapahuwa, Kurunegala, 
Dedigama, Gampola, Raigama, Kotte and Udarata (Kandy) were formed (Mitton 
1917, p. 251). Only the last capital survived the colonial period in a relatively 
unchanged urban layout and with original buildings (Bandaranayake 1994, p. 16). 
At the time of the arrival of the Portuguese to the island, there were already 
five geopolitical units, four Sinhalese kingdoms – Kotte in the west coast, Kandy 
in the central, southern and eastern parts of Ceylon, and the kingdom Raigama 
and Sitawaka between them, and the Tamil kingdom of Jaffna in the north. The 
Portuguese expansion did not cover the whole Ceylon, but was limited mainly to 
the west coast. The Portuguese subdued the kingdoms of Kotte and Jaffna, with 
the second one ultimately annexed to the colony, thus eliminating the only Tamil 
statehood, but lost the war with the Sinhalese kingdoms of Udarata (Kandy) and 
Sitawaka, expanded at the expense of the disintegrating Kotte. The Portuguese 
were expelled from Ceylon by the united forces of Sinhala and Dutch.  
The reign of the Dutch in Ceylon was less expansive than the Portuguese. 
The Sinhalese kingdom of Udarata (Kandy) remained separate and generally, 
apart from a period of a few months of colonial occupation during the transition 
to Dravidian dynasty, did not come into conflict with the Dutch. The area con-
trolled by the Sinhalese was larger than in Portuguese times, but the occupation 
of almost all of the coast by the Netherlands led to the economic blockade of 
sovereign Udarata.  
Following the British-French rivalry in India, Ceylon became the British 
property, with the Dutch unable to protest as they were busy conquering the 
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Malay Archipelago. Initially, the British recognised the sovereignty of the 
Kingdom of Udarata, but the internal conflicts in the country related to the rule 
of a foreign non-Sinhalese Dravidian dynasty persuaded them to also conquer 
the interior. This was initially limited to introducing formal colonial adminis-
tration, followed by the total eradication of Sinhalese statehood. Ceylon became 
the colony of British India, reporting to the Madras presidency, then a separate 
colony, to ultimately become a member of the British Empire as a crown colony. 
The colonists made profound social and political reforms, gradually introducing 
democracy and politically activating the society, which in turn led to ethnic 
conflicts as they favoured the Tamils in colonial administration.  
After the Second World War, the disintegration of the British Empire favored 
the independence of colonies. Ceylon first became a dominion in the Common-
wealth, and was associated with the United Kingdom by a common monarch, 
then became a republic within the Commonwealth, and later as a socialist 
republic of Sri Lanka.  
Throughout Ceylon's independence period, the issue of Sinhala-Tamil 
relations was not solved in a democratic manner. This led to over thirty years of 
civil war, during which one third of the island, mostly in the north, was home to 
the insurgent state of Tamil Eelam, forcibly removed by the Sinhalese troops at 
the end of the first decade of the 21st century. Currently, there is only one state in 
Ceylon, Sri Lanka, dominated by the Sinhalese, with a semblance of democracy 
and a socialist system operating within the frames of market economy.  
The history of Sri Lanka is a story of a struggle between two main ethnic 
groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, over territory and sovereign statehood on 
the limited space of the island. Except for the medieval times, the Tamils were 
usually defeated in this struggle, even though they managed to establish their 
own dynasties within formally Sinhalese political units. After Sri Lanka became 
independent, any attempts at establishing a modus vivendi acceptable to both 
sides of the conflict failed.  
Traditionally, the bad situation of the minority is blamed on the politicians 
from the dominant group, in this case the Sinhalese, who failed to create  
a democratic system of government or an efficient economic system, replacing it 
with the so-called third way, a flavour of socialism, often supported by religious 
and nationalist ideologies. This does not allow an optimistic look at further 
developments. A maxim by German general Carl von Clausewitz seems appro-
priate: “peace is a truce between two wars”. 
 
Translated by Jarosław Sawiuk 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Flanders1, which is today associated with the Dutch-speaking region of the 
Kingdom of Belgium, has a long and stormy history. Its name comes from the 
County of Flanders (Flandria), which at the end of the 9th century stretched from 
the Strait of Dover to the Scheldt estuary. The inhabitants of Flanders are 
Flemings and the adjective related with them is Flemish (Minahan 2000, p. 769). 
After many administrative divisions throughout the centuries, caused mostly by  
a succession wars of neighbouring states, lands of the former County of Flanders 
have become parts of today's Republic of France, Kingdom of the Belgium and 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. In the 21st century the western part of the historic 
County of Flanders forms part of the French region “Nord-Pas-de-Calais- 
-Picardie”2, its central part constitutes the Flemish region of the Kingdom of 
Belgium and the eastern part is called the Zeelandic Flanders and belongs to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. During the 80-year war (1568–1648) the predomi-
nantly Catholic County of Flanders found itself under the strong influence of the 
ideas spread by the representatives of the European Reformation movements. 
The Flemings were divided by the religion affiliations. Although the lands from 
the Strait of Dover to the Scheldt estuary were torn between Romanic and 
Germanic cultures, one common feature, fundamental for their national identifi-
cation has prevailed – the same language (despite the existence of local dialects). 
The objective of this article is to analyze the present situation of the Flemings 
                          
1 Dutch: Vlaanderen, French: Flandre. 
2 Since 28 September 2016 under new name – Region Hauts-de-France (effective  
30 September 2016). 
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and Flemish culture in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The key to under-
stand the unique situation of the Flemings over the borders lies in their history 
and territorial divisions.   
2. FLANDERS APPEARS ON THE EUROPEAN MAP 
The County of Flanders came to existence in the 9th century and was a feudal 
fief in West Francia (Latin: Francia occidentalis) or the Kingdom of the West 
Franks (regnum Francorum occidentalium), which was then the western part of 
Charlemagne's Empire. It was inhabited and ruled by the Germanic Franks. West 
Francia was formed out of the division of the Carolingian Empire in 843 under 
the Treaty of Verdun3. The division of the Frankish realm, together with earlier 
Frankish partitions (855, Treaty of Prüm and 870, Treaty of Meerssen) were 
“carried out without any regard to linguistic and cultural continuities, which 
resulted in conflicts in Western Europe until the 20th century”4.  
One of the characteristic features of the late Middle Ages development of 
Flanders' trading towns was the affluence of their inhabitants.  Towns such as 
Ghent, Bruges and Ypres formed one of the richest and most urbanized parts of 
Europe. Their wealth was based on the weaving of wool, in neighbouring lands, 
into cloth for both domestic use and export. As a consequence, they developed  
a very sophisticated culture with impressive achievements in the arts and archi-
tecture, which competed with the northern Italy (Vaughan 2004, pp. 239–245). 
The western districts of the County of Flanders fell under French rule in the 
late 12th century (fig. 1). The remaining parts of Flanders went to the counts of 
neighboring Hainaut. The apogee of power of these autonomous urban com-
munes is illustrated by the famous Battle of the Golden Spurs (11 July 1302), 
near Kortrijk.  
                          
3 The Treaty of Verdun was signed in August 843 and was the first of the treaties that 
divided the Carolingian Empire into the kingdoms among the three sons of Louis the 
Pious. Lothair received the central portion of the empire Lorraine, Alsace, Burgundy, 
Provence (which later became the Low Countries), and the Kingdom of Italy called 
Middle Francia; Louis the German received the largest component of the Holy Roman 
Empire called East Francia which became the high medieval kingdom of Germany and 
Charles the Bald received the western portion, which was called West Francia and later 
became France. 
4 Polish text directly referring to this issue: M. Kozłowski (2013); for other general 
approaches see for e.g.: R. McKitterick (2011), B. Zientara (1996). The quoted import 
ant point was made by an unanimous author in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty 
_of_Verdun#cite_ref-1. 
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Fig. 1. County of Flanders (1350) in relation to the Low Countries and the Holy  
Roman Empire. The county was located where the border between France  
and the Holy Roman Empire met the North Sea 
Source: based on – author Sir Lain, the map “Lage landen omsteeks 1350”  
in the De bosatlas van de geschiedenis van Nederland, p. 145 (2011), licensed  
under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license 
An untrained Flemish infantry militia, consisting mainly of members of the 
craft guilds (notably that of the weavers) defeated a professional force of French 
and patrician Flemish cavalry, thus checking the growth of French control over 
the area. It is so named for the spurs supposedly taken from the vanquished. The 
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towns of Flanders rebelled against the occupying French army and besieged the 
French garrison at Courtrai castle […] This victory led to a generation of political 
ascendancy of the weavers' guild in the urban centers and ended the threat of 
French annexation5.  
Although the uprising was defeated and Flanders two years later remained 
part of the French Crown, the Battle of the Golden Spurs was a milestone on the 
road to national identification of the Flemish people.  
2.1. Dukes of Burgundy – collecting the lands 
The Duchy of Burgundy6 existed from 1032 and roughly conformed to the 
borders and territories of the modern region of Burgundy. Philip the Good 
(1396–1467), the Duke of Burgundy and his successors, came to own consider-
able possessions, numerous French and Imperial fiefs (Vaughan 2004, p. 29–53). 
Further north were the Low Countries, collectively known as the Burgundian 
Netherlands (Prevenier and Blockmans 1986, pp. 57–112)7. The seventeen prov-
inces “collected” by the dukes of Burgundy in the 14th and 15th century were the 
core of it what later became the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of 
Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, plus most of the modern French 
department of Nord with Artois, French Flanders, and French Hainaut. It also 
included enclosed semi-independent fiefdoms, mainly ecclesiastical ones, such 
as Liège, Cambrai and Stavelot-Malmedy8. 
In 1477 the reigning House of Habsburg decreed that official documents in 
Flanders should be written in Dutch, not French, although French remains the 
language spoken among a larger part of the elites.   
After the Treaty of Venlo (1543), being an effect of the Italian Wars 1542–
1546 among Francis I of France and Suleiman I of the Ottoman Empire against 
the Holy Roman, Emperor Charles V and Henry VIII of England, the Seventeen 
Provinces comprised (fig. 2, tab. 1). 
 
 
                          
5 Battle of the Golden Spurs or Battle of Kortrijk (Ditch), Battle of Courtrai (French), 
Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-the-Golden-Spurs.  
6 Latin: Ducatus Burgundiae, French: Duché de Bourgogne, Dutch: Hertogdom 
Bourgondië. 
7 Also: van M. Damen and L. Sicking (2010).  
8 Dutch: De Zeventien Verenigde Nederlanden, Belgium Foederatum 1543–1579.  
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Fig. 2. The Seventeen Provinces 
Source: based on – author Denis Jacquerye, map of the Low Countries in 1477,  
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 1.0 Generic 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/Map 
_Burgundian_Netherlands_1477-en.png 
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Table 1. The Seventeen Provinces 
1 The County of Artois 
2 The County of Flanders, including the burgraviates of Lille, Douai, Orchies,  
the Lordship of Tournai and the Tournaisis 
3 The Lordship of Mechelen 
4 The County of Namur 
5 The County of Hainaut 
6 The County of Zeeland 
7 The County of Holland 
8 The Duchy of Brabant, including the Lordship of Breda, the Margraviate  
of Antwerp, the counties of Leuven and of Brussels, and the advocacy  
of the Abbey of Nivelles and of Gembloux 
9 The Duchy of Limburg and the “Overmaas” lands of Brabant (Dalhem, 
Valkenburg and Herzogenrath) 
10 The Duchy of Luxembourg 
11 The Prince-Bishopric, later Lordship of Utrecht 
12 The Lordship of Frisia 
13 The Duchy of Guelders 
14 The Lordship of Groningen (including the Ommelanden) 
15 The Lordship of Drenthe, Lingen, Wedde, and Westerwolde 
16 The Lordship of Overijssel 
17 The County of Zutphen 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventeen_Provinces. 
In 1548 the then emperor Charles V (born in Ghent) decreed that “the Low 
countries” – a term used as the official one for the first time then – will form  
a more or less independent unity, taking Flanders away from under the French 
crown9.  
2.2. Under the Spanish Rule 
Catholic emperor Charles V tried to prevent the triumphant conquest of the 
northern Europe by the religious novelties coming from the German states and 
Switzerland. Despite all the efforts of the emperor and his son Reformation ideas 
                          
9 In the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549 it was determined that the succession will be 
arranged identically in all Dutch provinces. Since the middle of the 16th century this area 
was often referred to by the common name of “Seventeen provinces”. 
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gained grounds in the big cities of the Low Countries (Israel 1998, p. 74f ). With 
his abdication in 1555, the Burgundian Netherlands passed to his only son  
Philip II, since 1556 the King of Spain. The bloody terror of Philip II's governors 
against followers of the protestant schism from the Roman Catholic Church, an 
exploitive taxation policy caused by expensive wars with Italy, England and 
France and efforts to modernize and centralize the devolved-medieval govern-
ment structures of the provinces, led to a revolt, which spread throughout all 
provinces of the Low Countries. In 1568 the Netherlands stadtholder10 William I 
of Orange stood against Philip II. An Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) began. Its 
final outcome brought the independence from Spanish rule of the northern 
provinces of the Low Countries.   
The seventeen provinces were divided between the Dutch Republic (roughly 
the provinces of contemporary Kingdom of the Netherlands) and the southern 
provinces, which remained under Spanish rule and were called the Spanish 
Netherlands or Southern Netherlands (Israel 1998, p. 29f). The division begun 
with the Union of Atrecht11, which was an accord signed on 6 January 1579 in 
Atrecht by the nobles loyal to Philip II. The Southern Netherlands comprised 
territories of today's Wallonia (region of the Kingdom of Belgium) and the 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardy) regions in France.  
Table 2. The Union of Atrecht 
The regions that signed it were: 
1.  County of Hainaut 
2.  County of Artois 
3.  Lille, Douai and Orchies (Lilloise Flanders) 
4.  Prince- Bishopric of Cambrai 
The regions that favored the Union, but did not sign it, were: 
1.  County of Namur 
2.  County of Luxembourg 
3.  Duchy of Limburg 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_of_Arras. 
 
                          
10 Dutch: stadhouder. A medieval function in the Low Countries which during the 
16th–18th centuries developed de facto into a hereditary head of state. 
11 French: Arras. 
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Fig. 3. The Spanish Netherlands, the Union of Atrecht and the Union of Utrecht (1579) 
This file is licensed under the Creative Commons  
Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Generic 
Source: based on https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
Map_Union_of_Arras_and_Utrecht _1579-en.svg  
The second step was the Union of Utrecht signed on 23 January 1579, by  
a number of the northern provinces of the Low Countries, in which they 
promised to support each other in their defense against the Spanish army. This 
was followed in 1581 by the Act of Abjuration, the declaration of independence 
of the provinces from Philip II (fig. 3). The Union of Utrecht is regarded as the 
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foundation of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands (Provinces), which 
was finally recognized by the Spanish Empire in the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, an end result of the both of the Thirty Years War and the Eighty Years' 
War. The Union of Utrecht was signed by (tab. 3): 
Table 3. The Union of Utrecht 
1 The County of Holland 
2 The County of Zeeland 
3 The Lordship of Utrecht 
4 The Duchy of Guelders (Gelre, the three northern quarters with Zutphen) 
5 The Lordship of Groningen (and the Ommelanden) 
6 The Lordship of Frisia (Frisland) 
7 The Lordship of Overijssel (divided between 1580–1597 into a Spanish- 
-controlled part in the East (capital: Oldenzaal) and a republican-controlled part 
in the West. Both had their own stadtholder. By 1597, the Lordship was reunited 
by the conquests of Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange. Oldenzaal was  
re-conquered by the Spanish in 1605, but definitely lost in 1626 
Also: the County of Drenthe (It had no voting rights in the Union of Utrecht and 
wasn't considered as one of the Seven Provinces) 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_Republic; https://www.britannica.com/ 
place /Netherlands/History#ref414017. 
Table 4. The Generality Lands 
Brabant of the States (Staats-Brabant): the northern part of the Duchy of Brabant, 
most of the present province of North Brabant 
Flanders of the States (Staats-Vlaanderen): the northern part of the County  
of Flanders, present Zeelandic Flanders and nowadays part of the province of Zeeland 
Overmaas of the States (Staats-Overmaas): several small territories between 
Maastricht, Liège and Aachen, e.g. Dalhem, Valkenburg and Hertogenrade.  
The city of Maastricht was a condominium of the United Provinces and the Prince-
Bishopric of Liège. Overmaas literally means “beyond the Meuse” or “Trans-Meuse” 
(from the perspective of Brussels). The 19th century term “Staats-Limburg”, invented 
for nationalistic reasons, is historically and geographically incorrect 
Upper Guelders of the States (Staats-Opper-Gelre): as a result of the Treaty  
of Utrecht (1713) a part of Spanish Guelders was ceded to the United Provinces,  
e.g. Venlo and Echt; another part came to Prussia and a small part around Roermond 
was left for the Austrian duchy of Guelders 
Westerwolde and Wedde: what is now the south-eastern part of the province  
of Groningen was a generality land between 1594 and 1619, after which it became 
part of said province 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generality_Lands. 
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Along with the signatory-provinces the Republic had a structure called the 
Generality Lands, Lands of the Generality or Common Lands (Dutch: Genera-
liteitslanden) (tab. 4).  
2.3. The Dutch Republic 
The Dutch Republic, officially called the Republic of the Seven United 
Netherlands, was the first republic in Europe (fig. 4). It was a confederation of 
seven provinces with their own governments and a number of the so-called 
Generality Lands. These latter were governed directly by the States-General 
(Dutch: Staten-Generaal), the Parliament. The States-General were seated in 
The Hague and consisted of representatives of each of the seven provinces. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Map of the Dutch Republic 
Source: based on https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ 
commons/d/d0/Tachtigjarigeoorlog-1583.png 
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The divisions of the seventeen provinces were primarily based on adherents 
of old and new order, which was expressed in support of different values 
identified with religious streams but not on language. It became central issue 
almost three centuries later. The role of French language was indisputable, at 
least among the contemporary elites until birth of first Dutch national state in the 
19th century.     
2.4. From the Kingdom of Holland  
to the United Kingdom of the Netherlands  
(1795–1839) 
The Southern Netherlands were ruled by Austrian Habsburgs while the 
Republic of Seven United Netherlands (Provinces) enjoined the status of the 
republic. They were united again under the rule of revolutionary France and later 
of Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1806 French emperor set up for his third brother, 
Louis Bonaparte, a puppet kingdom named after the leading province, the 
Kingdom of Holland12. The idea was to better control of the Netherlands in the 
time of continental blockade. Although popular among the Dutch, King Louis 
did not perform to Napoleon's expectations and the kingdom was dissolved in 
1810. The Netherlands were annexed by France and became part of the French 
Empire. After the defeat of Napoleon, at the Congress of Vienna, the former 
Low Countries gained real independence. The new state was officially called the 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815–1839)13 and was created mainly as  
a strong buffer state north of France (fig. 5). This state, a large part of which 
belongs to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, was made up of the former Dutch 
Republic (Republic of the Seven United Netherlands), the former Austrian 
Netherlands and the former Prince-Bishopric of Liège. The House of Orange- 
-Nassau gave the monarchs to this new state. 
 
                          
12 Dutch: Koninkrijk Holland, French: Royaume de Hollande. 
13 Dutch: Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, French: Royaume uni des Pays-Bas. 
The latter never was the French official name of this short-lived kingdom. This French 
unofficial name stayed in the common language to avoid any confusion with the rest of 
the Netherlands after the Belgian Revolution of 1830. Both in international treaties and 
national legislation was the country indifferently referred in French to Royaume des 
Belgiques (“Belgiques” in the plural) and Royaume des Pays-Bas. 
Ryszard Żelichowski  
 
160 
 
Fig. 5. United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815–1839) 
Source: based on Känsterle – own work originally at nl: Afbeelding:NLLuxDB.png. 
Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported 
2.5. The Belgian Revolution and Secession (1830–1839) 
The United Kingdom of the Netherlands collapsed after the 1830 Belgian 
Revolution. William I (1772–1843), King of the Netherlands14, refused to 
recognize a Belgian state until 1839, when he had to yield under pressure by the 
Treaty of London (1839), where the exact borders were agreed upon.  
Much was written about the causes of the Belgian Revolution15. Briefly one 
may say that the people of the south were nearly all Catholics and half of them 
                          
14 Originally, the official title of William I, was the King of the Netherlands (in 
Dutch: Koning der Nederlanden).  
15 See for example classical publications of: J.S. Fishman (1988), E.H. Kossmann 
(1978, pp. 151–60), Witte E. et al. (2009, s. 21–47), R. Coolsaet (2001, pp. 19–45). 
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were French-speaking. Many outspoken liberals regarded King William I's rule 
as a despotic one. There were high levels of unemployment and industrial unrest 
among the working classes. One of the key issues was a linguistic reform in 
1823, which intended to make Dutch the official language in the Flemish 
provinces, since it was the language of most of the Flemish population. This 
reform met with strong opposition from the upper and middle classes who at the 
time were mostly French-speaking (Kossmann 1978, p. 128). On 4 June 1830 
this reform was abolished.  
Religion affiliation was another cause of the Belgian Revolution. In the 
politics of the South Netherlands the Roman Catholicism was the most important 
factor. Its partisans fought against the freedom of religion proclaimed by the 
king William I that was at that time still supported by the liberal faction 
(Kossmann 1978, p. 123). Over time the (southern) liberal faction began to sup-
port the Catholics, partly to accomplish its own goals: freedom of education and 
freedom of the press (Kossmann 1978, p. 129). The Belgian Revolution of 1830 
crystallized this antagonism.  
The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium went separate 
ways16. The lands of historical County of Flanders became part of Nord-Pas-de- 
-Calais (France), Flemish Region Flanders (Great Flanders, Belgium) and Zee-
landic Flanders (The Netherlands)17. Below I will concentrate on the situation  
of the Flemings in those countries.  
3. FLEMINGS IN EUROPE 
3.1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
The region which is now called Zeelandic Flanders18, was not part of the 
historical County of Zeeland but a part of the County of Flanders initially ruled 
by the House of Habsburgs. The region was the front line in the Eighty Years' 
War and was conquered by the Dutch Republic in 1604. As such, it was the only 
                          
16 After the Belgian Revolution, the Belgian monarch has been called King of the 
Belgians. In Dutch: Koning der Belgen; in French: Roi des Belges (and not Roi de 
Belgique). 
17 Flanders, New York. Flanders is a hamlet and a census-designated place (CDP) in 
Suffolk County, New York. USA The population was 4,472 (2010). It is located in the 
town of Southampton on the south side of the Peconic River at its mouth in Peconic Bay, 
Riverheadis across the river to the north. 
18 Dutch: Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, Zeelandic: Zeêuws-Vlaonderen. 
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part of Flanders, which took part in the insurgency, and became part of the new 
republic. Zeelandic Flanders was subsequently ruled directly by the Dutch 
General States (parliament) as one of the Generality Lands and called Flanders 
of the States (Dutch: Staats-Vlaanderen). After occupation by the French in 
1795, the area accrued to the département of Escaut. Before the formation of the 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, Zeelandic Flanders was territory of 
the Dutch province of North Brabant for a few years, but when the present 
province Zeeland was formed, Zeelandic Flanders became a part of it, even after 
the 1830 Belgian Revolution that separated the remainder of Dutch Flanders 
from the Netherlands.  
Zeelandic Flanders is the southernmost region of the province of Zeeland in 
the south-western Netherlands (fig. 6). It lies south of the Western Scheldt that 
separates the region from province of Zeeland. Zeelandic Flanders is bordered to 
the south by Belgium.  
Since the reform of administrative division on the 1st of January 2003 Zee-
landic Flanders consists of three counties: Sluis, Terneuzen and Hulst. The area 
of Zeelandic Netherlands is 875,80 km² (733,19 km² land and 142,61 km² 
water), the population of 106,161 (density of 145 inhab./km²)19. It borders the 
Belgian provinces of East and West Flanders and is situated along the Western 
Scheldt, a North Sea estuary, and has no land access to the rest of the Nether-
lands. Zeelandic Flanders is connected to Flushing on Walcheren to the north of 
the Western Scheldt by the Western Scheldt Tunnel. It borders also the Zwin 
nature reserve in the West and the Drowned Land of Saeftinghe in the East. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Zeelandic Flanders 
Source: based on http://www.danifra.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Logo-Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen-vlag.jpg. Frank V. http://www.danifra.com/flag-of-zeelandic-flanders/ 
                          
19 On the 3rd January 2013, https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.  
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Table 5. Dialects and languages 
Dialects: Zeelandic Flemish. In the eastern part, East Flemish with some Brabantian 
influence is spoken  
The population of Zeelandic Flanders was 106,522 with 145 per km2 (2010)  
Language: The native dialect of the western part of the region is Zeelandic Flemish  
or also called Seelandish, a variety of West Flemish. In the central regions, the Land- 
-van-Axels and Land-van-Cadzands dialects of Zeelandic, itself a transition between 
West Flemish and Hollandic, are spoken. In the eastern part, East Flemish with some 
Brabantian influence is spoken. Because some smaller areas were isolated by water, 
and thus being small islands there are some dialects that differ slightly with the 
“normal” dialect. This way, some villages have their own dialect, which people from 
the provinces above the “big rivers” (the Waal and the Lek) cannot understand.  
The provinces above the big rivers include the provinces of North-Holland, South- 
-Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland  
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeelandic_Flanders#Language. 
The Zeelandic Flanders (Dutch: Zeeuws-Vlaanderen) has a national anthem, 
which was written in 1917 by Jacob Pattist and J. Vreeken with the music by  
A. Lijssen. The anthem was a reaction to Belgian annexation plans, reveled 
during the First World War. The Netherlands remained neutral but the Belgians 
considered their neighbour a pro-German state and demanded therefore Zee-
landic Flanders and Limburg to be annexed by the Germans. In Zeeland reaction 
to the Belgian requirements was extremely negative. As a result of it there was 
written a propaganda song that stressed the bond between the region and the 
Nether-lands. Later it grew to the Zeelandic-Flemish anthem. 
3.2. The Kingdom of Belgium 
The lands of the Southern Netherlands united under the rule of King Leopold I 
of Belgium (1790–1865) and his successor went through different stages of 
political transformation. From the unitary Kingdom, concentrated on defense of 
the newly born state, throughout most of the 19th century to the federal state in 
the last decades of the 20th century. Today, Belgium is a federal constitutional 
monarchy with a parliamentary system of governance. It is divided into three 
regions and three communities that exist next to each other. Its two largest 
regions are the Dutch-speaking region of Flanders in the north and the French- 
-speaking southern region of Wallonia. The Brussels-Capital Region is an 
officially bilingual (French and Dutch), an enclave within the Flemish Region 
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(Parijs van 2012, 7f). A German-speaking Community exists in eastern Wal-
lonia20. Belgium's linguistic diversity and related political conflicts are reflected 
in its unique solution of this problem.  
3.3. Municipalities with language facilities 
There are 27 municipalities with language facilities in Belgium which must 
offer services to its residents in Dutch, French or German, in addition to their 
official languages (fig. 7). All other municipalities – with the exception of those 
in the Brussels region which is bilingual – are unilingual and only offer services 
in their official languages, either Dutch or French.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Municipalities with language facilities 
No. 3. Mouscron (French: Dutch: Moeskroen, Picard: Moucron) is a Walloon city and 
municipality located in the Belgian province of Hainaut/Henegouwen, along the border 
with the French city of Tourcoing, which is part of the Lille/Rijsel metropolitan area. 
The Mouscron municipality includes the old communes of Dottignies (Dottenijs), 
Luingne, and Herseaux (Herzeeuw). Mouscron is a municipality with language  
facilities for Dutch-speakers 
                          
20 The German-speaking Community, http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/gov 
ernment/communities/german-speaking_community/. 
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Belgian law stipulates that: twelve municipalities in Flanders must offer 
services in French; of these twelve, six located around Brussels are now believed 
to have become majority French-speaking. Wallonia contains two language 
areas: in the French-speaking part of Wallonia, four municipalities offer services 
in Dutch and another two offer services in German. All municipalities in the 
German-speaking part of Wallonia (annexed after the First World War) offer 
services in French. In Brussels, Dutch and French are co-official. At the federal 
level, Dutch, French and German are all official languages21. 
3.4. Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie 
Former Nord-Pas-de-Calais, since the 1st January 2016, “Nord-Pas-de-Calais- 
-Picardie”22 is a densely populated region with its 330.8 people per km2 in just 
over 12,414 km2 and with 5,987,883 million inhabitants23. It is 7 percent of 
France's total population, making it the fourth most populous region in the 
country, 83 percent of whom live in urban communities. Its administrative centre 
and largest city is Lille (Dutch: Rijssel). The second largest city is Calais, which 
serves as a major continental economic/transportation hub with Dover of Great 
Britain 42 kilometers away. This makes Nord-Pas-de-Calais the closest con-
tinental European connection to the British Isles24 (fig. 8).  
Nord Pas de Calais, the French name of the Strait of Dover, North Strait of 
Dover), consisted of the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Nord-Pas-de- 
-Calais borders the English Channel (west), the North Sea (northwest), Belgium 
(north and east) and Picardy (south).  
The majority of the region was once part of the historical (Southern) Nether-
lands, but gradually became part of France between 1477 and 1678, particularly 
during the reign of King Louis XIV (“The Sun King”, 1638–1715).    
 
 
                          
21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipalities_with_language_facilities. 
22 “La carte à 13 régions définitivement adoptee En savoir plus sur”: http://www.lem 
onde.fr/politique/article/2014/12/17/la-carte-a-13-regions-definitivement-adoptee_45422 
78_823448.html#stkLME8ij9dzqpVl.99. 
23 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/recensement/populations-legales/fran 
ce-regions.asp?annee=2012; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hauts-de-France. 
24 Official website: http://www.nordpasdecalaispicardie.fr/. 
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Fig. 8. Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Picardie 
Source: based on http://france3 regions.francetvinfo.fr/picardie/sites/regions_france3/ 
files/stylestop_big/public/assets/images/2014/07/16/prog4189868.jpg?itok=VB_tW5Ku 
 
 
Fig. 9. French Flanders (territorial extent on the eve of the French Revolution) 
Source: based on author Ross, licensed under the Creative Commons  
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported,  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Carte_de_la_Flandre_fran%C3%A7aise.png 
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*** 
The historical French provinces that preceded Nord-Pas-de-Calais are Artois, 
Flanders, French Hainaut and (partially) Picardy. These provincial designations 
are still frequently used by the inhabitants. French Flanders25 is a part of the 
historical County of Flanders in present-day France. The region lies in the mod-
ern-day region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Together with French Hainaut, it makes 
up the French Department of Nord.  
It consists of two regions: French Westhoek to the northwest, lying between 
the Lys River and the North Sea, roughly the same area as the Arrondissement of 
Dunkirk; Lilloise Flanders (French: La Flandre Lilloise; Dutch: Rijsels-Vlaan-
deren), historically also called Walloon Flanders, to the southeast, south of the 
Lys River and now the Arrondissements of Lille and Douai (fig. 9).  
3.5. Languages 
While the region is predominantly French-speaking, it also has two signi-
ficant minority language communities: the western Flemings, whose presence is 
evident in the many Dutch place names in the area and who speak West Flemish, 
a dialect of Dutch (perhaps 20,000 inhabitants of Nord-Pas-de-Calais use 
Flemish daily and an estimated 40,000 use it occasionally, both, primarily in and 
around the arrondissement of Dunkirk) and the Picards, who speak the Picard 
language and who have been working to revive this nearly-extinct regional 
speech since the 1980s26. Although neighbouring Belgium currently recognizes 
and fosters both Picard and Dutch, and a few city-level governments within 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais have introduced initiatives to encourage both languages, the 
national French government maintains a policy of linguistic unity and generally 
ignores both languages, as it does with other regional languages in France.  
During the 4th and 5th centuries, the Roman practice of co-opting Germanic 
tribes to provide military and defence services along the route from Boulogne to 
Cologne created a Germanic-Romance linguistic border in the region that 
persisted until the 8th century (fig. 10). By the 9th century, most inhabitants north 
of Lille spoke a dialect of Middle Dutch, while the inhabitants to the south spoke  
a variety of Romance dialects. This linguistic border is still evident today in the 
place names of the region. Since the 9th century, the linguistic border began  
a steady move to north and the east and by the end of the 13th century, the 
                          
25 French: La Flandre française; Dutch: Frans-Vlaanderen. 
26 Or Ch'ti (speakers, chitimi, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Flanders. 
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linguistic border had shifted to the river Lys in the south and Cap-Griz-Nez in 
the west27. French Flemish (Dutch: Frans-Vlaams, and flamand français or 
Fransch vlaemsch in France) is the West Flemish language as spoken in the 
north of contemporary France (Ryckeboer 2002, p. 21f). 
 
 
Fig. 10. Historic regression of Dutch in the Western periphery 
Source: released into the public domain by its author, I. Finnrind, based on 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:France_Flanders_language-no.svg 
Place names attest to Flemish having been spoken since the 8th century in the 
area that was ceded to France in the 17th century and which became known  
as French Flanders. Its dialect subgroup, called French Flemish, meanwhile, 
became a minority dialect that survives mainly in Dunkirk (Duinkerke in Dutch 
/Duunkerke in West Flemish – dune church), Bourbourg (Broekburg in Dutch), 
Calais (Kales), Saint-Omer (Sint-Omaars) with an ethnic enclave Haut-Pont 
(Haute-Ponte) known for its predominantly Flemish community and Bailleul 
(Belle).  
This area roughly covers the arrondissement of Dunkerque (Nord-Pas-de- 
-Calais Region). It is often referred to as “Flandre maritime” (maritime Flanders) 
and people used to speak of “Flandre flamingante” (Flemish Flanders) as opposed 
to “Flandre Lilloise” or “Flandre wallingante” (Walloon Flanders)28.  
                          
27 http://dictionnaire.sensagent.leparisien.fr/French%20Netherlands/en-en/. 
28 http://www.uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/document/neerlandes/an/i1/i1.html. 
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French-Flemish, as previously mentioned, has about 20,000 daily users, and 
40,000 of occasional speakers. There has been an active movement to retain the 
West Flemish language in the region for the last 40 years, but the language's 
status appears to be moribund29.  
French Flemish is taught in a few schools in the French Westhoek. The 
L'Akademie voor Nuuze Vlaemsche Taele/Institut de la Langue Régionale 
Flamande (ANVT-ILRF) was given permission to carry out experimental 
lessons in four public schools (in Esquelbecq, Noordpeene, Volckerinckhove, 
Wormhout) for the school years of 2007–2008 until 2010–2011, after which it 
would be evaluated30. Afterwards, all requirements were met but it was only 
allowed to continue them, but not to expand to other schools or to the collège. 
On the other hand, the private Catholic education began teaching Dutch in 
collèges in Gravelines and Hondschoote.  
3.6. Flanders Fields 
French President Charles de Gaulle, who was born in Lille, called the region 
a “fatal avenue” through which invading armies repeatedly passed (Holmes 
1992, p. 384). Over the centuries it was conquered in turn by the Celtic Belgae, 
the Romans, the Germanic Franks, England, the Spanish and Austrian Nether-
lands, and the Dutch Republic. After the final French annexation in the early  
19th century, much of the region was again occupied by Germany during the 
First and Second World Wars.  
When the First World War started, the region became a strategic target for 
the Allies and the Central Powers, mostly because of the coal and mining 
resources. During the war the region was split in two: the German holding the 
French Flanders and Cambrai area, the Allied controlling Atrecht (Arras) and the 
Area of Lens. When the region was finally liberated by the Canadians, the whole 
country was devastated, Atrecht being destroyed at 90 percent. The Nord-Pas- 
-de-Calais became one of the main theaters of the conflict, with many battles 
occurring between 1914 and 1918. Nowadays, there are 650 military cemeteries 
                          
29 http://broom02.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=French%20Flemish&item_type=to 
pic http://www.uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/document/neerlandes/an/i1/i1.html 
30  “French Flemish is not a dialect; it is a regional language.” Couché is chair of the 
ANVT, the Akademie voor Nuuze Vlaemsche Taele, an organisation dedicated to the 
preservation of French Flemish. “Flanders Today”, “French Flemish: group defends  
a dying language”, http://www.flanderstoday.eu/living/french-flemish-group-defends-
dying -language http://www.anvt.org/. 
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throughout the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, mostly British and Canadians as well as 
large memorials like Vimy or Notre Dame de Lorette.  
During the Second World War, the name “French Flanders” referred to all of 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, which was first attached to the military administration of 
German-occupied Belgium, then part of Belgien-Nordfrankreich under a Reichs-
kommissar, and finally part of a theoretical Reichsgau of Flanders. During the 
occupation it was attached to the Military Administration in Belgium and 
Northern France, ruled from the Wehrmacht Kommandantur in Brussels. The 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais region was used for such vengeance weapon installations 
like V-1 “ski sites” that launched attacks on England and massive bunkers for 
the V-2 rocket and V-3 cannon. Operation Crossbow counteroffensive bombing 
by the Allies devastated many of the region's towns. Although most of the region 
was liberated in September 1944, Dunkirk was the last French town to be freed 
from German occupation (on 9 May 1945) (Warmbrunn 1993, p. 76)31. 
Flanders Fields is a common English name of the First World War battle-
fields in an area straddling the Belgian provinces of West Flanders and East 
Flanders as well as the French department of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, part of which 
makes up the area known as French Flanders. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The territories of the medieval County of Flanders over the centuries were  
a victim of the rivalry of emerging states, mainly Germany and France. The 
centralized monarchies, which were multinational and multicultural in their 
nature, because of their size and range, did not pay attention to any local 
differences as long as they were loyal to the ruling monarch. The wealth of 
Flemish towns gave them some local autonomy but the wars conducted by the 
competing kings and princes, often caused by the changing alliances stemming 
out of the succession interests, made the lands of the Low Countries a profitable 
reward for the winning side. The Reformation ideas divided the Low Countries 
and the unfortunate rule of the king Philip II of Spain caused their permanent 
division. The North part joined protestant Europe and the South the Habsburg, 
Catholic Europe. The religion was not anymore the binding factor of the old 
Low Countries. The only common features were based on the values related with 
the Germanic culture and the language. The latter played not important role in 
                          
31 Also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
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the internal relations until the 19th century. Dutch was considered by the elites in 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands as a language of the low classes and 
farmers. The educated Flemings spoke French. Division of the Netherlands into 
two independent states changed the situation of the Dutch language and Dutch 
culture dramatically. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was a national state 
where the interests of the Dutch speaking population and their cultural values 
were secured. The Kingdom of Belgium went through long and painful 
transformation which in the 20th century led to the situation that the national 
interests of the Flemish people were protected by the institutions of the federal 
state (Witte et al. 2009, p. 376). The Region of Flanders and the Region of 
Brussels respect the rights of the Flemish majority in the Kingdom of Belgium.  
The western parts of the County of Flanders, which became part of the 
Republic of France are in totally different position. The French Republic does 
not recognize any minorities on its territory32. The Flemish language is not 
afforded any legal status in France, neither by central nor regional institutions. It 
enjoys no official recognition, either by the public authorities or by the education 
system33.  
French Flemish does not enjoy any official recognition in France, with the 
exception of a Ministerial memorandum of 1982, which was supposed to 
facilitate teaching of the language. Despite the additional obstacle of the absence 
of any written form of French Flemish, its relationship to Dutch, which is one of 
the official working languages of the European Union, could contribute to its 
preservation. Knowledge of Dutch is, moreover, vital for any understanding of 
the historical background and cultural and linguistic roots of the region. This 
knowledge is also extremely useful for economic and tourist dealings with the 
region's Belgian and Dutch neighbours 34. 
The Belgian side undertakes many efforts to preserve diminishing range of 
the Dutch language. The Flemish-Dutch Cultural Institution “Our Heritage” 
(Dutch: Ons Erfdeel) has been publishing since 1957 a monthly cultural 
magazine under the same title. It has a seat in the small Belgian town Rekkem 
located on the French border by the city of Rijssel (Frech: Lille) and dedicates 
                          
32 Marie-France Gaunard-Anderson, from University of Lorraine, touches upon this 
subject in her paper (“Minorities and borders in France: bridges for cross-border and co- 
-operation”) presented on the15th ‘Łódź’ international conference on political geography 
Borderlands of nations, nations of borderlands, Złotniki Lubańskie, September 14–16, 
2016.  
33 http://broom02.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=French%20Flemish&item_type=to 
pic. 
34 http://www.uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/document/neerlandes/an/i1/i1.html. 
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much attention to the problem of the inhabitants on both sides of the Belgian- 
-French border35. Among other important publications are the bilingual yearbook 
“De Franse Nederlanden – Les Pays-Bas Français”, the yearbook “The Low 
Countries” in English, and a quarterly “Septentrion” published in French, which 
is focused on art, literature and culture of Flanders and the Netherlands. The 
Dutch speaking population in French Flanders has been slowly diminishing and 
has difficult years ahead in the times of the growing radicalism and xenophobic 
programs of some French political parties.  
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BUILDING A NEW BORDER: THE CASE-STUDY  
OF THE NEW BARRIER BETWEEN UKRAINE  
AND RUSSIA, AND THE PROBLEM  
OF MINORITIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays there is an evident tendency of building new boundaries as 
fortified barriers in Eastern and Balkan Europe. It represents a dramatic 
historical shift. Except in the cases of new boundaries of Hungary, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria, Norway1 – or the project of building new boundaries and walls 
between Estonia and Russia in the Narva Region – between these countries and 
their South or East, mainly due on the problem of the current migration crisis, 
new borders as fortified boundaries and barriers are under construction because 
of the new active foreign policy of Russia in the “near abroad”. This is the case 
of the new barriers that are currently under construction between Ukraine and 
Russia. They derived not only from the civil war in the eastern part of the 
country, but also from the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (in March 2014) 
– part of Ukraine since 1954 – marking the first time since the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War that an European state seized and 
incorporated territory from another state, establishing a dangerous precedent. 
Russia's annexation changed dramatically the perception of stability of post- 
-Soviet borders. This dramatic event served to accelerate a process of what 
might be called a “hard bordering” between Russia and Ukraine (Filippova 
2016, p. 65). Moreover, shortly after the annexation the Ukrainian government 
                    
1 Even Norway announced on August 24, 2016, that it was erecting a 660-ft. steel 
fence at its northern Skorskog border point with Russia, to deter migrants from entering 
the country via the Arctic Circle.  
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announced plans to construct a “Maginot Line” on its eastern border with 
Russia, in order to avoid further possible Russian invasions.  
The building of new boundaries has many theoretical and practical con-
sequences. The borders of a nation may have very meaningful foreign policy 
implications. First of all, some scholars have argued that nations with more 
(fortified) borders tend to be involved in more regional wars than nations with 
few borders, arguing that proximity may become the catalyst for conflict. 
Moreover, borders drawn with more reference to a political map than to realities 
on the ground, may also have a profound (and destructive) foreign policy effects 
(Hudson 2007, p. 147). The geography of Russia's borders augurs for increased 
levels of cross-border and near-border conflicts. As it is well known, the travail 
of Russia's “near abroad” has been a long-standing security vulnerability both in 
contemporary times as well as historically. Moreover, violations of the inter-
national recognised borders and new boundaries under construction, even more 
fortified and scrutinized as a response to (current or potential) aggressions, are  
a clear demonstration of an enormous restructuring process of the international 
system of states in Eastern Europe. 
As van Houtum pointed out, the simplest way to understand the significance 
of borders is to examine them by their function: borders serve a purpose 
(Houtum van 1998, p. 21). Anssi Paasi wrote that borders help us to create and 
perceive differences, indispensable for us in order to build contexts and 
meanings and to construct meanings in order to make sense of an otherwise 
complex society in which we live (Paasi 1999). Borders continue to influence 
socio-spatial behaviours and attitudes, how we perceive different places, and 
how we interpret our own actions. How borders are drawn has important 
consequences for international stability. As well known, the social construction 
of the nation as a political institution originates from state attempts to commit 
people to a territory (Taylor and Flint 2000, pp. 29–30) and modern sovereignty 
is strongly connected to modern borders. Today we take sovereignty for granted 
but even in the West it is largely a modern phenomenon. Most societies, in most 
parts of the world, throughout most of history, have not known the practice. In 
fact, even the idea of separate and separable political communities was not 
clearly established in the medieval world and in Eastern Europe in particular2. 
Conceptions of territoriality are neither fixed nor constant across time and place. 
Control over borders is an attribute of sovereignty but the “essential” attribute of 
it have always been very fluid. The attempt of today in this region is to build  
a clear-cut system of boundaries protecting exclusive jurisdictions that is in  
                    
2 See also A. Vitale (2016). 
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a deep contrast with the real status of sovereignty in Eastern Europe, the 
resurgence of power politics and territorial conquests. An active fear for survival 
is currently at stake.  
2. THE FUNCTIONS OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINE BORDERS 
The construction of an exclusive political border is a decisive part of the 
process of Ukrainian nation-building (also on symbolic scale: it defines also the 
European or Eastern Slavic character of this country) and strengthening the state 
under permanent threat after Independence, making this case-study a fascinating 
case for analysis of the concrete border-drawing exercise. The new borders may 
become a material manifestation of a new permanent opposition between 
Ukraine and Russia and at the same time a crucial constituent of Ukrainian 
national identity. What we see today is an enormous effort to exclude the other, 
both from the Russian and the Ukrainian sides. The Ukrainian nation-building 
process in the recent past and particularly the post-Maidan history have 
projected Russia as eternal other to Ukraine. In order to build a coherent nation, 
it is necessary to define who “us” actually are and what actually “ours” and to 
demarcate that difference the border is perceived as necessary3. The Ukrainian 
identity is under construction vis-à-vis its neighbours, reflecting the typical role 
of borders in constructing various forms of identity, as well as the multilayered 
nature of that identity (Donnan and Wilson 1999). The borders are playing  
a key-role in the Ukrainian nation and in the current process of identity and 
nation-building.  
The second function of this border is to try to assure military defence. 
Borders are seen as a guarantee to ensure territorial integrity. Ukraine's borders 
are closely associated with potential threats and national security. The annexa-
tion of Crimea has shown the interrelatedness of borders, strategic concerns and 
questions of national identity (Filippova 2016, p. 66).  
The third is directly linked to sovereignty and depends on the fact that 
elements of territorial state are basic to international recognition. Despite the fact 
that criteria of international recognition of the states deeply changed across the 
Twentieth century (Vitale 2012), the crucial point for recognition purposes has 
been that the state maintain effective territorial control. The idea that it is 
necessary the requirement of firm control remains highly influent in this part of 
                    
3 As wrote Beatrix Haselberger: “How could we acquire a national identity if we 
were not able to distinguish between «us» and «them»”? (Haselberger 2014, p. 510). 
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Europe and it is quite understandable because after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the prospect of contesting and renegotiating state borders has become 
everyday reality. This is the case especially of a newly independent state such as 
Ukraine, permanently seeking to secure national cohesion and territorial 
integrity as tools of existential survival (Filippova 2016, p. 67). However, it is 
necessary to underline that the building of new borders between Russia and 
Ukraine also depends (as it happens in central Europe) on the standards for 
border management and enforcement, requiring (following new international 
agreements) Ukraine to develop a new migration policy, create new forms of 
control, strengthen the borders with Russia. Demands to enforce borders are 
motivated by EU concerns about security threats from outside the Union. Border 
policies implemented by Ukraine's political class bear the stamp of the two 
neighbours: Russia and the EU. 
3. THE PROBLEM OF DYNAMIC BORDER CHANGE 
The Russian-Ukraine borders are international state borders. They formally 
have been in existence since Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union, on 
August 24, 1991. They have inherited their location from the administrative 
territorial division between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR and some land 
from the first real demarcation between both countries which took place in 1918, 
after the fall of the Russian Empire, when Ukraine managed to recover all its 
territories of former Ukrainian governorate and annexing neighbouring counties 
(such as Kursk and Voronezh) where ethnic composition of inhabitants was 
predominantly “Ukrainophone”. Moreover, the former internal boundaries of 
USSR became international after the Ukraine's independence and this process 
exacerbated border issues and the situation of ethnic minorities. Ukraine means 
“borderland”, which is an appropriate name for a country which frequently 
endured much of its history as a frontier for her neighbors. In the years that have 
passed since the Ukrainian declaration of independence, the country had not 
fortified its borders on the east. Much of the Ukraine-Russia border is just on 
maps. There are no natural barriers or border fences. Ukraine's borders with its 
neighboring Soviet Republics (Russia, Belarus, Moldova) were purely admin-
istrative lines, not controlled and not demarcated. The Ukrainian-Russian border 
was one of the busiest among post-Soviet borders: 20 to 30 million persons 
crossed it per year. Russian and Ukrainian citizens could cross it with internal 
passports. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the question of the 
precise territorial delimitations of the Ukrainian borders with Russia has been  
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a permanent source of tension and a point of irritation. It took years for the 
Russian political elites to accept Ukrainian independence, and until the mid 
1990s the Ukrainian-Russian border issue remained open. One of the reasons 
why Moscow was slow in dealing with the Ukrainian border issue was that 
“keeping the issue suspended”, Moscow though it could use its eventual 
concession as a bargaining chip. But it happened mostly because after the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union, the problem of ethnic minorities significantly 
changed the meaning of new borders. An evident strategy of the Kremlin has 
been that of using minorities (not only in Ukraine) in order to destabilize new 
states and to achieve, sooner or later, a new configuration of Ukraine's borders4. 
As a consequence, nowadays former soviet internal borders are defined in 
Russian official discourse by the nationality of inhabitants. There was an evident 
shift in the concept of borders: they present now, within this discourse, an 
evident linkage with ethnicity rather than statehood. Hence the concept of 
borders based on nationality was the precondition for Russia's pressures on 
Crimea that ended in a “punitive” land-grab. It seems that respect for the borders 
established with the collapse of the Soviet Union can no longer be taken for 
granted. In the recent past Russian foreign policy decision-makers have demon-
strated an ability to annex territories and create puppet states and dependent 
regions such as Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-
niestria, using the ambiguous policies of protecting “compatriots” (sootech-
estvenniki). As Harvey pointed out, nationalism is first of all a specific type of 
human territoriality and a territorial form of ideology (Harvey 1989). As well 
known, nationalism manipulates various attributes of national pride (the army, 
the armaments and the borders) and assures unequivocally, when it became 
possible, also expansionist forms. Border unresolved disputes between Russia 
and Ukraine are currently created by the difficulty to solve the controversies 
through a process meeting appropriate standards of lawfulness that allows to 
consider the border as permanent. This is the case of Russian attempt to correct 
the map of the world, beginning from the former Soviet space and the case of 
minorities, used as a tool of influence.  
The main problem is that the exercise of power through a set of central 
political institutions and a clear spatial demarcation of territory remain crucial 
points for Ukraine. New imposed boundaries undermine the exclusive and 
legitimate exercise of power and authority over former areas, referred to 
                    
4 Russia's foreign policy concepts throughout the Putin's presidencies have repeatedly 
claimed a right to protect the interests of Russian “compatriots” living beyond its 
borders. 
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Ukrainian sovereignty, according to sovereign territorial ideal. The attempt  
to build new boundaries reveal a dramatic legitimacy shift and a consistent 
political-geographic change. Due to the fact that the territorial norms of the 
modern state system display a remarkable tenacity, international recognition of  
a state presumes that statehood implies control over territory. Moreover, according 
to the doctrines of international law state boundaries, once established, should  
be seen as legitimate and state governments should have the right to control 
territory within their boundaries (which means that they should have sovereignty 
over their territories) (Murphy 2002, p. 199). Ukraine is a de jure sovereign state 
that entered after centuries of failed attempts into the international system of 
states in keeping with established practice in international law. As a sovereign 
state it had, and continues to have, the right to expect other states to respect its 
territorial integrity. In fact, Ukraine after its independence negotiated and con-
cluded border agreements with all states contiguous with it, thus formalizing its 
territory as inherited from the precursor state, the Soviet Union. Needless to say, 
the issue of Ukrainian statehood as it is manifested geographically is strongly 
related to the problem of its borders. Implications of non-recognition could be 
very serious in the international context in the practical sense. Thus, both Ukraine 
and Russia are bound to build new fortified boundaries, in order to reassert their 
sovereignty over highly contested territories either internally (e.g. civil war) or 
externally (e.g. interstate warfare). The building of new, strong boundaries, 
depends on the necessity of the regimes of territorial legitimacy and is a strategy 
by which the states seek to legitimate themselves after their entrance into the 
system of states.  
The problem of Ukraine's Eastern borders is also connected with the legitimacy 
of the new Ukrainian state and as such it remains a symbol of “unfinished nation 
building”. For Ukraine, to have its borders legitimised by international treaties 
and arranged according to international standards it was a necessary pre-
condition for building an independent statehood. Nation and state-building 
processes in both countries, problems of “divorce” and of building new relations 
based on principles of national sovereignty have shaped the context of the 
Ukrainian-Russian border issue since 1991. Various parties and politicians in 
Russia (from the nationalists to the neo-communists) did not hesitate to claim 
Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine on historical and language related grounds. 
In Ukraine, similar territorial claims to Russia (most often for Kuban as a former 
Ukrainian ethnic territory) were only marginal and limited to some radical 
nationalist groups. Ukrainian nationalists would like to transform this new 
border into a frontier between cultural-“civilisational” macro-regions. Success in 
this endeavor would exclude Russia from Europe, firmly place Ukraine in the 
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West, institute new geopolitical blocs and certify the edge of Europe as the 
Ukrainian-Russian border.  
Geopolitical interests too dictate to Ukraine the need to strengthen and 
carefully protect its eastern border, avoiding any alliances or security agreements 
with Russia and looking for a union with the West. For Ukrainian leaders, the 
eastern border is crucial not only as a protective barrier around the national 
economic space but also as a major political and ideological symbol of inde-
pendence.  
4. THE NEW UKRAINE'S BOUNDARIES 
Ukrainian diplomats have lobbied for the delimitation and demarcation of the 
border, but the Russians were rather reluctant in this respect. Indeed, for Russia 
in the 1990s, the border with Ukraine was not the issue of first priority: Russia 
had to cope with new borders of around 13,000 km total length, some of them 
going through zones of military and ethnic conflicts. But the deeper reason was 
rather political than technical: Russia considered “internal” the borders inside 
the CIS and declined any discussions on demarcation as not compatible with 
“partnership relations.” Russia's new position on demarcation can be explained 
by its new accent on “sovereignty” as the centre of its national doctrine. The 
worst consequence is that the new borders reflect an exclusionary approach  
– according to the Western model of the nation-state – of the domination of the 
majority nation. It means that the pressures to build new boundaries between 
Ukraine and Russia are reciprocal and internationally based.  
After the annexation, the de facto land border between Ukraine (the Kherson 
region) and Crimea became an international border without international 
recognition. The previous negotiations on delimiting the waters of the Azov Sea 
are no longer relevant. The consequences for the shipping routes to the ports of 
Odessa, Nikolayev, Belgorod and Kherson are enormous. Kyiv refused any 
acknowledgement of the territorial changes. Russia increased its military presence 
along the demarcation line and in response to this military buildup Ukraine also 
deployed more troops and resources closer to the border with Crimea. Every day 
there are significant clashes (with several casualties) on this border, especially 
near Armyansk and at the isthmus of Perekop. The secession of Crimea has been 
a destructive process (especially for trade, social cooperation and coexistence), 
reinforced by the use of borders. It every day confronts the new authorities on 
the Peninsula with serious problems related to the need to establish a new 
relationship with Ukraine, on which the Region is profoundly dependent, such as 
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deliveries of raw materials and supplies, the transport and tourism sectors, the 
need to rebuild the financial system, transborder cooperation and so on. Closing 
the land border between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine (including two 
railway lines, two major and two minor roads), the only way to supply Crimea 
would be the ferry on the strait of Kerch. This situation of the border, along with 
the strong militarization of the peninsula, causes not only serious supply 
difficulties but also contributes to the collapse of trade and tourism (one of the 
man source of richness in Crimea: approximately 70% of tourists coming to 
Crimea were from Ukraine). Moreover, in June 2014 Ukrainian government 
planned to build a wall along the border of Russia, known as “Ukrainian Wall” 
or, significantly, “European Wall” (Project Wall which officially started on  
10 September 2014) – due on the war against pro-Russian separatists and the 
Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine – taking into account the goal 
to prevent the infiltration by the adversary into the territory of Ukraine, Russian 
military and hybrid warfare intervention in the country and to cut off Russian 
support for insurgents in Ukraine's Eastern 
regions, obtaining at the same time a clear 
fortified “European” border and consequently 
a visa-free regime with the EU for Ukraine 
and a closer position to NATO membership 
(fig. 1–2).  
On 18 July 2014 the National Security and 
Defense Council presented a plan to build 
engineering structures at the Ukraine-Russia 
border. It instructed the government to con-
duct unilateral demarcation of the Ukraine- 
-Russia border. This project is planned to be 
finished in 2018. Ukrainian government of-
ficial proposed on 13 June, 2014 building  
a 2,000 kilometer fence between the two coun-
tries. Topped with barbed wire and electri-
fied, the fence would be protected by ditches 
and anti-personnel mines. The $130 million- 
-project is far from becoming a reality. But it 
illustrates very well how hostile relations 
 between the two bordering nations have become. Ukrainian officials say the wall 
 will enhance national security, improve the business climate and bring Ukraine 
 closer to NATO membership and EU integration. The former Ukraine's Prime 
 Minister Yatsenyuk claimed the fortifications would serve as Europe's de facto 
 
Fig. 1. A part of the Project Wall 
on Eastern Ukraine 
Source: https://www.behance.net/ 
gallery/19754607/Wall-on-
Ukraine-Russia-border 
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eastern boundary, while also helping Ukraine reassure its European partners that 
it is in full control of its borders. Russia erected 40 km of fortified walls, and 
more than 100 km of defensive trenches on its border with the rebel Ukrainian 
regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. Ukraine planned to seal itself off from Russia 
by building a 2,000-kilometer fence at a cost of $150 million. But the project has 
been delayed due to its enormous cost to a cash-strapped state. A freshly-dug 
anti-tank ditch running along a short stretch of metal fence topped with barbed 
wire marks the start of a new border defense that Ukraine hopes will protect it 
from Russia. But over two years later, only a small fraction of the $250-million 
(225-million-euro) project that Kiev hopes could help withstand a Russian 
invasion has been built. Nevertheless, Ukraine has already built 115 kilometers 
(71.5 miles) of anti-tanks structures, 82 kilometers (51 miles) of rocade roads, 
412 kilometers (256 miles) of intrusion detection strips and 10 kilometers  
(6.2 miles) of metal fences and 49 observation towers along the national border 
in Sumy, Chernihiv and Kharkiv regions since the project began in 2014. Over 
230 kilometers of anti-tank trenches, 45 kilometers of drag road, 103 kilometers 
of lateral roads and 75 kilometers of fences and lookout towers were established. 
400 million hryvnia ($15.8 million) were spent on the construction in the Kharkiv 
and Chernihiv regions in 2015. In 2017 the plan will be to start construction in 
the Luhansk region. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The original project of the Ukraine's fortified Eastern border 
Source: Internet 
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Curiously, this new boundary's project coexists with a de facto loss of 
Ukraine's eastern regions, now under the strong control of the Kremlin and  
a new fortified boundary, erected by the Russians, along the demarcation of 
annexed region of Crimean peninsula: in both cases the movement of peoples 
became increasingly difficult as Ukraine and Russia raised barriers to entry. 
Now, it is quite evident the deep contrast existing today between the rigidity of 
new borders, both many practical problems in the determination of boundaries 
and the high dynamism of the political map of the European regions, where the 
reality is still the plurality of ethnos and the presence of different cultures. The 
problem of ethnopluralism has a direct bearing on the question of borders since 
much of the problem is due to the fact that many national minorities are linked to 
a majority population group in neighbouring countries (Delanty 2011, p. 123) 
and the notion of borderland is particular relevant in the context of inter- 
-civilisational zones of overlapping identities. Moreover, as S.R. Ratner (1996,  
p. 605) pointed out: “Once boundary lines assume new significance, their 
location becomes even more critical”. 
This statement is particularly true, taking into account the length of the 
border to be protected: it measures 2292.6 km which is almost one third of the 
overall length of the state borders of the country. It crosses urbanised and 
densely populated territories, which have a crucial importance for the economies 
of both countries and which until recently were deeply integrated. Obviously, the 
additional problems Project Wall may stimulate (not only geographic and 
economic but also social and ethno-political) are enormous. It may hinder 
transborder cooperation, interactions across state borders and exacerbate ethno-
national conflicts with a snowball effect of migrations and territorial and 
political fragmentation. This case-study demonstrates the role of war and 
aggression in providing justifications for hardening of borders and power 
practices related to state borders.  
It is very relevant and useful to study the building of modern state borders in 
Eastern Europe where flexible regional, multilayered and hybrid identities are 
widespread. More complex is the issue of Ukraine's borders with Russia and 
potential future restrictions on movement between the two countries. Given the 
very close cultural, social, ethnic and economic ties between Ukraine and 
Russia, visa requirements and border checks have proven highly disruptive 
(Mrinska 2006, Krok and Smętkowski 2006). Ukraine remains a pluralistic, 
multi-ethnic state and contains a typical ethnically plural society: her role is to 
be a bridge between East and West. The use of borders against invasions may 
end in a totally inefficient and counterproductive effect. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The traditional definitions and comprehensions of borders have been 
challenged primarily because the context in which they were created and existed 
has also altered (Anderson and O'Dowd l999). Control over borders is one of the 
attributes of sovereignty that today seems increasingly precarious. Nowadays we 
see sovereignty as held by states or peoples and tied to a clearly fixed territory. 
But in Eastern Europe is increasing an extensive range of “imperfect sover-
eignty”, implying forms of political fragmentation, international protectorates 
and so on. The attempt to create an alignment and a coincidence of the functions 
and roles of socio-cultural, ethno-political, and economic boundaries in order to 
establish a reference for people's identity is increasingly difficult. The attempt to 
reinforce the old aspect of sovereignty using the boundaries became much more 
difficult than in the past. In fact, many of the states created over the past forty 
years lack the capacity to provide even minimal self-defence. Sovereignty at the 
end of the twentieth century appears to be still “conditioned-sovereignty”. 
Particularly in this case study, the length of territory hinders the building of very 
long fortified boundaries. They might resemble a dream, full of fallacies and 
difficulties. As Oleksandr Sushko pointed out, despite new borders Ukraine may 
find itself in a growing security vacuum that will create a perfect environment 
for the further marginalisation of the country (Sushko 2010). Moreover, the 
political and cultural dialogue between Russia and Ukraine is strongly informed 
by the presence of national minorities living on the territory of neighbouring 
states (Filippova 2016, p. 71): this fact hinders even the reinforcement of the 
socio-cultural boundaries.  
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No. 13 
THE PRECONDITIONS FOR CONFLICTS  
IN DONBAS AND CRIMEA: SIMILARITIES  
AND DIFFERENCES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Geography of conflicts is a promising area of science, especially during the 
ongoing territorial and political conflicts (TPC) in Ukraine, which was faced 
with serious security threats between 2014 and 2016. Conflicts estimated by the 
“Conflict Barometer” (Conflict Barometer 2014: disputes, non-violent crises, 
violent crises, limited wars, wars, 2015) to be at the “war” level have influenced 
the safety of Central-European and Baltic region's post-socialist states. Many 
causes can be identified as key to conflict eruption in Southern and Eastern 
Ukraine. They often involve spatial characteristic features that determine the 
basic plan (final goal) of those initiating the conflict, directions and limits of its 
distribution, intensity, cyclical character (due to some seasonal phenomena), 
forms and means of struggle for territory and even the timelines of those 
conflicts. In this respect, geography of conflict is much more closely related in 
its subject matter to military geography or the art of military tactics and strategy 
of fighting than to geopolitics and international relations theory. In the conflict, 
the subject of the territorial struggle looks for the most vulnerable places in the 
opponent's positions, meaning to cause considerable losses that would neutralise 
the opponent and implement the plan of control over the territory and its 
resources. Therefore, vulnerability is not only the consequence of but also the 
condition for a successful territorial combat. In its absence, intensification of 
vulnerability becomes a means of struggle. Vulnerability of both Ukraine as  
a whole and its individual regions has become one of the most important pre-
requisites for the emergence of conflict zones. 
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2. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL  
BASIS OF THE STUDY 
There is quite a vast experience of W.N. Adger (2000), R. Leichenko and  
K. O'Brien (2002), S.L. Cutter et al. (2003), S. Sterlacchini (2011), J. Bryan 
(2015) in researching vulnerabilities of people who are exposed to negative 
effects of natural hazards and threats, or vulnerabilities caused by political 
conflicts or other economic and social factors.  
Vulnerability is one of the concepts in use of which it is difficult to reach  
a consensus, and is characterised by many interpretations, since it depends on 
research approaches and perspectives. There is no clear understanding of the term 
“vulnerability” in literature, so it is open to interpretation – says S. Sterlacchini 
(2011).  
He believes that vulnerability reflects the ability of an item or a set of items 
(organised into the system) exposed to danger to withstand the damage 
(Sterlacchini 2011). In geography, vulnerability is defined as the degree to which 
a community, structure, service or geographical area may be damaged or de-
stroyed, based on their natural properties or locations under the influence of 
specific hazardous risks (Glossary of Environment Statistics 1997, p. 76). The 
concept of “vulnerability” is characterised in detail by the authors of United 
Nations’ “Human Development Report 2014”. It states that in places where 
social and legal institutions, authorities, political space or social and cultural 
norms and traditions fail to serve the members of the society equally, and where 
they create structural barriers for some people and groups preventing them from 
implementing their rights and choices, they generate structural vulnerability 
(Human Development Report 2014, p. 19).  
Three main groups of people who are more vulnerable to threats are dis-
tinguished: 1) the poor, informal workers, socially excluded; 2) women, people 
with disabilities, migrants, minorities, children, the elderly, youth; 3) whole 
communities, regions. The report indicates major threats that affect the growth 
of vulnerability: 1) economic shocks, health shocks; 2) natural disasters, climate 
change and industrial hazards; 3) conflicts, civil unrest. Three main prerequisites 
for vulnerability growth are defined: 1) limited capabilities; 2) location, position 
in society, sensitive periods in the life cycle; 3) low social cohesion, irrespon-
sible institutions, poor governance (Human Development Report 2014, p. 19). 
Nowadays, vulnerability is considered the property of regional systems (Ster-
lacchini 2011). Vulnerability is the inter-action between threats (in TPC – poli-
tical threats – R. Slyvka) and systemic vulnerability that produces certain results. 
It is clear that vulnerability is a dynamic characteristic (Cutter et al. 2003). 
The preconditions for conflicts in Donbas and Crimea...  
 
189 
In political geography, a long tradition of vulnerable countries and their 
separate parts can be traced. 19th-century mercantilism defined a vulnerable state 
as one deprived of significant natural, human resources, as well as markets for 
finished goods. Political geographers often talk about the vulnerability of 
borders connected with probable aggression of neighbours. A well-known theory 
of “natural borders” was popular by the mid-20th century and was used to justify 
territorial expansion and annexation. Orographic borders, river, lake and sea 
borders were considered reliable and profitable. The fatalism of impact of 
natural boundaries on international relations is justified in popular scientific and 
journalistic literature. The idea of people's vulnerability in some regions of Latin 
America as a legitimate reason for the implementation of “humanitarian inter-
vention” of US forces is described in J. Bryan's (2015) article, which points to 
the paradoxical situation when the hegemonic state intervened to protect 
vulnerable people, while being the one who caused this vulnerability in the past 
(Bryan 2015). This interpretation of aggressive action is quite appropriate to 
explain Russia's interference in Ukrainian or Syrian internal affairs. 
In the context of Ukraine, the vulnerability of this country's plain borders was 
described by S. Rudnytskyi (Рудницький 1923). J. Lypa (Липа 1992) con-
sidered the Black Sea coast to be the only reliable line of independent Ukraine. 
Polish-American political scientist and geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski 
pointed to geopolitical vulnerability of Ukraine (1997). In the context of vulne-
rability issues, Ukrainian geographers M.O. Baranovskyi (Барановський 2010),  
M.S. Dnistrianskyi (Дністрянський 2006), F. Zastavnyi (Заставний 2006), and 
O. Shablii (Шаблій 2001) paid much attention to the problem of uneven 
regional development, which should be interpreted as a threat to national 
security. In 2002, Transit published Mykola Riabchuk's article “Ukraine: One 
State, Two Countries” (Riabchuk 2002) which was followed by a comment 
addressing the discourse of two Ukraines in a critical way1. N.W. Bagrov 
(Багров 2002), M.S. Dnistrianskyi (Дністрянський 2011) predicted possible 
negative consequences of unbalanced regional and foreign politics and the 
growth of devolution processes in the Crimea and South-Eastern Ukraine. The 
development of southern and eastern regions of Ukraine in terms of their frontier 
position was investigated by O. Afanasiev (Афанасьєв 2012), and in terms of 
their political weight by S.W. Adamovych (Адамович 2009). O. Vendyna and 
V.A. Kolosov (Вендина и Колосов 2007), T. Zhurzhenko (2002, 2010, 2014) 
studied the interaction between Russia and Ukraine in the borderlands. In their 
studies, A.B. Shvets (Швец 2007, 2013) and A.N. Yakovlev (Яковлев 2008) 
                          
1 http://www.iwm.at/uncategorized/the-myth-of-two-ukraines/. 
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emphasised the socio-cultural conflicts in the Crimea. Ukraine's vulnerability 
due to blurred legal status of the Crimean autonomy was described by Y. Roznai 
and S. Suteu (2015). 
At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, scientific discourse on the issue of 
vulnerability of some regions and countries to the conflict emerged. It involved 
the concept of “Eurasian Balkans” (Brzezinski 1997), crush zones (O'Loughlin, 
1999), buffer zones (Prevelakis 2009), in-betweenness (Rey and Groza 2009), 
overlapping territorialities (Agnew and Ulrich 2013), or failed/fragile states 
(Marshall and Cole 2014). 
When developing a geographic approach to understanding the vulnerability 
of a region to the emergence of TPC, we paid special attention to the ideas 
presented by S. Rudnytskyi (Рудницький 1905), the founder of Ukrainian 
geography, expressed in the early 20th century. He stated that, in general geo-
graphy, every object and every phenomenon is thoroughly investigated, focusing 
on four major issues: morphological, content-based, dynamic and genetic (Руд-
ницький 1905, p. 25). Shablii notes that due to this approach, Rudnytskyi dif-
ferentiated between two types of geographic laws: 1) spatial (horologic), that can 
also be called laws of territorial structure, and 2) genetic (laws of generation, 
development) (Шаблій 2001, p. 411). In our opinion, in terms of political geo-
graphy, spatial (horologic) laws are able to explain the morphological and 
structural peculiarities of conflict regions. Their dynamic and genetic properties 
belong to genetic laws. According to O. Shablii (Шаблій 2001), in modern 
geography, the so-called functional laws are singled out; they reflect the 
essential links between entrances and exits of local natural, social or natural-
economic systems in the process of changing their states (Шаблій 2001, p. 411). 
Assuming that the zone of TPC distribution is a kind of dynamic territorial social 
system, the change of state is influenced by the purposeful fight (public and 
hidden, inner and outer, violent – using force, soft – using the power of 
authority, hybrid – a combination of the previous two) to gain control over the 
territory as well as its properties and resources. This fight involves the inter-
action with the systemic vulnerability of the territory, resulting in attempts of the 
fighting subject to set control (de jure or de facto) over the disputed territory. 
We suggest considering the conflict zone a vulnerable territorial and political 
system. Its opposite in terms of quality is a geographically stable political 
system. In political geography, it is appropriate to use the term “conflict region 
vulnerability”. It can be defined as the degree to which the region is vulnerable 
to political threats based on its geographical location, physical and geographical 
conditions, socio-geographical structures, political status and functional capacity. 
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Assuming that the goal of acknowledged rational politics is to achieve a sus-
tainable level of territorial and political system (minimal vulnerability to con-
flict), it seems logical that another possible extreme manifestation – vulnerable 
territorial and political system (maximal vulnerability to conflict) is possible as 
well. The transitional state is a so-called transit territorial and political system. 
The latter may have three dynamic qualities: 1) structural (aimed at achieving 
stability of territorial and political systems); 2) destructive (aimed at reducing 
the stability of territorial and political systems); 3) fluctuating (random deviation 
from the previous development of territorial and political system).  
Extreme ideal condition of a territorial and political system involves the 
implementation of the religious concept of universal Christian Peace (or Islamic 
Ummah), or secular concepts such as utopian ideal city-states of Plato, Cam-
panella or More, communist utopia of Marx and others. Ensuring peace by means 
of various military, political, social, economic and cultural tools is actually the 
way to reduce the vulnerability of the territorial and political system to the 
threats and risks, the extreme of which is war. The ultimate vulnerable territorial 
and political system is the “bellum omnium contra omnes” according to Thomas 
Hobbes works De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651). The aim of territorial and 
political organisation of the society is to achieve resilience to threats and risks 
that a war, destruction, radical lifestyle changes may bring. At this stage,  
a territorial and political system may be exposed to fluctuations, i.e. a deviation 
from the constructive or destructive development as a result of shock effects. 
The latter include climate changes (Hsiang et al. 2011), ecological crises and 
spread of epidemics (Barnett 2009; Environment and Security Program Report, 
2009), the deterioration of market opportunities and resource cycles in the world 
economy (Collier et al. 2008, Kennedy 2014) and mass migration. 
The destructive direction of the territorial and political system is carried out 
by the subjects of the struggle for territory and its resources. Their goal is to take 
advantage of preconditions that can be well described according to five 
parameters: 1) positional vulnerability; 2) structural vulnerability; 3) historical 
vulnerability; 4) dynamic vulnerability; 5) functional vulnerability. If they do not 
manifest clearly enough, the subject may deliberately act in the direction of 
individual components of vulnerability. This destructive effect can be amplified 
or attenuated by shock effects, such as falling prices for energy resources and  
a decrease in the capacity of “petrol filling countries” in terms of aggressive 
rhetoric and actions. The Crimea and Donbas remain vulnerable regions of 
Ukrainian territorial and political system. Thus, the investigation of vulnerability 
phenomenon is an important task for geography of conflicts as a structural 
component of political geography. 
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3. POSITIONAL VULNERABILITY 
Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europe by territory; its area 
constitutes 5.7% of the total area of the region. The total length of Ukrainian 
state borders is 7,700 km, land borders accounting for 5,740 km. The total length 
of Ukrainian state borders with Russia is 2,063 km. First of all, they are the 
borders, that Ukraine inherited from the USSR; but, taking into consideration the 
conditions and circumstances of their establishing, they were mainly imposed 
unilaterally during the period when Ukrainian people were not an equitable 
subject of international relations and were not able to implement its right of self- 
-determination over their whole ethnic territory (Дністрянський 2006, p. 298). 
However, owing to the increase in Ukraine’s fragility caused by a number of 
internal and external factors, control over individual borderlands, especially in 
Donbas and the Crimea, which border with Russia, has become complicated. 
The geopolitical buffer position of Ukraine has become a classical definition 
of the state's position in political geography. This positional vulnerability of 
Ukraine found extreme expression in S.P. Huntington's (1993) findings con-
cerning the presence of civilisational faultline that passes through its territory. 
One of the first to point to the geographical position of Ukraine was Brzezinski 
(1997; Бжезинский видит… 2015). Most Ukrainian politicians2 themselves 
pointed out the positive functions of this position, as Ukraine had to become  
a bridge between the East and the West (Украина может… 2016). Thus, the 
mass consciousness of Ukrainians have a mental image of it being a buffer 
country. By 2013, 42% of Ukrainians were in favour of Ukrainian non-aligned 
status, but at present, the number of such people hardly reaches 25%3. The end 
of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s passed under the imperative of 
multi-vector foreign policy of Leonid Kuchma. As a result, Ukraine has become 
a non-aligned country. This largely happened due to the pressure from Russia.  
It was a hybrid technology that allowed for creating the conditions for open and 
concealed occupation of post-Soviet countries. Last, but not least, Ukraine has 
become a victim of Russian aggression because of the adoption of this status. 
This may be reminiscent of the “Trojan Horse”, as it opened space for the onset 
of Russia4. 
                          
2  Preferably, the pro-Russian, such as Viktor Medvedchuk, one of the negotiators in 
the peace talks in Minsk. 
3 http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_na-referendumi-ukrayinci-golosuvali-b-za-nato-so 
ciologi/709089.  
4 http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_na-referendumi-ukrayinci-golosuvali-b-za-nato-so 
ciologi/709089. 
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Ukraine has not gained all characteristics of a geopolitical buffer at once; it 
happened after the state's refusal to participate in Russia-initiated Eurasian 
integration projects at the beginning of the 21st century. In particular, Ukraine's 
participation in the CIS was inactive, the state kept away from the joint projects 
with Russia within the framework of common defence and economic policy. On 
the other hand, Ukrainian attempts to find new platforms for cooperation with 
the West proved unsuccessful. At various times, Ukraine's intention to partici-
pate in the project of NATO-bis or to join the Visegrad Group were announced. 
Ukraine has been looking for alternative platforms to integrate with Europe 
participating in the Central European Initiative, BSEC, and GUAM for 25 years 
of its independence. President Leonid Kuchma tried to find ways of rapproche-
ment with NATO under the “Partnership for Peace”. In January 2008, the 
proposition from the second Yulia Tymoshenko cabinet for Ukraine to join 
NATO's Membership Action Plan was met with opposition. A petition of over  
2 million signatures has called for a referendum on Ukraine's membership 
proposal to join NATO. The opposition called for a national referendum to be 
held on any steps towards further involvement with NATO. In February 2008 
57.8% of Ukrainians supported the idea of a national referendum on joining 
NATO, against 38.6% in February 20075. 
In 2013, Yanukovych's attempts to bond with the EU in the framework of 
association failed, causing protests against the autocratic regime created by him 
and sparking the Revolution of Dignity. Under such circumstances, Donbas and 
the Crimea became a buffer region of the buffer state. Not coincidently, they 
were marked as a zone of instability, “Eurasian Balkans”, on Brzezinski's geo-
political map. What was important here is that in Donbas there was a delimita-
tion line not only between Ukraine and Russia, but also between European 
values and the values of the old Soviet totalitarianism. Moreover, Donbas 
received another frontier – the contact zone with Turkey, the Middle East and 
the Caucasus. 
Both regions are close to areas of territorial-political instability and interna-
tional legal vacuum (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh). 
All together, they form the “post-Soviet zone of instability”. Strategists in the 
Kremlin granted the title of the centre of this area to the Crimea. No wonder that 
now Kremlin states that Ukraine has to forget about the return of the Crimea, 
apparently in exchange for the stabilisation of the situation in Donbas. In the 
future, even if a new base is built near the port of Novorossiysk, consolidating 
the position of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Crimea would still be the center of 
                          
5  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations. 
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gravity of the Russian military footprint, consolidating its ability to project force 
deep into the Mediterranean (Goşu and Manea 2015, p. 10). In short, the 
annexation of Crimea is already shifting the geography of control in the wider 
Black Sea region. In the past, the Black Sea used to be called a Russian lake; 
now it is becoming an A2/AD Russian bubble6 (Goşu and Manea 2015, p. 10). 
The Ukrainian-Russian border in Donbas, mostly flat and continental, makes 
Ukraine more vulnerable to the prevailing Russian armed forces. A small access 
of Donetsk region to the Sea of Azov makes it vulnerable to amphibious assault 
landings as well. The viability of the project aimed at creating separatist “repub-
lics” in the Donbas is dependent on the constant supply of new materials and 
military manpower from Russia. Furthermore, the evidence points to the fact that 
Russia's reserves of “volunteers” now appear to have been exhausted. Conse-
quently, in mid-August 2014, Russia began to send regular soldiers to Ukraine. 
These latest reinforcements are fighting not for ideological motivations or material 
incentives, but on the direct orders of their military superiors (Mitrokhin 2015,  
p. 220). The peculiarity of the Crimea is its absence of land border with Russia. 
Maritime boundary runs along the inland sea waters of two basins – the Sea of 
Azov and the Black Sea. The presence of the naval base of Russian Black Sea 
Fleet in Sevastopol and the lack of its own powerful navy did not allow Ukraine 
to defend the peninsula against the aggression. 
The vulnerability of Azov basin is explained by its unique location, which is 
described as an enclosed sea of the semi-enclosed Black Sea, which is a part of 
the greater Mediterranean Sea. After the collapse of the USSR, the Sea of Azov 
lost the status of internal Soviet sea basin. Russia was deliberately weakening 
the Ukrainian position in marine basins. One example of this is the territorial 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2003 centred on Tuzla Island in the Strait 
of Kerch. Article 2 of the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federa-
tion on the Ukrainian-Russian state border dd. 28.01.2003 7defines a navigation 
mode in using the Azov-Kerch basin and complete loss of the status of internal 
waters of Ukraine and Russia. Under this agreement, Ukraine had to coordinate 
the visits of foreign military vessels in their ports with Russia. 
Thus, one of the consequences of morphologically positional vulnerability of 
Donbas and the Crimea was the idea of the Russian leadership to invade the 
Crimea and Donbas by force, which would later cause the “domino effect”, with 
all the other Ukrainian regions pleading to join the Russian Federation. 
                          
6 Anti-Access / Area Denial Weapon.  
7 http://interlegal.com.ua/en/publications/occupation_of_the_territory_of_ukraine_in 
_focus_of_maritime_law/. 
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4. HISTORICAL VULNERABILITY 
For many years after achieving its independence, Ukraine maintained an 
invisible “colonial umbilical cord” connecting the Ukrainian society with 
Moscow. It was less pronounced in western and central Ukraine, in comparison 
to the southeast of Ukraine. Putin's famous statement on Soviet Union's collapse 
as the greatest “geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century reflects the desire of 
modern Russia to fix an a situation that, in their view, was unfair, through 
reintegration of the post-Soviet countries into the neo-imperial project. The 
strategy of “short leash” was applied to most European post-Soviet countries 
neighbouring Russia. Everywhere it found vulnerable regions in the state 
mechanism, it followed a masking strategy – covert interference in the internal 
affairs of pro-European neighbours, maintaining the slogans of fraternal 
relations with neighbouring nations. In case of Moldova, the region of Trans-
nistria became vulnerable, in Azerbaijan it was Nagorno-Karabakh, in Georgia  
– South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in Ukraine – the Crimea and Donbas. Only 
the countries involved in political, military and economic integration projects 
spearheaded by Russia (Organizacija Dogovora o Kollektivnoj Bezopasnosti, 
ODKB; The Eurasian Economic Union, EAEU) could avoid separatism and 
military conflicts. Political instrumentalisation of historical memory played  
a key role in Kremlin's strategy. 
Historical vulnerability is one of prerequisites of the fact that Ukrainian- 
-Russian violent territorial and political conflicts occurred in Donbas and the 
Crimea, but not in other border regions of Ukraine, that also had the experience 
of national statehood formation; for example, Galicia, located in the west 
(declaration of statehood of West Ukrainian People's Republic in Lviv in 1918) 
and Transcarpathia (declaration of independence of Carpathian Ukraine in Khust 
in 1938). After 1991, the western regions turned from the periphery of the Soviet 
empire into the main base of the national democratic movement, as well as  
a gateway to Europe. Simultaneously, Eastern Ukraine, which formed an 
industrial core of the USSR and contributed essentially to the intellectual and 
administrative potential of the Soviet system, with its overwhelmingly Russian- 
-speaking population, was marginalised on the new symbolic map of Ukraine 
(Zhurzhenko 2002). 
It is obvious that Russia regarded these border regions of Ukraine as the 
weakest link in the territorial and political system of Ukraine. Loosening the 
regions historically less loyal to the national state, according to the Kremlin, 
could cause disintegration of the entire Ukraine, or its significant weakening due 
to its internal conflicts. 
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The main features of historic vulnerability of Donbas and the Crimea are:  
1) the dissemination of Russia's imperial and Soviet discourse among the people 
of both regions, including the myth about the threat from the West; 2) existence 
within the overlapping cultural and information spaces between Ukraine and 
Russia; 3) the prevalence of communist ideas and developed traditions of social 
paternalism; 4) post-Soviet industrial inertia; 5) the renaissance of Orthodox 
Moscow-oriented fundamentalism in late 20th and early 21st centuries; 6) margin-
alisation of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar identity, culture and nation-state model. 
There are common and diverse features in the manifestation of historical 
vulnerability in the Crimea and Donbas. Common to these two regions is a strong 
position of the Russian-imperial and Soviet discourses. It can be explained by 
the lack of experience in being under the influence of European democratic 
culture. The role that the locations of the regions played in the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union was an important “brick” strongly embedded in the 
imperial myth about the historical role of Russia/USSR development. 
Differences between regions lie in the fact that Soviet, not Russian imperial 
conceptual discourses are represented in Donbas. However, there is a more 
visible tendency of the ruling political and economic elite to positioning itself as 
a part of global establishment. However, for ordinary citizens, regional authori-
ties prepared a simulacra of the Soviet era. Kyiv did not conduct any active 
cultural, educational and information policy here, de facto turning Donbas into 
cultural autonomy of Ukraine. 
At the same time, the local political and intellectual elites of eastern Ukraine, 
above all in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk, reinvented their regions as border-
lands, first of all in order to justify the close cultural ties and economic cross- 
-border cooperation with Russia. Stressing cultural diversity, bilingualism and 
the depoliticisation of ethnicity, the concept of borderlands also helped legiti-
mise the lack of a strong national identity (Zhurzhenko 2014). 
Due to poorer resources and industrial capacity, there were not many powerful 
business structures in the Crimea. Thus, higher political positions were occupied 
by people from the former communist elite. A mixture of nostalgic Imperial 
Russian and Soviet concept discourses was more common in the Crimea. 
For crystallisation of political myths, the cultivation of the idea of the threat 
posed by any Western influences is crucial. What is important here is that the 
association of market reforms in late 1980s and 1990s with its negative impact 
of Western liberal ideas led to the pauperisation of the population. Skillful ma-
nipulation of political technologists during national elections necessarily implied 
the use of techniques of juxtaposing east against west, not only in Ukrainian 
context, but also in the context of Europe and Russia. 
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An excellent perception of the West in Donbas mythology was the pre-
dominance of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and the Great Patriotic War (the 
Second World War) as a liberation war against the German invaders and the role 
of Donbas in ensuring victory over the enemy. The regional elites of Donbas and 
the Crimea supported the cult celebration of the “Great Victory”. Especially 
pompous ceremonies in pseudo-Soviet style began to reemerge when Yanukovych 
became president of Ukraine. The regional mental map illustrates a taxonomy 
that is so brilliantly represented in the names of settlements, streets and squares, 
as well as political iconography of monuments of Lenin, Artem, Zhdanov, 
Voroshilov and other members of the Bolshevik leadership. 
In the Crimea, a mixture of old imperial myths about the colonisation of the 
Crimea in the 19th century, the apogee of which was the Crimean War (1853 
–1856), was predominant. A symbolic series associated with the defence of 
Sevastopol from German occupation (1941–1942), Yalta Conference (1945) and 
the redistribution of the postwar world, Turkish threat as a member of NATO 
during the Cold War gained its popularity. In addition, common myths of Soviet 
propaganda about Crimean Tatars as traitors of the Soviet fatherland, sparked by 
accusations of collaboration with the German occupation authorities, were 
spread. In such landscape, this mythology found its reflection in the imperial 
pseudo-Greek and Soviet topology. Moreover, Tatar names of places after the 
deportation of the Crimean Tatar people almost disappeared. The presence of  
a large military base and Russian personnel contributed to justification of Fleet 
location in Crimea and preservation of myths about the threat. 
A characteristic feature for both regions was the common Russian cultural 
and information space, almost total domination of Russian media and cultural 
figures. Russian cultural products (especially works of popular literature, films 
and television shows) dominate the Ukrainian market and serve to export 
Russian imperial history and Russian patriotism, to glorify the Russian and Soviet 
army and security services, and to excite anti-western sentiments (Zhurzhenko 
2014). 
In Donbas, the influence of Russian pop culture in the working environment 
was manifested to a great extent. In the Crimea, a mixture of modern Russian 
mass pop culture and traditional Russian high culture, writers, poets and artists 
connected with creative relations to the Crimea such as Alexander Pushkin, 
Anton Chekhov, Ivan Aivazovskiy, Appolinary Vasnetsov, Vasily Aksenov 
persisted. They actually created artistic images, original artwork for the Russian- 
-imperial discourse of the new Promised Land for the Russians.  
One common characteristic of both regions is the post-Soviet inertia of 
economic development, commitment to communist ideas and deeply rooted 
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ideas of social paternalism. Russian media (especially television) has fostered 
deeply paternalistic model of behaviour of Donbas inhabitants. This behavioural 
model is closely connected with the conviction that all basic public goods should 
be obtained from the transcendent “father”, the image of which is constantly 
represented by Putin. A feeling of special mission of these regions in the scale of 
the Soviet Union and levelling their importance in Ukrainian period was 
common (Донбас і Крим: стратегія повернення 2015). 
One of the peculiarities of Donbas is its pronounced inertia of post-industrial 
development, and the cult of “honourable professions” of metallurgists and 
miners associated with it, as well as so-called “noble dynasties of workers” in 
the era of socialist competition. It was not as pronounced in other regions of 
Ukraine. Therefore, the post-Soviet mythology for the population of Donbas  
was firmly intertwined with the ideas of communist industrialisation of the  
20th century. This strengthened the foundation of regionalism in eastern Ukraine. 
Soviet internationalism and the preference of class over ethnic identity served to 
construe Donbas as a “special case” that escaped the logic of the nationalising 
state. The rejection of ethnic categorisation and the emphasis on local identity 
was a typical reaction to what was perceived as the “nationalism” of Kyiv and 
western Ukraine. This defensive borderlands discourse was linked to the trauma 
of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It evoked an undifferentiated, common 
cultural space with a local population that valued blurred or hybrid Ukrainian- 
-Russian, eastern-Slavic, Orthodox or residual Soviet identities (Zhurzhenko 
2014). 
The common feature of both regions in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods 
was the weakness of Ukrainian national democratic movement, Ukraine's de-
privation of “national” construction in southern and eastern regions; margina-
lisation of pro-Ukrainian activists; negative myths about the Ukrainian national 
liberation movement, and its representatives and symbols. One jarring example 
of this came in 2008 when students of Donetsk National University launched an 
initiative to name their university after its famous graduate, poet, dissident and 
political prisoner Vasyl Stus. At that time, the initiative was supported by the 
President of Ukraine, Minister of Education and Science, as well as cultural and 
public figures. They were opposed by the Regional Council, the Party of 
Regions and the administration of the university itself. In addition to naming the 
university after Stus, another initiative appeared to name the university after 
Vladimir Degtyarev (Soviet Communist Party functionary). As a result, the old 
name remained unchanged8. 
                          
8 http://misto.vn.ua/news/item/id/9164. 
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Both regions stayed away from the Ukrainian national state-building process 
during the 20th century, except for a few episodes of pro-Ukrainian actions in the 
Crimea. In Donbas, there were attempts to create pseudo-national formations 
under the protection of Russia, namely the pro-Bolshevik Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih 
Republic in 1918, the South East Ukrainian Autonomous Republic in 2004. The 
Russian army led by Denikin and Wrangel in 1920–1921 carried out unsuc-
cessful attempts to transform the Crimea into a sort of outpost in the restoration 
of the Russian Empire. Crimean Tatar national movement failed in 1918. Being 
the part of the RSFSR (approximately 30 years), the Crimea was suffering from 
the levelling of national and state life of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic 
minorities. The quintessence of such policy was initiated by Stalin's act of 
deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944. In early December 1991 in Verkhovna 
Rada of the Crimea, attempts were made to take an appeal to the Presidium of 
the USSR to withdraw the Act of 1954 on the transfer of the peninsula to 
Ukraine. After the referendum on December 1, 1991, a representative body of 
the Crimean Tatar, the Mejlis, drafted the Constitution of the Crimean Republic, 
in which the right of self-determination was given only to Crimean Tatars, Kara-
ites and Krimchaks, which evoked suspicious and sometimes hostile reaction of 
non-Tatar population of the peninsula, and led to excessive politicisation 
(Адамович 2009, pp. 371–374). Thus, the experience of the 20th century shows 
the historical vulnerability of these Ukrainian regions to the development of 
conflict processes. 
5. STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY 
As part of Ukraine, Donbas and the Crimea were different in rather distinct 
structural characteristics that increased their vulnerability to external interven-
tion. Among them administrative, ethnic, religious, political, criminal and eco-
nomic structures were identified. 
The administrative structure. Ukraine is a non-classical unitary state. This 
is due to the presence of a single autonomous entity, the Crimean Autonomous 
Republic, in addition to its 24 regions and 2 cities of national subordination 
(Kyiv and Sevastopol) in its composition. Ukrainian unitarianism was inherited 
from its predecessor, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). In 1991  
a referendum, which had a positive outcome for Crimean separatists, was ini-
tiated. Against this backdrop, Kyiv offered a compromise, suggesting restoration 
of rights for the Crimean autonomous region and the rise of its territorial and 
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political status to the level of the autonomous republic as well as the exclusion 
of Sevastopol from its composition. It was an adequate way to resolve peacefully 
and legally the problems of separatism. This was done through full participation 
in the political system of the parent state, as well as through various degrees of 
regional administrative, cultural and/or fiscal autonomy (Roguski 2015, p. 92). 
The so-called territorial autonomy was formed; it had no right to secede from 
Ukraine, possessed its own constitution, government, including the cabinet and 
parliament, and the formal use of three official languages: Russian, Ukrainian 
and Crimean Tatar.  
Other regions of Ukraine were characterised by federalist sentiments rather 
than those of separatists. Movements for the withdrawal of Ukraine from the 
Soviet Union were most active in western regions (historic Eastern Galicia, 
Volhynia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, but to a lesser extent) and Kiev. The 
main claim to communist leadership and the Soviet authority was the connivance 
of Ukraine's political and national rights. Donbas of the late 1980s was also 
marked by significant dissatisfaction, primarily with the economic policies of 
Moscow in one of the oldest industrial regions, which suggested the closure  
of unprofitable mines in order to provide economic support for coal mining in 
Kuzbas (now an industrial region in Russia). For the population of Donbas, 
majority of which were Russianised and educated in terms of socialist inter-
nationalism by the Communist Party of the USSR, Ukrainian national political 
rhetoric of Western politicians often sounded alien. However, there was a stra-
tegic alliance between the two politically most active regions of the USSR, 
possible for joint upholding the sovereignty of Ukraine, according to Adamovych 
(2006). The high degree of Ukrainian patriotic sentiment prevalent in Western 
Ukraine's political culture could hardly be supported by other regions of the 
USSR. That is why, before the proclamation of Ukraine's sovereignty in 1991, 
the idea of the appropriateness of the federal structure in Ukraine that would 
make it possible to combine the efforts of all the regions to struggle for 
independence and develop a regional political culture and the economy in the 
forms that were used in late 1980s and early 1990s, was widely spread in the 
circles of Ukrainian intellectuals. However, very soon Ukrainian politicians took 
the issue from the political agenda on the basis of alleged threat of separatism in 
the Crimea and Transcarpathia and the risk of territorial claims from neigh-
bouring countries. The development of Ukraine during the tenure of President 
Kuchma between 1993 and 2003 was marked by the formation of soft autocratic 
regime power vertical, which excluded the likelihood of an increase of autono-
mist and federalist movements, but on the contrary, contributed to centralised 
region management. 
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Ukraine provided Crimean Tatars, excluded from Crimean political life in the 
1990s, and created shadow institutions dealing only with Tatar interior affairs 
and serving as a platform for the Tatar community on the peninsula, with limited 
personal autonomy. Their representative body, Majlis, was legalised by presi-
dential decree of May 18, 1999, when it received the status of advisory 
committee of Ukrainian Presidential Administration (Wilson 2013, p. iiii). This 
mechanism ceased to function after 2006 (Aydin 2014, p. 83). However, neither 
local nor state authorities officially recognised the Crimean Majlis as a co-creator 
of the legislative process. The Ukrainian Parliament did not pass legislation 
regarding the status of indigenous people for the Crimean Tatars until after the 
Russian annexation either. This law would have provided the Tatars with the 
right to national self-determination, and thus grant national-territorial autonomy 
in Crimea (Aydin 2014, p. 83–84). 
Russia agreed with Crimean autonomy establishing, but preserved its sub-
stantial instrument of influence on Ukraine – and extraterritorial military base  
of the Black Sea fleet numbering 25 thousand people, with the main forces 
localised in the city of Sevastopol. By 1995, the time of signing Ukrainian- 
-Russian agreement on the Black Sea Fleet, the question of the fleet ownership 
and the perspectives of nuclear weapons had been the main agenda of Ukrainian- 
-Russian relations. The agreement provided for the base localisation until 2017, 
but pro-Russian President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych signed the Kharkiv 
Pact9 (2010) and prolonged its duration until 2042. Now, it is clear that Russian 
military presence on the peninsula did not only project military threat to the 
Ukrainian Crimea but also legitimised the presence of Russian authorities and 
security forces both on the territory of Russian bases and all over the Crimea. 
As far as Donbas is concerned, during one of Ukrainian political crises in 
2004, which resulted in the Orange Revolution, the Eastern regional elites tried 
to implement the idea of creating autonomous territorial and political structures, 
such as South East Ukrainian Autonomous Republic. Their main goal was to 
maintain control over political and economic life, not only in Donbas, but also in 
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson regions and in 
the Crimea. This scenario was completely typical of Kremlin's geopolitical 
ambitions to keep industrial regions of Ukraine under control, but until the 
Ukrainian-Georgian war in 2008, Russia had not dared to use the tools of direct 
intervention in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Eastern autonomist 
                          
9 Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine was  
a treaty between Ukraine and Russia whereby the Russian lease on naval facilities in 
Crimea was extended beyond 2017 until 2042. 
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movement disappeared as a result of the resolution of the situation through the 
mediation of the EU. 
Ethnic structures in Donbas and the Crimea differed greatly from those 
prevailing in other regions of Ukraine. Donbas, which was exposed to massive 
Russification and Sovietisation during the Soviet period, had no internal pre-
requisites for ethno-political conflicts. The most irritative problem was the 
functioning of the Russian language as regional or the second official one in the 
state. However, there were no manifestations of internal conflicts between the 
ethnic communities of the region; they were rather conflict breakouts between 
supporters of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian policy. 
People who consider Russian as their native language are not exclusive 
characteristics of the Crimea and Donbas; they are predominant in almost all 
largest cities of Ukraine, except Kyiv, Lviv and Kryvyi Rih. Particularly, in 
2001 in Sevastopol they amounted to 90% of all residents, in Mariupol – to 89%, 
in Donetsk – 87%, in Luhansk – 85%, in Kharkiv – 66%, in Odessa – 65% and 
in Zaporizhia – 57%. In the 21st century, the most powerful Russian commu-
nities of Donbas included Donetsk (899 thousand inhabitants, who considered 
Russian their native language), Mariupol (450 thousand inhabitants), Luhansk 
(420 thousand) Makiyivka (370 thousand) and Horlivka (260 thousand). The 
Crimea in its turn had its largest Russian communities formed in Sevastopol 
(340 thousand) and Simferopol (300 thousand) (Лозинський 2012, p. 55). In 
such circumstances, it is difficult to talk about any policy of forced Ukrainisation 
because, de facto, it did not exist. Instead, R. Lozynskyi (2012) states that:  
1) if in Europe mostly the horizontal type of bilingualism, in which both 
languages have equal status, is predominant, in Ukraine the vertical bilingualism 
is widespread, which means that in the majority of regions the Russian language 
has a higher social status due to prolonged restrictions of the Ukrainian 
language;  
2) a prejudicial attitude towards the state language remains in some regions 
of the state;  
3) important methods of Russia's influence on neighbouring countries is an 
attempt to interfere in their language policy and political pressure to strengthen 
the role of the Russian language in these countries, implementing the slogans to 
ensure the language rights of the population, particularly the Russian-speaking 
one (Лозинський 2012, рр. 113–114). 
In 2001, about 240 thousand people in Ukraine spoke the Crimean Tatar 
language freely. Crimean Tatars live in all administrative regions of the Crimea. 
Their share ranges from 10 to 30% of all residents of Crimean districts. Majority 
of the population considering the Crimean Tatar language native live in the 
The preconditions for conflicts in Donbas and Crimea...  
 
203 
northern foothills of the Crimean Mountains, namely in the city of Simferopol 
itself (over 25 thousand people), and such districts as Bilohirsk (over 19 thou-
sand people, 25% of the total population), Bakhchysarai (over 19 thousand 
people, 20%), Dzhankoi (17 thousand, 20%) and Kirov (14 thousand, 25%) 
(Лозинський 2012, p. 55). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Ethno-geographic structure of Donbas and temporarily occupied territories  
in the context of rural regions and municipal councils (as of 2015) 
Source: http//www.mil.gov.ua/multimedia/infografika-ato.html; 
М.С. Дністрянський (2006)  
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Nevertheless, 2014 military operations resulted in the loss of Ukraine's 
control over the territories, where not only Russian-speaking majority lived, but 
in fact the Russians were the majority (fig. 1). They are mainly the largest, by 
population, urban agglomerations of Donetsk, Makiyivka, Yasynuvata, Yenaki-
yevo, Krasnodon, Luhansk, Krasnyi Luch, Antratsyt, and only one agricultural 
district, Stanychno-Luhansk, though with Russian population prevailing, re-
mained under the control of Ukraine. 
Sambanis believes that with increasing speed of ethical and religious 
diversity (fractionation), the risk of conflict grows too (Sambanis 2001). On the 
other hand, P. Collier (2001) denies this claim. 
If ethno-social, ethno-religious and ethno-political structures that operate in 
the Crimea today were analysed, it would turn out that at present they have  
a number of properties that suggest its vulnerability. According to Dnistrianskyi, 
the densest concentration of ethnic conflicts can be observed in areas charac-
terised by: a) a high degree of ethno-geographical mosaic; b) mismatch between 
ethno-geographical structure and territorial organisation of the political sphere;  
c) a relatively high level of self-awareness and political activeness of ethnic 
communities or groups that are in a discriminatory position (Дністрянський 
2006, p. 67). We claim that all these features are typical of the Crimea. Accord-
ing to Dnistrianskyi's estimation, a mosaic of ethnic structure is a vulnerable 
characteristic of the Crimean TPC. During the post-Soviet period, ethnic mosaic 
index of Eckel in Ukraine decreased from 0.42 (1989) to 0.37 (2001), while in 
the Crimea, it has slightly increased from 0.54 (1989) to 0.59 (2001) (tab. 1). 
This is due to returning deported people, Crimean Tatars, to the Crimea 
(Дністрянський 2006, p. 219). 
Table 1. Changes of the degree of ethnic mosaic index from 1989 to 2001 
Population 
Total Rural Urban 
Ukraine, regions, 
autonomy 
1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 
Ukraine  0.42 0.37 0.25 0.24 0.48 0.41 
The Crimean 
Autonomous 
Republic 
0.54 0.59 0.57 0.67 0.45 0.51 
Donetsk region 0.55 0.53 0.45 0.42 0.56 0.53 
Luhansk region 0.53 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.54 0.52 
Ternopil region 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.08 
Source: M.S. Дністрянський (2006, p. 219). 
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Long before the annexation in 2008, Korostelina recorded ten conflict 
indicators that were also uncovered in Crimea: High salience of Soviet, Russian, 
and regional identity; High economic deprivation; Threat of violence and eco-
nomic threat; Threat to culture; High distrust of national government; Russians' 
negative stereotypes; Perception of Russians as a “fifth column”; Low tolerance; 
High level of ethnic mobilisation; Desire for independence (Korostelina 2008,  
p. 90). These ideas were pronounced by the Russian elite, too. In an interview on 
the eve of Crimea's annexation, the last leader of the USSR, the Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate who is credited with ending the Cold War, declared that Putin 
should not stop at Crimea. All of southern Ukraine, Gorbachev said, is Moscow's 
rightful dominion. “In essence, in history, it's just like Crimea”, he told a Rus-
sian news website. “Its population is Russian. It was civilised by Russians” 
(Shuster 2014). 
The complexity of controlling the Crimea by Ukraine was explained by the 
return of deported Crimean Tatar people in the times of Stalinism (1944). In 
terms of absence of a legal framework for the restitution of property among the 
repressed Crimean and Tatar population, property and land conflicts accompa-
nied by squatting land, aggravated (more about conflicts in the Crimea: Швец 
2007, 2013, Яковлев 2008). 
In order to pacify separatist movements, Ukraine provided the Crimea with  
a status of an autonomous republic within the unitary Ukraine in 1991, but it did 
not offer a clear model of relations between the indigenous peoples of the 
Crimea. Peninsular position and continuous Russian propaganda contributed to 
strengthening regional identity of Russians in the Crimea. In parallel, propaganda 
was aimed at the sacralisation of the Crimean territory for Russian citizens to 
create an image of the unjustly lost homeland. And this despite the fact that in 
the late 19th century Russians were only the second largest ethnic group after 
Crimean Tatars, indigenous people of the Crimea (tab. 2). 
Table 2. Crimean population of the 19th–21th centuries  
Crimean population in % 
Ethnic group 
1897 1939 1989 2001 
Russians 33.11  49.6  65.6  58.5  
Ukrainians  11.84  13.7  26.7  24.4  
Crimean Tatars 35.55  19.4  1.9  12.1  
Other 19.51  17.3  5.8  5.0  
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimea. 
Roman Slyvka 
 
 
206 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Tatars accounted for only 12% of the 
population in the Crimea. The biggest problems of the long-suffering minority 
prior to the Russian annexation were poverty and significant obstacles in the 
official support of the Crimean Tatar language and culture. Acquiring Ukrainian 
citizenship lasted unfeasibly long time. Since Tatars did not have Ukrainian 
citizenship, they were not able to elect their representatives for solving public 
affairs not only in the Crimea, but also at the level of Ukraine. Socio-economic 
disqualification overlapped with political disqualification, which led to lower 
living standards resulting from the exclusion from administrative offices and to 
anti-Tatar policies carried out primarily by pro-Russian political elites (Klípa 
2006). A principle problem was the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Ukrainian government did not bring the desired improvement of the 
social status of Crimean Tatars. 
A researcher of geography of conflicts, A.B. Shvets (Швец 2007), stated that 
during the years that had passed since the repatriation, socio-cultural confron-
tation in the Crimea was continuously changing in its qualitative (more rigid) 
and quantitative (more recorded conflict situations) respects (fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Number of conflicts by three type of manifestation in the Crimea  
Source: A.B. Shvets (Швец 2007) 
A.N. Yakovlev (Яковлев 2008) distinguishes between two types of areas 
within the range of the Crimea: the first marked by the apparent predominance 
of confessional forms of socio-cultural differences (foot-hill Simferopol, 
Bakhchysarai and Bilohirsk regions); the second characterised by the domination 
of social and economic contradictions (municipal councils of southern coast of 
Yalta, Alushta, Sudak, Feodosia). 
Meanwhile in Donbas, people of the Muslim Volga Tatar origin formed the 
business elite, which includes Ukraine's richest man Rinat Akhmetov, the main 
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sponsor of the “Party of Regions” ruling prior to the Revolution of Dignity.  
It was his authority and financial support that made it possible to develop 
aggressive election campaigns in Donbas and to place their pro-Russian people 
in leadership positions of Ukrainian policy (Kuzio 2014). Thus, an ethnic factor 
was used by Russia to the fullest extent in order to destabilise the internal 
expense of “Russian speaking compatriots”. 
The positivist approach of Ukrainian patriots, based on the perception of  
a fundamental thesis that the ethnic origin of most residents of Donbas is an 
automatic reason for their loyalty to the Ukrainian state has not been justified. 
Unfortunately, disinformation imposed by political propaganda and the media is 
capable of influencing the political process in the regions of Ukraine. The lack 
of citizens' critical attitude to destructive information facilitated the development 
of the sense of “other Ukraine”, which was manifested in the Crimea and 
Donbas. “Otherness” is effectively used as a manipulation tool by both external 
and internal political subjects. Promotion of regional “otherness” acquired such 
forms that, according to D. Harvey, provoked deeper fragmentation of lifestyles, 
the emergence of a myriad of new political and cultural subjects, the revival of 
regionalism, localism, and a series of fundamentalisms (Minca 2009, p. 366). 
The religious structure. According to official data of January 1, 2013, there 
were 33,581 religious communities in Ukraine, representing several dozens of 
churches, denominations, trends and currents. The number of religious com-
munities, with 10 thousand people or more, was gradually decreasing in eastern 
and southern areas, reflecting at the same time the overall reduction of religious 
population. The densest was a network of religious communities in Ternopil 
(13.2 communities per 10,000 people), Transcarpathia (9.5), Lviv (9.5) and 
Ivano-Frankivsk (8.3) regions, while the lowest one was recorded in Luhansk 
(1.6), Donetsk (1.4) and Kharkiv (1.3) regions (Дністрянський 2014, p. 230). 
This suggests a different historical experience of religious life in individual 
regions of Ukraine in the 20th century. Eastern Ukraine was more affected by  
70-year long atheistic policy of the Bolshevik regime. That's why a great part of 
the inhabitants of the Crimea and Donbas after the revival of the Orthodox 
Church in the 1980s and 90s became neophytes. Moreover, unlike the western, 
northern and central regions of Ukraine, which in varying degrees were 
represented by the Greek Catholic (UGCC), the Orthodox Kiev Patriarchate 
(UOC-KP) and the faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
(UAOC), Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, in the Crimea and Donbas 
Orthodox the Church of Moscow Patriarchate was relatively predominant. We 
can assume that neophytes to a greater extent accepted obvious or hidden 
propaganda of clergymen’s political ideas uncritically. The role of the Patriarch 
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of the Russian Orthodox Church Kirill promoting the geopolitical concept of 
“Russian World” is widely discussed in Ukrainian politics, which is the result of 
his overt comments. For example, on the 3rd of November, 2009, according to 
the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate, Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow 
and All Russia, presented his “program speech” at the opening of the Third 
Assembly of “Russian World”. What is especially notable in this speech is the 
fact that the Primate of the largest national Orthodox Church during his  
25-minute speech did not mention the word “Christ”, only three times he 
referred to “God” and at the same time 38 times repeated the word-combination 
“Russian World”, a term that in the context of patriarchal speech sounds like  
a geopolitical concept hardly related to the teachings of his Church10.  
According to Patriarch Kirill's point of view, the tasks of the Russian 
Orthodox Church are: to ensure the Russian World plays a role of a “powerful 
player on the world stage”; “to save values and lifestyles precious to our ances-
tors, focusing on which they created the Great Russia itself”; “to become a strong 
subject of international global politics”11. Numerous paramilitary structures of 
Russian, Don and Kuban Cossacks promoted the idea of protection of Ortho-
doxy in the context of “Russian World”. Obviously, the appearance and 
activities of such organisations before or after the conflict had a very clear goal  
– to show that Ukraine should be deprived of the influence of competing 
confessions – UGCC, UOC KP and UAOC. 
Consequently, this complex internal religious structure of Ukraine was used 
as a precondition for undermining the political situation. Against the background 
of Donbas, the peculiarity of the Crimea was a rapid development of a network 
of Muslim communities (414). The organisation of the religious life of Muslims 
has every reason to be based in Ukraine upon constructive terms, as evidenced 
by the religious infrastructure development (7 schools, 90 Sunday schools, 5 pe-
riodicals) (Дністрянський 2014, p. 235). Moreover, with the increase of the 
influence of Turkish preachers in the Crimea, suspicion of the spread of political 
Islamism among the Crimean Tatars as possible allies of Turkey emerged among 
the pro-Russian forces (Швец 2007). Using the theme of Turkish threat is an old 
Soviet myth, another mean of mobilising people loyal to Moscow. It also 
contributed to the reasoning of Russian propaganda and fighters in favour of the 
establishment of “Russian World” on the peninsula. Moreover, Turkey's foreign 
policy, changeable in relation to Russia in terms of the ongoing conflict in 
                          
10 http://gazeta.dt.ua/POLITICS/geopolitika_vid_patriarha__tsarstvo_nebesne_vs_rus 
kiy_svit.html.  
11 http://www.russkiymir.ru/fund/assembly/the-third-assembly-of-the-russian-world/. 
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Ukraine, did not confirm the connection of such myths with reality. On the 
contrary, the annexation of the Crimea and the implementation of legislation and 
political culture of Russia, as M. Solík and V. Baar claim (2015), can provoke 
manifestations of Islamism on the peninsula. 
As M. Dnistryanskyi (2014, p. 232) notes, the fact of the identification of 
large populations, including local, with certain denominations is a generator of 
regional alienation, especially in combination with historical and geographical 
factors.  
Economic vulnerability. The share of Donetsk and Luhansk regions made 
up 11.7%, and 4% respectively in the structure of the gross regional product in 
2012 (Обсяг реалізованої... 2012). Powerful industrial enterprises are located in 
the territory of Donbas. The region manufactures large volumes of production in 
mining, metallurgical, machine building, food and chemical industries. The 
share of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the total volume of industrial pro-
duction in 2012 was 27% (fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Proportion of Donbas and temporarily occupied cities of regional importance  
in the total volume of industrial production in Ukraine in 2012, in %  
Source: Обсяг реалізованої... (2012)  
The potential of natural resources in the region is characterised by significant 
reserves of mineral resources that are of great importance on a national scale. 
First of all, they are the resources of Donetsk coal basin. According to structural 
and tectonic features, the area of Donbas is divided into thirty coal-bearing 
regions that differ in their tectonic position, coal composition and supply 
(Горючі корисні... 2009, p. 232). Nineteen coal-producing regions are located  
in Ukraine. Seventeen of them are of the greatest significance. The remaining 
two coal-producing regions today have no commercial value. About 80% of 
Ukrainian coal is mined in Donbas (in 2012 the combined share of Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions accounted for 78.5% of total coal production in Ukraine, in 
2013 – 76.6% and in January-May 2014 – 76.1%). The share of Donetsk region 
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in the production of the extracting industry in 2013 was 24.1%, and that of 
Luhansk – 8.4%12. Besides, Donetsk region provides more than 90% of national 
production of rock salt and clay for refractory materials, and 79% of fluxing 
limestone13; Luhansk region is responsible for 80% of national supplies of 
titanium ore and quartzite, which are raw materials for the steel industry14. 
Donbas is a major metallurgical center, with considerable production capaci-
ties located there; they are represented by large enterprises of national impor-
tance in cities like Alchevsk, Stakhanov, Luhansk, Mariupol, Khartsyzsk, 
Donetsk and Yenakiyevo. The share of two regions in the structure of steel 
production in 2012 accounted for more than 45%, Donetsk and Luhansk region  
– 36.4% and 8.7% respectively15. Donetsk and Luhansk regions play an impor-
tant role in the production of chemicals; in 2013, their share in total sales of such 
products in Ukraine reached 15.9% and 12.9%, respectively16. 
Significant capacities of heavy and raw material intensive engineering are 
located in Donbas. The region specialises in manufacturing locomotives and rail 
cars, machinery and equipment for metallurgy and chemical industry, material 
handling and mining equipment17. The share of Donetsk region in the manu-
facture of engineering products in 2012 was 17.4%, while that of Luhansk  
– 6.9%18. Besides, military-industrial complexes were also operating before 
2014, such as JSC “Topaz” in Donetsk, which was involved in the development 
and mass production of complex radio systems and systems for special purposes, 
radio equipment for a wide range of uses, and PJSC “Luhansk Cartridge-Manu-
facturing Plant” in Luhansk producing small arms ammunition (Slyvka and 
Zakutynska 2016, p. 102). 
Above all, the critical importance of industrial East Ukraine for the en-
richment of the budget and the GDP of the whole country should be mentioned. 
Problems in this region are immediately experienced by all Ukraine. Economic 
structures of Donbas can be seen as a precondition for the region's vulnerability 
to conflicts. According to Bogatov's fundamental article “Recent developments 
                          
12 http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/1639/. 
13 http://www.kr-admin.gov.ua/dpasport/1.pdf. 
14 http://www.ukrproject.gov.ua/sites/default/fil es/upload/lugansk_dlya_saytu_1.pdf. 
15 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/; http://donetskstat.gov.ua/statinform/promisl7_2.php; 
http:// www.lugastat.lg.ua/sinf/promis/promis1013_8.php. 
16 http://www.niss.gov. ua/articles/1639/. 
17 http://www.kr-admin.gov.ua/dpasport/1.pdf; http://donetskstat.gov.ua/statinform/ 
promisl3 _2.php. 
18 http://www.lugastat.lg.ua/sinf/promis/promis1013_8.php; http://www.niss.gov.ua/ 
articles/1639/. 
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in Donbas coal industry” (2003), the state monopoly has given way to a mo-
nopoly of large, regional financial–industrial groups. Such a monopoly is 
already established in the coking-coal industry and is in the process of forming 
in the energy-coal industry as well. These groups consider the coal mines as the 
bottom tier of the metals industry and the principal source for cost cuts in metal 
production. The controlling groups keep coal prices down to allow the ferrous 
metal producers to compete in the international market. The prices, regulated by 
the state, and the state subsidies are set at levels that only allow mines to cover 
their operating costs, leaving them no money for development. The monopoly 
existing in the Ukrainian coal market has virtually put a block on its develop-
ment and growth. On the one hand, it prevents the creation of a competitive coal 
market, so prices that would cover both production costs and mine investment 
cannot be set. On the other hand, it controls the external investment streams. The 
large financial-industrial groups of the Donbas have a firm grip on its coal 
industry and the future of this industry is thus entirely dependent on them 
(Bogatov 2003, pp. 165–166). 
Business elite tried to use economic control over the industrial region of 
Donetsk as a resource in the struggle for political monopoly in Ukraine in 2000s. 
When their protégé, Viktor Yanukovych, left the country, they began to support 
the force scenario in order to maintain their monopoly position and shady 
business schemes at least in the richest region of Ukraine. V.V. Kravchenko and 
M.O. Zamykula (2014) prove that political elites of Donetsk had claims to 
giving their city the status of the capital center and were mentally ready for 
them, but did not have a similar historical tradition (as in Kyiv or Kharkiv). This 
situation provoked mass stereotypical thinking (used to promote DNR), which 
raised the morale of the region and was meant to separate Donbas from the rest 
of Ukraine. Here we can cite such examples of popular slogans as “Donbas feeds 
Ukraine’, “Donbas does not blather”, “Donbas decides everything” (Kravchenko 
and Zamykula 2014). One should bear in mind that none of these slogans 
explained any reasons for the uneven distribution of wealth and poverty in 
Donbas, specific problems of pollution, gender relations and demographic 
decline. The readiness of Donetsk business elite to such course of events was 
demonstrated with an attempt to create South East Ukrainian Autonomous 
Republic back in 2004. In the spring of 2014, they skilfully exploited the 
phobias and ambitions of Donbas residents so that extremists took up arms. 
The economic component of structural vulnerability in the Crimea is sig-
nificantly different. The structure of industrial production of the peninsula is 
dominated by food, machine building and metalworking, fuel, chemical and 
petrochemical industries. The main branches of plant industry are cereal and 
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vegetable cultivation, horticulture, viticulture; breeding livestock – dairy cattle, 
poultry and sheep. A separate role is played by huge resort complexes. History 
of many Crimean enterprises started after 1954. Economic growth of all 
industries in the first decade after the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine is the 
most significant evidence of Ukrainians' decisive contribution to postwar revival 
of the peninsula (Москалець 2008). Indicative in this respect is the first 
interview of the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, who said that Ukraine 
had invested $100 billion in the Crimea19. 
“The role of the Crimea in the formation of GDP (of Ukraine) is insig-
nificant. Crimea gives only 3% of total GDP of Ukraine. During the last few 
years it was only a recipient, and its influence was insignificant in the overall 
Ukraine's GDP” – said the Director of World Bank of Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova affairs in 201420. Sevastopol city gave 0.7% of the state GDP. In 2013, 
the Crimea was only in 15th place among 27 administrative regions in terms of 
gross regional product per capita, while Sevastopol occupied the 10th place21. 
Gross regional product of the Crimea and Sevastopol steadily increased from 
2004 to 2008, but with the beginning of the global crisis, it decreased to the 2006 
level, and prior to the last “pre-war” year it gained its lost position. The 
peninsula earned half of the funds it needed itself, the other half was sent to the 
peninsula from the “mainland”22. 
One peculiarity of the industry on the peninsula is the location of quite  
a large number of institutions and enterprises of the military-industrial complex, 
which were inherited from the Soviet Union. They were of urban importance. In 
post-soviet years many plants of this type were closed or reduced their pro-
duction. Among them were: Feodosia research institute that produced parachute 
systems for military and space vehicles; Feodosia factory “Hidroprylad” which 
created marine underwater weapons; Feodosia optical factory, which at times of 
Ukraine was transferred to produce mainly peaceful goods; in Sevastopol  
– “Sevmorzavod” and aircraft factories. Demilitarisation in Ukraine during the 
2000s explains the lack of orders, layoffs and restructuring of work. This could 
cause dissatisfaction of former employees and promote hope for the revival due 
to investments and orders from Russia, which on the contrary carried out the 
policy of militarisation of the economy. This created a loyal public opinion 
about Russia's politics. 
                          
19 https://slon.ru/posts/73137. 
20 http://dt.ua/ECONOMICS/chastka-krimu-u-vvp-ukrayini-stanovit-ne-bilshe-3-141 
028_html. 
21 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/. 
22 http://ua.krymr.com/a/27693639.html. 
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The development of such sentiments was influenced by the fact that among  
6 million of tourists in 2013, 65% were residents of Ukraine, the share of 
Russians in the tourist flow did not exceed 20%23. However, higher Russian 
financial solvency against the backdrop of the global oil boom made them more 
attractive customers for local workers of tourism industry; and for many of them 
Russian guests were the most desirable. However, the current critical situation of 
this sector demonstrates the hollowness of such judgments. 
To sum up, in Donbas, ideas to stop subsidising other regions of Ukraine 
prevailed as an argument for autonomy. Meanwhile in the Crimea, dissatis-
faction with insufficient attention paid to the economic problems of the region 
were predominant. The imbalances in the development of some regions of 
Ukraine had a long history, and some deepened in modern times. At some point, 
they became the subject of political speculations. We are talking primarily about 
touting ideas that, in case of separation from Ukraine, even with the continuation 
of the current level of production, can actually increase their standard of living 
on the residents of the industrial south-eastern regions of Ukraine, especially 
ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population, by means of information and 
psychological influence. D. Gorenburg (2015) provides us with more informa-
tion about the Russian view of Ukrainian reality. 
6. DYNAMIC AND FUNCTIONAL VULNERABILITY 
Dynamic vulnerability. Ukraine can be characterised by two specific fea-
tures during its independence: being late with reforms and “delayed” European 
integration. According to T. Kuzio (2011), until recently, there have been four 
factors that had caused the inability of the Ukrainian state to reach effective 
changes (Ukrainian state's immobility, p. 54), as well as the existence of cor-
ruption in the country: political culture, weak political will and civil society, lack 
of institutions that can effectively fight corruption, weak ideology and mutual 
dependence of political parties and business areas. 
The country's transient situation increases its vulnerability. The cessation of 
old political practices is very difficult and, as it was before, was implemented by 
force by elites in the form of Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of 
dignity (2013–2014), as well as de facto war in Donbas. One of the most 
respected rankings “Polity IV” allows us to trace the inconsistent development 
                          
23 http://ua.korrespondent.net/main/3392657-turpotik-do-krymu-skorotyvsia-maizhe-
vtrychi. 
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of democracy in the country. The system of division of political regimes of the 
world into categories is as follows: 10 points for the most democratic states,  
-10 for the most autocratic. On this scale, anocracy occupies an intermediate 
interval from -5 to 5, indicating the transitional state of regimes. Throughout its 
brief history, except for 1993, Ukraine belonged to the category of democracy, 
mainly at the lower boundary of this indicator (fig. 4). 
The authors of “Polity IV” state, that during the early years of independence, 
tensions over the terms of economic privatisation, the status of the former 
communist party and officials, and conflicting relations and orientations with 
Russia to the east and the European Union to the west polarised groups and led 
to political paralysis. A compromise was reached between leading members of 
the “old regime” and the reformers that culminated in a unity coalition and led to 
the July 1994 election of Leonid Kuchma as president. The “unity of necessity” 
felt the strains of post-communist transition and began to unravel during the 
1999 election campaign as Kuchma began to assert his independence and 
attempted to consolidate power24. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Authority trends, 1991–2003, Ukraine 
Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Ukraine2010.pdf  
Such constant balancing between East and West has created a favourable 
environment for cultivating illusions of a “special path”. It has turned Ukraine 
into a buffer state between the EU and Russia. In terms of poor inter-regional 
                          
24 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Ukraine2010.pdf. 
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consolidation, it has caused multidirectional dragging of borderlands into the 
sphere of influence of neighbouring countries. According to T. Zhurzhenko 
(2014), as geopolitically amorphous “in-between” zones, they generate hybrid 
identities and create political, economic and cultural practices that combine 
different, often mutually exclusive values. Moreover, borderlands are associated 
with multiculturalism, cultural authenticity and cosmopolitanism. Yet from the 
nation-building perspective, their ambiguity is nothing to be celebrated. Mixed 
and overlapping identities and multiple loyalties pose a challenge to the 
nationalising agenda and potentially threaten the integrity of a nation-state 
(Zhurzhenko 2014).  
However, according to Rastow's dynamic model (Rostow, 1996), an indis-
pensable prerequisite of irreversibility of democratic transit is to achieve na-
tional unity. The next phase is a long-term political struggle, during which new 
elite emerges and tempers, institutions of civil society appear, citizens' partici-
pation in political processes increases, i.e. the process of instilling political 
culture takes place. 
According to O.W. Radchenko (Радченко2009), constant political and geo-
political balancing of Ukraine resulted in rapid transformation and emergence of 
the democratic model with dominant state as the initiator and leader of demo-
cratic reforms. It is characterised as a “defective” regime with formal (from the 
first point of view) democratic institutions which in their real essence are 
authoritarian (Радченко 2009). At the same time, Ukraine got in the “trap of 
oligarchic capitalism”. In the late 90s and early 2000s, groups closely related to 
power and business got the opportunity to make fortunes on monopolies (energy, 
metallurgy, food and chemical industries), withdrawing part of funds through 
offshore companies, reinvesting the other part in political life and the support of 
the status quo. The growth of Ukrainian economy in 2002–2008 was driven by 
rapid growth of China and some countries in Southeast Asia that needed supply 
of metal and other raw materials produced in our country, as well as the policy 
of low interest rates of major world central banks around the world25. Actually, it 
was this period when Donbas' regional elites got the chance to accumulate and 
concentrate funds and resources of political influence. During the global 
economic crisis, these drivers disappeared, but the economic model of Ukraine 
based on them remained in a state of inertia. In order to encourage changes, 
structural transformations in the economy had to occur, but that would put an 
end to the political and economic domination of financial and industrial groups 
                          
25 http://politeka.net/242581-tretya-promyshlennaya-revolyutsiya-ukraina-teryaet-vre 
mya/. 
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of Donbas. A prolonged and critical course of the transition process in Ukraine 
led to increased social unrest, doubt and frustration among the Ukrainian 
population, both in the southeast, as well as in the western and central regions. 
One of the reasons for this slow transition is the lack of a common vision for the 
directions and outcomes of the process. The revolution of dignity had to protect 
the pro-European course and accelerate reforms, but it faced a considerable 
opposition on the part of regional elites of Donetsk, Luhansk, Simferopol and 
Sevastopol, due to the risk of them losing their political and economic positions. 
This forced them to stir up anti-Ukrainian and, as a result, pro-Russian propa-
ganda among the masses. 
Its success was facilitated by the fact that after the election of President of 
Russia Vladimir Putin in 2000, the dynamics of national economies of Ukraine 
and Russia differed substantially. If in 2000 Ukrainian GDP per person 
amounted to 56% of the Russian index, in 2013 this ratio deteriorated to 35%.  
In such circumstances, much of the population of Donbas and the Crimea, 
already having a pro-Russian sentiment, influenced by the propaganda of 
economic success was prone to idealise uncritically a neighbouring state and to 
compare Ukrainian modest successes to those of Russia. We call it uncritical 
idealisation, since income distribution, despite significantly worse macroecono-
mic indicators, was much fairer in Ukraine. This may at least be explained by 
the dynamics of Gini index, which is significantly better in Ukraine (fig. 5).  
 
 
Fig. 5. Dynamics of Gini index in Ukraine and Russia in 2000–2012 
Source: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&ctype= 
l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=si_pov_gini&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=
region&idim=country:UKR:RUS&ifdim=region&tstart=972338400000&tend=1351029
600000&ind=false 
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The geopolitical effect of demonstrating the economic component of Russia's 
“soft power” amplified due to significant labour migration of the population of 
Donbas and the Crimea to the neighbouring state (flow of labour migrants to 
Russia amounted to 43% of the total number in 2013) (Cирочук 2014). Signi-
ficantly higher earnings in Russia in comparison to other countries reinforced 
this effect (fig. 6). 
 
 
Fig. 6. The size of the average earnings of Ukrainian migrants in different countries 
and the average salary in Ukraine, 2010–2012  
Source: Звіт щодо методології…, 2013, p. 57; http://www.bankstore.com.ua/ua/ 
component/option,com_bankstore/Itemid,233/task,showcurrencydailyrates/bank_id,1232
86/currency_id,16/rate_type,0/year,2010/month,1/day,1/ 
Thus, the transient situation of Ukraine has led to the development of 
dissonance in regional policy. This in turn led to an increase of separatism and 
hope for external intervention as a way of solving problems. Changing such 
sentiments will not be easy, as experts say. Researcher Motyl is sure that the 
main factor here is the economy. “If in the next 5 years, Ukraine shows rapid 
growth, the regions beyond the control of the government will become loyal to 
Ukraine. The state simply has to provide Ukrainians, and especially residents of 
Donbas, with those economic opportunities it has been promising for the past  
25 years”, says the historian26. This is the way, he states, to overcome the pro- 
-Russian sentiments, as they are partly based on the belief “that Ukraine has not 
fulfilled its promises and Russia could theoretically do it”. The expert believes 
that having seen the improvements, East will be ready to talk with Ukraine in the 
same language27. 
                          
26 http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/society/2016/07/160704_ukrainian_Donbas_ag. 
27 http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/society/2016/07/160704_ukrainian_Donbas_ag. 
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Functional vulnerability. As Tomeš and others suggest, among experts 
there is a consensus in assessing the impact of one factor of political origin on 
the conflict, namely the weakness of state power, failure to provide basic public 
functions and prevent undermining legitimate governments, which is also the 
cause of these conflicts (Tomeš et al. 2007). 
On this occasion, it is appropriate to recall the hierarchy of territorial and 
political systems and functions of territorial and political areas by V.A. Kolosov 
(Колосов и Мироненко 2002, pp. 291–292) and to combine it with the concept 
of dysfunction of social institutions coined by Merton. Merton believes that 
some things may have consequences that are generally dysfunctional or are 
dysfunctional for some and functional for others. For example, poverty may 
benefit the rich because they are allowed to maintain more of their wealth, but it 
certainly does not benefit the poor who struggle. At this point, he suggests the 
conflict theory, although he does believe that institutions and values can be 
functional for society as a whole. Merton states that only by recognising the 
dysfunctional aspects of institutions, can we explain the development and 
persistence of alternatives (Mann 2009).  
Based on the combination of these approaches, in the case of Donbas and the 
Crimea, manifestations of dysfunction of political and geographical areas at 
different levels in Ukraine can be traced, which led to the destabilisation of the 
situation and gave grounds for regionalism and separatism. 
1. At the level of primary self-administrative territorial units: crises of poli-
tical culture, inability to adapt to the national and global impacts; 
2. At the level of large cities, metropolitan areas, administrative and 
territorial units of the second order: difficulty in transferring national impulses to 
the regions; 
3. At the level of large administrative and territorial unit of the first order: 
failure to regulate stability and variability of state political system and crisis of 
regional political culture; 
4. At the level of a large political district (in case of Donbas and the Crimea 
– the South-East of Ukraine): loss of influence on the national political system 
and development of the whole country; 
5. At the state level, failure to provide administrative impact; 
6. At the level of international community: the inability to regulate inter-
actions within the post-Soviet countries (Ukraine and Russia); destruction of 
indigenous macro-regional features of post-Soviet political culture. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
As T. Zhurzenko (2014) wrote, with the annexation of Crimea and the mili-
tary conflict in the East, the era of post-Soviet ambiguity and tolerance of 
blurred identities and multiple loyalties has ended. An important conclusion can 
be made that the vulnerability of the state and its individual regions to conflicts 
is particularly manifested in countries that are in a state of transformation. 
Vulnerability is the result of incompleteness, inconsistency and non-systemic 
character of transition to democracy. It creates conditions for conflict mani-
festation in post-Soviet states. The growth of economic power in Russia and 
authoritarian tendencies is accompanied with simultaneous restoration of its 
hegemony in relations with neighbouring countries. The reaction to such geo-
political challenges could be the formation of an effective state. The only way 
for a relatively successful modernisation of post-socialist countries is the Euro- 
-Atlantic integration. Almost completed or fully completed final transformation 
of post-socialist Baltic countries and those of Central Europe were manifested in 
their integration into NATO and the EU, despite numerous protests from Russia. 
Due to a number of internal and external reasons, Ukraine did not go through  
a similar path. 
Because of the burden of post-colonial heritage and developmental inertia, as 
well as vulnerable features of its geopolitical position, Ukraine did not manage 
to undergo rapid transformation, at the same time “freezing” (Hawrylyshyn 
2006) the vulnerable status of Donbas and the Crimea. Pro-Russian separatists 
supported by Russia could take the advantage of existing problems that had 
emerged not only in the times of independence, but long before the struggle of 
Ukrainian people against imperial and Soviet power for their state. This is due to 
the effects of weak and inconsistent dynamics of democratic and market 
development. In western and central regions of Ukraine, the social costs of 
transformation from socialism to capitalism were partially compensated by the 
appeal of Ukrainian elites to the patriotism of local people. But in regions in the 
South and East, less linked to the Ukrainian statehood movement, government 
failed to convince the public of the positive effects of post-socialist changes for 
the majority of society, which led to the cultivation of competitive regional 
policy (“people of Donbas”) and supranational identities (“Soviet person”, 
“Orthodox person”). By 2014, Russia had actively contributed to the process 
facing no resistance on the part of regional authorities in the Crimea and Donbas 
and, moreover, it had gained the support of the central government under 
President Yanukovych. This is what made it possible to prepare the ground for 
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interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, occupation and annexation of this 
part of its territory. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the willingness of Russia to use 
historical, positional, structural, dynamic and functional vulnerability of border 
areas of neighbouring states to initiate and support the conflict is obvious, taking 
into consideration the fact that during its independence Russia participated in the 
establishing of a number of zones characterised by “frozen” conflicts in Mol-
dova (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic), Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), 
Ukraine (the Crimea, DPR and LPR). Against this background, the willingness 
of Ukraine over the past 25 years to participate actively in the cross-border 
cooperation of borderlands resulted in the formation of the “Bug”, “Carpathian”, 
“Upper Prut”, “Lower Danube” and “Sloboda” Euroregions. 
Russia's strategy to strengthen Ukraine's vulnerability failed during 2014. It is 
obvious that most of countries and, what is more important, an absolute majority 
of Ukrainian society rejected the idea of returning to the era of power 
redistribution, boundaries, the Cold War, the restoration of the imperial projects 
of the past. In order to preserve its sovereignty and integrity, modern Ukraine is 
ready to set an example of converting historical vulnerability to perspective 
advantages, to neutralise positional vulnerability, to find a balance in economic, 
social and religious structures, to ensure the positive dynamics of changes and 
ensure reliable operation of the regions and the state as a whole. The study of 
preconditions of conflict development in terms of their historical, positional, 
structural, dynamic and functional vulnerability appears to be a promising area 
of research in political geography of post-socialist countries, especially in terms 
of prevention of such conflicts. 
 
English verification by Jarosław Sawiuk 
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No. 13 
THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS  
OF CROSS-BORDER ILLEGAL MIGRATION  
AT THE SOUTH HUNGARIAN BORDERS SINCE  
THE COLLAPSE OF THE BIPOLAR WORLD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The bipolar world and the end of Cold War oppositions brought about 
fundamental changes in Europe and across the globe. During and immediately 
following the era of the collapse of European Socialist Federal regimes, the 
geography of states in Hungary's neighbouring environment was thoroughly 
reorganised. The allied Socialist neighbouring countries were dissolved, and the 
former republics were transformed into new independent states. Depending on 
the peaceful or bloody nature of the transformation, the respective countries saw 
the arrival of refugees.  
Albeit in the course of the transformation of the milieu made up of the 
neighbouring states, Hungary's borders remained unchanged, the character, 
functional and political content of borders underwent several basic transforma-
tions in various border areas. Due to the Hungarian state borders and the 
reorganisation of allied relations, considerable functional changes occurred at 
“the Federation's borders, i.e. where they were aligned with Hungary's borders”.   
From the beginning of the 1990s, new global processes began to unfold. 
These resulted in the accelerating globalisation of the economy, making it even 
more obvious that globalisation does not only produce winners but territorial 
losers as well. The crisis hotspots of the Near and Middle East have not 
disappeared, instead, certain countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, then Syria) 
entered into an almost permanent political, social, economic and modernisation 
                    
 This study was prepared within the framework of OTKA research project NN 
114468. 
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crisis, and a state of war. The “mass refugee training” was built on conflicting 
external and internal forces and their self-reinforcing effects in each of the 
countries in question. The massification of “client wars” introduced new features 
into the complex system of relations.  
Hungary, as a member of NATO (1999) and later of the European Union 
(2004), became a collective actor rather than an individual participant of global 
processes through a natural process. Hungary had to meet the most severe 
challenges from the South (just as in history). The South Slav war conflicts 
(1991–1995), the accompanying waves of refugees, the air war against Serbia 
started in the spring of 1999, the renewing waves of Kosovar refugees still 
emerged as European-scale issues. The majority of Hungarian society demon-
strated solidarity towards South Slav refugees, irrespectively of their ethnic or 
religious affiliation. 
Between 2013 and 2014, the primary challenge was the massive apparition of 
Kosovar migrants at the Southern state borders, while only a limited number of 
migrants or refugees arrived from other territories. The daily illegal border 
crossing peak extended beyond 1,200 persons. The majority of Kosovars also 
headed towards Germany, as Hungary was not an attractive destination or 
opportunity for them, they regarded the country as a mere “transit area”, not as  
a settlement country.  
In 2015, a new challenge, intercontinental migration emerged at the 
Hungarian-Serbian border. Masses of Middle Eastern migrants, and a smaller 
proportion of African migrants appeared at the borders, unanticipated by the 
Hungarian society and the political sphere and causing a panic-like reaction. The 
Hungarian political leadership – due to a lack of effective European aids to 
manage the processes – applied unilateral and much-debated solutions.  
Pursuant to a unilateral decision, the Hungarian fences constructed at the 
Hungarian-Serbian, and later on, the Hungarian-Croatian state borders contrib-
uted to the handling of the migration challenge, and while they produced virtual 
diversion effects, they received highly negative reactions from international, 
European political players and the press. Owing to the construction of fences, 
inter-sate relations between Hungary and Serbia, Hungary and Croatia, Hungary 
and Austria, and even Hungary and Germany deteriorated temporarily.   
Owing to the fences, Hungary was able to avoid the direct effects of the 
massive intercontinental migration wave, however, European political leaders 
wanted to delegate the issue of migration and refugees within the EU to the 
competence of the Commission, by introducing mandatory migrant quotas. This 
would mean that migrants deterred by the fence could enter Hungary through  
a “back gate”.  
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2. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS: THE FIRST PHASE  
OF ILLEGAL MIGRATIONS, 1988–1998 
In the era of the bipolar world, in addition to the iron curtain dividing Europe 
(West-East), a specific “Socialist iron curtain” in terms of “non-state, military, 
official structures” was erected between small Socialist countries and the Soviet 
Union, which, based on a conscious Soviet decision, hindered the cultivation of 
interpersonal relationships on a massive scale. Even tourism-related movements 
consisted predominantly of state-organised, collective trips (fig. 1). 
Due to internal social, economic and political relations characterising former 
Socialist countries, the transformation process was launched and executed under 
heterogeneous conditions. In the federal states (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the 
Soviet Union), the crisis of the state and the internal social, economic and 
political regime change occurred simultaneously. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The two „Iron Curtains” in 1988 
Source: Z. Hajdú (1995)  
Due to the situation encountered in neighbouring countries, illegal border 
crossers to emerge at the Hungarian-Romanian border for the first time were 
predominantly Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. In 1988, some 
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13,000 people crossed the green border illegally. In 1989, the number of illegal 
entrants exceeded 17,000. The approach adopted by the political sphere and the 
state towards illegal border crossers was defined by the existing bilateral 
agreements, the captured illegal entrants were forced to return to Romania, and 
mostly suffered the serious consequences of their failed attempt to escape. 
Due to pressure exerted by society and the church, the Hungarian political 
sphere had to abandon its “legal, yet inhuman practices”. Thereafter, neither the 
Hungarian nor the considerably smaller proportion of Romanian illegal entrants 
were repatriated. They were permitted to continue on their way towards the 
West. 
In 1989, Hungary was the only Socialist country to become a member of the 
Refugee Organisation of the UN, which created new legal bases and opportun-
ities shaping the possible approach towards illegal border crossers, thereafter 
regarded as refugees. 
In 1989, the Hungarian political leadership encountered special problems due 
to the massive emergence of citizens arriving from GDR, which captured the 
attention of the international community as well. GDR citizens arrived legally 
with passports as tourists and, afterwards, they refused to leave the country. 
From “illegal tourists” they were transformed into “illegal residents”, and finally 
were officially referred to as refugees, with refugee camps established to host them 
(Zugliget, Zánka). During the event of the “Pan-European Picnic” (August 19, 
1989) a share of GDR citizens “illegally broke through” the Hungarian-Austrian 
border. On August 21, 1989, a GDR citizen was shot at the Hungarian border (he 
was considered to be the last victim of the Hungarian Iron Curtain), and 
following a complex political bargaining process, Hungary “released” GDR 
citizens, who were permitted to cross the Hungarian-Austrian border with their 
GDR passports and return to the GDR. 
The issue was complex, as it affected the basic regulations of the entire 
system of  socialist federal republics of the period, i.e., in order to cross the 
western Iron Curtain bordering any other country, a person was obliged to hold  
a valid passport from the country in question. The massive release of GDR 
citizens contributed significantly to the internal desintegration of the GDR, and 
ultimately, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  
The desintegration processes of Yugoslavia from the summer of 1991 created 
a totally new neighbourhood environment along the southern borders of the 
state. First, Slovenia (during a 10-day-long local war involving no serious 
losses) and later on, Croatia (during a series of bloody conflicts) seceded from 
the Federation, entailing the acceleration of the process of desintegration. 
Between 1991–1995, masses of people arrived from Croatia and Bosnia- 
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-Herzegovina (a part of them without any official documents) to Hungary. (Their 
number reached 50,000 in 1991 and 16,000 in 1992). Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, 
Hungarians, Serbs, etc. were all represented among those fleeing from war. 
Hungary and the Hungarian society aided the refugees without any ethnic, 
linguistic, religious discrimination. Those who wanted to were free to continue 
their journey to Western Europe or overseas, while those who really demanded 
accomodation in refugee camps received all the necessary support as well as full 
board. (The last refugee camp for refugees arriving from the territory of former 
Yugoslavia, located in the proximity of the southern border in Vés in Somogy 
county was closed only in 1998. Mainly old refugees resided there until that year). 
The self-destruction of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was not followed 
by massive illegal or legal migration towards Hungary. Albeit Hungarians, 
Ukrainians, Russians arrived from neighbouring border areas, their number 
remained low. 
The velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993 did not result in 
cross-border migratory movements through the new Hungarian-Slovakian 
border. No-one felt jeopardised by the dissolution of the state.  
The due significance of the functional transformation of the Hungarian- 
-Austrian border in 1995 related to the EU accession of Austria is rarely recog-
nised. The EU border opened up new cooperation opportunities for Hungary.  
Overall, between 1988–1998, Hungarian state borders were affected by 
massive illegal migratory processes on several occasions. Hungarian Govern-
ments almost always handled the problems of citizens of various ethnicities in  
a politically responsible and humane manner, and strived to resolve their prob-
lems via international conventions. A small share of illegal immigrants settled 
down in Hungary. 
3. HUNGARY IN A TRANSIT SITUATION: BETWEEN  
SENDING COUNTRIES AND DESTINATIONS 
Hungary obtained NATO membership in the spring of 1999 and EU 
membership in May 2004. These accessions entailed a changing significance of 
state borders and Hungary remained a “landlocked island country” for a brief 
period under the aegis of NATO since it could count no NATO members among 
its neighbours. In terms of political geography, the situation of Hungary is 
unique since its state borders were entirely aligned with the external borders  
of the alliance. EU membersip represented a changing context both in terms of 
internal and external borders. 
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Post-2000, albeit illegal migration was still present in the life of the country, 
its size was not significant in numerical terms. The institutions of asylum created 
in Hungary pursuant to the regulations of Act LXXX of 2007 (on asylum) were 
able to tackle the situation of refugees arriving from neighbouring countries and 
increasingly from remote crisis zones. The country became a member of the 
Schengen Area in 2007, which imposed a unified, community-level border 
regime in every respect. 
The number of illegal migrants, particularly those arriving from various war-
stricken zones showed a gradual increase from the beginning of the 2010s. This 
growth was transformed into a virtual explosion in 2014. According to the ana-
lyses of the UN High Commission for Refugees, a total number of 50 million 
people had to leave their home during 2014 at the global level. The majority  
of the exiled became refugees within their own nation, while a total number of 
14 million people were forced to leave their home country. The overwhelming 
majority of international refugees (86%) were admitted by neighbouring devel-
oping countries of Africa and Asia. 
In the aftermath of the conflicts in Iraq and, later on, in Syria, millions of 
refugees remained trapped in the neighbouring Muslim states. (Lebanon and 
Jordan became the major refugee-receiving countries in the region.) Turkey 
obtained a strategic role in European migration processes since it had accepted 
approx. 1.8–2 million Syrian refugees by 2015. 
In order to hinder the augmentation of the number of refugees at the Greek- 
-Turkish land border, Greece (with the express approval and support of the EU) 
constructed a massive, strictly controlled border fence in 2012, which was occa-
sionally able to prevent the massive influx of refugees. Turkey – as a NATO 
member and potential EU member state – did not wish to prevent the massive 
outflow of refugees and migrants of Syrian and other nationalities via the sea. 
The large-scale outflow of refugees relieved internal tensions, while at the same 
time providing a new negotiation and bargaining position for the country vis- 
-à-vis the EU. 
The prolonged internal economic, social and political crisis of the NATO and 
EU member state, Greece, partially contributed to its inability and lack of 
willingness to halt and register the masses arriving from Turkey to the islands  
of the Aegean sea (as a means to obtain a bargaining position in Europe)  
– notwithstanding that it would have been obliged to do so under the Schengen 
system. Greece “exported” hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants 
towards Macedonia, a country aspiring for EU membership. 
Macedonia was unable to resist the migration pressure and passed the 
problematic masses on to Serbia. Serbia was faced with a difficult situation since 
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it encountered a delicate challenge in the course of EU negotiations. Serbia, 
besides providing minimal services and serving as a parking lot for refugees for 
a short while, oriented the masses towards Hungary. 
Hungary as an external Schengen border of the EU, encountered a special 
challenge on the Serbian border section. According to the EU rules of the game, 
it was obliged to execute its tasks in line with the Schengen border Code, ensure 
the global control of both official border crossings and the green border, take 
measures against illegal entrants in light of the formerly defined protocols and 
perform registration-related tasks. 
Hungary was ill-prepared (while it was able to gain a thorough picture of the 
intensifying migratory movements – if not from the observation of the processes 
themselves, at least from the situation analyses of FRONTEX) to meet the 
challenge of the arrival of unprecedented masses of “non-law abiding” people 
from Serbia. Refugees and migrants – as opposed to the previously arriving 
masses from Kosovo – did not wish to register themselves in Hungary, since 
they considered the country as a mere transit zone. 
The destination country marking the end of the “migration path of the 
Balkans” was Germany, whose leadership, owing to historical liabilities and 
value-based considerations, called for a migration policy targeting the “admis-
sion of all refugees” from mid-September 2015. 
Hungary found itself in a trap, constituting a transit area between sending and 
receiving countries in such a way that the majority of refugees and migrants did 
not wish to enter into a relationship with Hungary (fearing later repatriation). 
The conflict between the legal obligations arising from the Geneva Convention, 
the Dublin regulation and Schengen and the political intentions began to adopt  
a structural character. 
Albeit in 2015 Germany demonstrated its political will to establish an 
inclusive refugee welcoming society, in 2016, various unfavourable phenomena 
questioned the pertinence of the solidarity-based approach towards immigrants 
on behalf of a part of German citizens. Meanwhile, divisions among German 
political leaders and within society have become more pronounced. Due to the 
changing scope of the issue, the country has to decide sooner or later to what 
extent it is willing and able to pursue its policy of welcoming refugees and 
migrants. This decision will ultimately shape the situation of the potential and 
effective transit countries. 
 
Zoltán Hajdú 
 
232 
4. HUNGARIAN “FENCE-BUILDING RESPONSES”  
TO MIGRATION CHALLENGES AT THE SOUTH- 
-HUNGARIAN BORDER 
Since 2012, Hungarian refugee organisations have become aware of the 
beginning of a new chapter in the history of illegal migration. Individuals, 
families, smaller groups of Near-Eastern origin started to appear in growing 
numbers alongside the Kosovar refugees. The bulk of refugees arriving at this 
period supposedly decided to embark on the voyage out of their own free will, 
and exploited  the “services” offered by human smugglers on a complementary 
basis. 
The first turning point occurred during 2013–2014 (tab. 1) when the number 
of illegal arrivals, those registering as refugees suddenly doubled. What had 
previously been a professional issue gradually drifted into the political arena, 
since managing and ensuring the mass transfer of illegal migrants demanded this 
shift. The negative impacts of the process of illegal migration penetrated into the 
everyday life of inhabitants of Southern Hungarian areas touched by the phe-
nomenon.   
Table 1. The evolution of the number of asylum seekers and refugees,  
2012–2016 
Refugee Protected Admitted 
Period Asylum seeker 
Obtaining refugee status  
2012 I 457 21 55 27 
 II 363 23 108 17 
 III 538 12 80 2 
 IV 799 31 85 1 
2013 I 2,322 26 45 3 
 II 9,419 47 54 1 
 III 4,404 54 40 – 
 IV 2,755 71 78 – 
2014 I 2,736 45 51 5 
 II 2,699 95 42 1 
 III 8,711 58 44 1 
 IV 28,631 42 99 – 
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2015 I 33,549 29 96 3 
 II 33,239 44 68 – 
 III 109,175 35 73 1 
 IV 1,172 38 119 2 
2016 I 7,182 39 109 4 
 II 15,309 48 56 2 
 III     
 IV     
Source: KSH: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/xstadat_evkozi/e_wnvn001.html. 
The examination of persons demanding refugee status based on their pre-
vious, documented citizenship clearly shows that during 2013 and the beginning 
of 2014, Kosovars constituted the majority of illegal border crossers, and from 
mid-summer onwards, the number and proportion of Afghans, Syrians and Iraqis 
increased at an accelerating pace. 
Between 2014 and 2015, fundamental changes occurred in the size of illegal 
immigration. It became crucial for Hungarian authorities to distinguish refugees 
from economic migrants within the mass of illegal migrants. The decisions of 
Hungarian asylum authorities (2014, Month I–XI – 2015, Month I–XI) reveal 
that while 232 asylum applications were accepted in 2014, this figure dropped to 
123 in 2015, while the number of persons granted humanitarian protection rose 
from 205 to 318. The fundamental shift occurred in the number of rejected 
asylum applications which rose from 17,473 to 135,963.  
The number of illegal crossings at Hungarian borders attained 400,000 in 
2015. Illegal daily border traffic can be monitored on the basis of police 
statistics (www. police.hu). The bulk share of migrants arrived from the 
direction of the Serbian-Hungarian border. Migrants showed a “moderate” 
willingness to cooperate with Hungarian authorities, in reality, they regarded the 
country merely as a transit zone. 
Migration-related processes did not only affect Hungarian border areas, but 
the cities situated along the principal railway lines and motorways. Keleti 
railway station won an international reputation due to the incidents and the 
chaotic situation which developed there and which the city's inhabitants deemed 
intolerable. 
Keleti constituted a unique case since this was where the joint efforts of 
church, civil organisations and individuals to aid refugees were most visible. 
(The refugee issue and the proper attitude to its management caused a division 
between ecclesiastical personalities, not only within the political sphere).   
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The Hungarian government decided to seal off the Hungarian-Serbian green 
border with a fence (June 17, 2015). The construction of a 175 km-long fence 
advanced at a rapid pace. Thereafter, migrants appeared at the Hungarian  
– Croatian border, particularly at the land border section of the Baranya 
Triangle. (Only individual attempts to enter across the Drava were recorded). 
The construction of the 41 km-long fence along the common border was 
completed by 15 October 2015 (a piquancy of the situation was that the Serbian 
mine barrage built during the South Slav conflict was removed from the land 
border section of Baranya only in the spring of 2013, just before the EU acces-
sion of Croatia), provoking an extremely hostile reaction from the Croatian 
Government (fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Hungarian fences on the borders 
Source: Magyar Idők, October 7, 2015 
Albeit in this game of “hide-and-seek” with migrants, the idea of constructing 
a fence along the internal border between Hungary and Slovenia within the 
Schengen Area did emerge, barbed wires appeared only on a minimal section for 
a period of three days and were shortly removed. 
Preparatory works were implemented at the southern Hungarian-Romanian 
border at the prolonged section of the Hungarian-Serbian border, however, no 
extensive constructions were initiated. 
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Fences – besides all other potentially functional interpretations – carry  
a basic message transcending that of each previous constructions (iron curtain, 
mine barrage, etc.), namely, that they were not constructed in order to prevent 
the outflow of Hungarians, nor as a defense against citizens of neighbouring 
countries, but against specific “third parties”. 
Migratory processes gave rise to specific internal and external tensions. 
Viktor Orbán employed a combative, war-like rhetoric in the fight against illegal 
immigration and a migrant-friendly Brussels. 
In 2015, the issue of the supervision of the southern borders, albeit in  
a symbolic manner (contingents of 50 people arrived from the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland), was delegated to the compence of the Visegrad countries. 
During autumn 2016, the Austrian Parliament authorised the deployment of  
80 soldiers in order to ensure the control of the southern borders of Hungary. 
This gesture signified that the rest of the three Visegrad countries also consented 
to and supported the strict control of external borders. 
According to Hungarian governmental data, a total number of 17,351 illegal 
migrants were stopped during the first semester of 2016, 330 people were held in 
detention centers, and „illegal border traffic was confined almost exclusively to 
the Hungarian-Serbian border”. The tight Croatian border control prevented 
illegal crossings along the Hungarian-Croatian border section. The irregularities 
and crimes surrounding illegal migration impose a heavy burden on the 
Hungarian judicial system. Between the end of September 2015 and the end of 
June 2016, 4942 criminal proceedings were initiated related to the destruction of 
the fence (the trial surrounding the battle of Röszke gained international 
notoriety), in 2015, 1176 human smugglers were summoned to trial in Hungary. 
At the beginning of July 2016, the Hungarian Government constructed  
a 8 km-wide deep border zone along the southern state borders. Illegal migrants 
captured within the deep border zone were immediately sent back to Serbia 
without court proceedings. In parallel with the construction of the fence, transit 
zones were built between Horgos in Serbia and the internationally renowned 
town of Röszke in Hungary, and also between Kelebia and Tompa. Those 
seeking to enter were submitted to strict control, and a total of 100 migrants per 
transit zone were admitted to the country each day. (This daily figure had 
dropped to 15 by September, 2016). Due to the strict Hungarian border control 
regime, thousands of migrants were trapped in Serbia, Croatia, and it has not 
become easier to reach Western Europe from the direction of Croatia, either. As 
a significant outcome of the refugee and migration crisis, the Government 
declared a state of emergency in those counties that were most exposed to the 
massive migration (Bács-Kiskun, Csongrád, Baranya, Somogy, Zala, Vas). 
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5. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS, A PERMANENT CRISIS 
The major achievement of the Summit of the European Union and Turkey in 
November 2015 (whose major agreements have since been interpreted in 
different ways by the Turkish people and EU leaders) was that theoretically, it 
created the possibility of restricting the outflow of migrants from Turkey, while, 
in practice, its impacts have hardly been felt. (While in December 2015, an 
average number of 5000 refugees arrived each day from Turkey to Greece, at the 
beginning of January, the daily average was 3000 persons). 
In addition to a financial aid of 3 bln euros, the European Union hinted at the 
possibility of the acceleration of pre-accession negotiations and the elimination 
of the visa obligation. The channelling of the financial aid is increasingly 
becoming a function of the effective steps Turkey is willing to take. (In this 
respect, the Dutch Presidency during the first Semester of 2016 may constitute  
a milestone). 
EU leaders adopt a novel approach to organising the defence of common EU 
borders (FRONTEX). FRONTEX, its major mid-term organisation, is respon-
sible for ensuring common, effective border supervision both along external land 
and sea borders. (The planned cooperation is opposed by a number of member 
countries). Hungary is potentially affected by this solution due to its relation to 
the external Schengen Area (Serbia, Ukraine) and the internal Schengen Area 
(Crotia, Romania). If a member country fails to perform its obligations in the 
realm of border control and supervision, this would authorise FRONTEX to 
proceed in an arbitrary manner. 
Besides Hungary, the EU has a key role in shaping the future of the borders 
of Hungary and the processes characterising the southern border section. This 
does not only imply that the admission of new member states is based on the 
unanimous decision of the entire Community (who will be our future neighbours 
within the EU, along the southern border, only Serbia qualifies as a potential 
candidate), but that further potential enlargement (the remaining areas of the 
Balkans, Turkey) will also entail fundamental consequences. 
The global refugee and migrant crisis requires that the international com-
munity reach a consensus on who may qualify as a refugee, whose support is not 
only being prioritised by by the current international treaties in force, but by the 
humanitarian system of values as well – and who are considered as “mere 
migrants” whose admission or rejection may be judged on the basis of a different 
set of criteria. (The distinction is all the more crucial since a radical increase of 
both categories is anticipated). 
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The Hungarian refugee quota referendum held on 2 October 2016 serving to 
decide whether the EU is authorised to settle migrants in Hungary without the 
consent of the Hungarian Parliament was not valid, since it was attended only by 
43.3% of those eligible to vote, thus participation did not attain the minimal 
threshold prescribed by the law. The rate of submitted pro-government “no” 
votes was particularly high (98.3%), the weight of “yes” votes was only 1.7%, 
which is probably due to the rate of consciously submitted invalid votes (6.3%). 
The European Union must soon make a long-term decision defining its 
Common Migration Policy (implying “mere migrants” in this approach), and 
also its structural policies targeting neighbouring areas. The decision is far from 
being simple if we consider the current processes and existing structures, not to 
mention its potential impacts and perspective outcome. 
The EU may impose various types of structural decisions concerning external 
(mainly African and Near-Eastern) migration processes: either it may maintain, 
fundamentally restrict (by imposing special selection criteria) or completely 
break with its welcome policy towards migrants from the neighbouring African 
and Near Eastern areas. The major obstacles to maintaining the current size of 
immigration are not primarily demographic and material in nature, but social and 
internal policy-related. Massive restriction or complete abolishment may lead to 
a situation of a “fortress under siege”, which would require an unprecedented 
tightening of border control along the external frontiers of the EU. 
The EU must rearticulate its neighbourhood policies within the macro-region, 
particularly its strategies concerning Islam in a generally visible and under-
standable way (after the failed attempt to export democracy, the failure of 
sneaking neo-colonial integration, and a questionable outcome of “supported 
abandonment”). In the case of Turkey, these approaches may emerge in the 
context of a multi-dimensional network. In the scenario of the country's EU 
accession, one of the strongest and most self-assertive states of the Islamic world 
would be included within the borders, at the same time, this would not guarantee 
the EU's capacity to open up towards the most unstable macro-regions of the 
world. 
English verification by Jarosław Sawiuk 
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No. 13 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE  
OF SORBIAN LANGUAGES 
Lusatian Sorbs – nowadays the smallest of the Slavic nations – came to 
Central Europe from the vicinity of central Dnieper around the 6th century A.D., 
during the so-called “Migration Period” of the Slavic people (Strzelczyk 2000,  
p. 6). They were one of the Polabian Slavic tribes, the majority of which were 
conquered during medieval times and fully assimilated by more powerful and 
expansive Germanic tribes. Apart from the Lusatian Sorbs only the group of so 
called Hannover Wends, living in a couple of villages in the area of the 
Lüneburger Heide in Lower Saxony have been able to maintain their difference 
and a certain cultural distinctiveness. Even so, this language is spoken now by 
tens of people at the most (Kłos 1994). Contemporary investigations, including 
by Heinz Schuster-Šewc, show certain similarities between the languages of the 
Lusatian Sorbs and Balkan Serbs (Siatkowska 1991). The Germans call all 
Slavic inhabitants who have been living for a long time in their state – with the 
exception of Poles and Czechs – Wends, which is nevertheless understood 
pejoratively by the people called that way, who describe themselves as “Sorbs”. 
The Polish word Łużyczanin (German: der Lausitzer), however, means in 
German every inhabitant living in the area of Lusatia, regardless of their 
language and national identity (Szczepankiewicz-Battek 2005, p. 77).  
The contemporary Lusatian languages – Upper Lusatian and Lower Lusatian 
– belong to the group of West Slavic languages (including Polish, Czech, Slovak 
and Kashubian). Upper Lusatian displays significant similarity to Czech, and 
Lower Lusatian more to Polish. Apart from them there are some dialects in 
between, and the most characteristic of them is considered that in the vicinity of 
Slepo (German: Schleife). The inhabitants of this enclave have preserved their 
certain cultural distinctive features until today. These languages nevertheless 
evolved in the past.  
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During early medieval times, there were Slavic tribes living within range of 
the River Kwisa (German: Queis) and the River Bóbr to the east, the place called 
Kopanica (nowadays Köpenick – the eastern part of Berlin) to the North, the 
western border was created by the River Soława (Saale) and the River Dubje, 
and the southern one by mountains, e.g. Rudawy (Ore Mountains), Smreczany  
– Fichtel Mountains (German: Fichtelgebirge), with the south-eastern border 
situated close to the Lusatian Neisse sources (Šołta 1984, pp. 13–17). This terri-
tory can be considered as the greatest reach of Lusatia as a region. The majority 
of the Lusatian tribes during the 9th century were influenced by the state of Great 
Moravia (Šołta 1984, p. 10). Since the 10th century it was constantly diminish-
ing, due to German expansion, not only military, but also economic and cultural 
as well. On the Lusatian territories conquered by Germans two marches were 
created: the one of Meissen (Upper Lusatia) and the other of Lusatia (Lower 
Lusatia). As late as the 16th century, the Sorbian population still reached Witten-
berg in the West. Martin Luther was not keen on the Lusatian people (despite the 
fact, that his wife, Katharina von Bora, had her roots there), he considered them 
in his “Table Talk” (“Tischreden”) as “the worst among all nations” (Cygański 
and Leszczyński 1995, p. 34). His closest collaborator, however – Philipp 
Melanchton – was proud to have a Lusatian as a son-in-law (Mahling 1991). In 
spite of Luther's scepticism, who was sure the Sorbian language would not stand 
the test of time, in 1548 a translation of the New Testament into Lower Lusatian 
appeared. The author of it was a clergyman from Lubanice near Żary – Mikławŝ 
Jakubica. It is the oldest monument of literature in this language (Piwoński 
2000, p. 92). Still in the 16th century, translations of the “Little Catechism” of 
Luther into lower and upper were created, and part of the lectures on theology at 
the Viadrina University (Frankfurt/Oder) was given in Sorbian languages (Šołta 
1984, p. 34). The oldest preserved written document in Upper Lusatian is the 
Bautzen-Oath (German: Der Burger Eydt Wendisch) – a secular document with 
an oath of loyalty towards the king of Bohemia, written by the burghers of 
Bautzen – until recently dated to 1532. Nevertheless, it is believed that its origin 
could stretch back to the very beginning of the 16th (Leszczyński 2000, pp. 7–19). 
The preserved Bible translations (both Protestant and Catholic) into Upper 
Lusatian did not arrive until the turn of the 17th and the 18th centuries. The new 
church order of the 16th century was accepted by the majority of the Lusatian 
population – with only some places, generally monastery areas or the Bautzen 
deanery, remained Catholic. The Reformation in this area was nevertheless 
entirely peaceful, and the reciprocal attitude of the Catholic and Protestant 
populations was always at least a proper one. Since 1524 until today, the biggest 
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church of Bautzen – St. Peter's church – has been used together (and with no 
conflicts) by confessors of the two faiths.  
The Reformation accepted from its very beginning the rule that services, 
sacraments and other church activities (e.g. marriages or funerals) must be held 
entirely “in a language understandable for the people”. Everyone, regardless of 
their sex or their financial status, was obliged to read the Bible by themselves, 
which caused a speedy growth in their educational level and an increased request 
for religious writings in their mother tongue. Initially, Catholicism underesti-
mated the meaning of national languages during worship services – the first 
Upper Lusatian religious books appeared in the 18th century (Upper Lusatia had 
almost no Catholic population). At the beginning, however, only a few confes-
sors were able to use them, because until the 19th century, the majority of them 
were illiterate. The Protestants of Lusatia at that time were gaining an awareness 
of their national and linguistic identity far more quickly than the Catholics. At 
the same time, they were more quickly subjected to Germanisation. A common 
Protestant aspiration to become educated and to gain social rise caused a need 
for education in the German language. Getting work and living in a mostly 
German area was leading to the assimilation of Lusatian Sorbs in an area with a 
German majority. The Lusatian Catholics nevertheless constituted a significant 
minority in Saxony (despite the fact that the Saxon rulers around the turn of the 
17th and 18th century were converting to Catholicism and since then the 
Catholics were preferred in their court). They tending to change their social 
position more seldom than the Protestants, and they left their places of origin 
more rarely (almost all of them were involved with agriculture). Because of this, 
they assimilated within the German environment far more weakly. A significant 
improvement in the level of educational among Lusatian Catholics came only in 
the second half of the 19th century. A great role in awakening of their national 
consciousness belonged to well educated teachers and clergymen of both 
confessions, as well as artists (poets, painters and composers) who identified 
themselves with this ethnic tradition. The government of the united Germany 
considered the ethnic emancipation of Lusatian Sorbs as a disadvantage and tried 
to oppose it (the intensity of these processes was different regarding the political 
option represented by the authorities). Generally, the most popular way for the 
authorities to deal with the population was to send people who did not speak 
Lusatian languages to work in the Lusatian area. At the same time, educated 
Lusatian people were sent to work in other parts of Germany. This politics was 
more successful in the case of the Protestants, since the Catholic church of 
Lusatia was part of the Prague bishopric until the beginning of the 20th century, 
being mostly independent from Berlin in its personnel decisions. Particularly 
Joanna Szczepankiewicz-Battek 
 
242 
significant was the Germanisation of areas close to the borders with Poland and 
the Czech Republic, to separate the Sorbs from other Slavic nations with a kind 
of special “cordon” (Szczepankiewicz-Battek 2005, p. 268). Since the second 
half of the 19th century a significant population of the poorer and more under-
developed Lower Lusatia were leaving to seek work in Berlin or another great 
cities of Germany. Men worked in industry and women mostly as domestic 
servants in more affluent bourgeois homes. Remaining in a pure German 
environment, frequent mixed marriages were not advantageous for maintaining 
the language and culture of their Slavic ancestors. The Catholics Sorbs, living 
mainly in a consistent group of villages, a dozen or so, towards the northwest 
from Bautzen (known as Catholic Lusatia), emigrated very seldom (the soil of 
the Upper Lusatia is much more fertile than that of Lower Lusatia). They were, 
instead, maintaining their language and traditions in a much more intensive way.  
Population registers, executed since the second half of the 19th century on 
behalf of state authorities, and statistical-demographic inquiries of ethnographers 
(the majority of them were of Lusatian origin themselves) show huge differences 
of statistical data concerning the number of Sorbs. According to official state 
statistics, the number of Sorbs was distinctly smaller than according to the 
scientific data. Apart from – undoubtedly a strong one – pressure from the side 
of state authorities to understate the number of population of the ethnic 
minorities (other minorities, including Poles, faced the same problems), also the 
different methodology of these inquiries played a certain role. According to 
suppositions of the Prussian authorities (and then of the united Germany), 
anyone who declared that their mother language (German: Muttersprache) was 
not German was considered to be a representative of an ethnic minority. In 
practice, however, everyone who was able to communicate in German, was 
recorded during the common listing as a member of the German nation. Already 
at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, almost all Sorbs were bilingual 
(Marciniak 1991). 
Facing the common education duty in Prussia and Germany, it meant that 
everyone who was professionally and/or in another way active in public, was 
considered to be German. Although there were still schools educating in their 
mother languages on the territories inhabited by minorities until 1871, German 
was taught there as well. According to this registration, “Sorbs” were only those 
people who did not work professionally and were not active in public, mostly 
poorly educated women. The last cases of the complete ignorance of the German 
language (including a passive understanding) were noted around 1930 in the 
“primeval forest villages of Upper Lusatia”, only amongst women (Marciniak 
1991). 
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The ethnographers, however, recorded as “Lusatian” everybody who declared 
a knowledge of Lusatian language, or even who merely described themselves as 
“Sorb”. For example: official registers from 1843 and 1846 gave the number of 
133 thousand Sorbs, while Jan Arnošt Smolar, at around the same time (about 
1841) estimated their number at 164 thousand. Official registers of 1885 and 
1890 showed 113 thousand Sorbs, while Arnošt Muka (very exact research from 
1880–1884) found 166 thousand. The official register of 1910 gave 103 
thousand, whereas Adolf Černy (research conducted in 1904–1905) showed the 
number 146 thousand (fig. 1). The official register in 1933 showed 57 thousand, 
while the research of Polish scientist Olgierd Nowina (1936–1938, during the 
Nazi times) mentions about 111 thousand Sorbs (Marciniak 1991).  
The first societies, aimed at promoting the knowledge of Lusatia and 
Lusatian languages, were the Lusatian Preachers Society, for students of 
Protestant theology (1716, University of Leipzig) and the society “Sorabicum” 
(with a status close to that of the contemporary scientific circles), mainly for 
German students of other faculties, and the Upper Lusatia Scientific Society 
(1799, Zgorzelec/Görlitz; Cygański and Leszczyński 1995, pp. 56–59). During 
the 19th century, a couple of other organisations came into being – for Catholics 
and Protestants as well, in Upper and Lower Lusatia. The societies for confes-
sors of both faiths were this time working separately, and reciprocal contacts of 
the Catholics and the Protestants were marked with much more reserve, though 
they were not hostile towards one another. Such an attitude was imposed on 
members by authorities of both churches in conflict, which confirmed that the 
feeling of religious independence was, in this period, still dominant over the 
solidarity with members of the same nation (Szczepankiewicz-Battek 2005,  
p. 125). The greatest role in the integration of Sorbs of both faiths, living in the 
Upper and Lower Lusatia, was played by “Domowina”, founded 1912 – a fed-
eration of many societies and associations.  
There was not only the Germanisation politics from above, which caused the 
acceleration of the assimilation processes of Sorbs in the German environment at 
the end of the 19th century. The more powerful practical impact on this was 
caused by progressive industrialisation. Until the 1860s, the lowlands of Lower 
Lusatia were among the most backward areas of Germany (Arasimowicz 1993). 
A discovery of huge lignite deposits in Lower and Middle Lusatia caused 
German people to flock to these areas (mines needed many workers) and saw the 
destruction of many indigenous Lusatian villages, liquidated step by step, as 
mine pits were growing bigger. Many farmers sold their farms voluntarily and 
took up jobs in the mines (Scholze-Šołta 1997), because it meant an improve-
ment of their financial situation for them. 
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Fig. 1. Deployment and strength of Sorbian population in 1900  
Source: according to: E. Tschernik (1954)  
The Sorbs (in Lower Lusatia in the 19th century with numbers estimated  
at 40–50 thousand – Wiatrak 1992), dispersed and displaced to bigger places, 
living in an environment with a German majority, began using Lower Lusatian 
more and more rarely, and their integration in their own environment became 
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step by step weaker. “Roads and railways, along which German newcomers 
were heading for Lusatia, divided Lusatian territories step by step into a row of 
language isles” (Scholze-Šołta 1997). The Germanisation of Sorbs was also 
advanced by more and more numerous mixed marriages, with the children born 
in them declared to be German nation and using the German language.  
Apart from opencast lignite mining in Lower and Middle Lusatia, the textile 
(mainly wool) and glass industries were also developing intensively (Arasimo-
wicz 1993). Only in the Spreewald vicinity (Lusatian: Błota), due to physical- 
-geographical conditions (flood plains of the River Spree, hard to get into and 
not attractive to potential industry) did the population of the place manage to 
preserve their language and culture for much longer. For example, they used 
their characteristic, picturesque folk dresses. From the end of the 19th century, 
Spreewald became an attraction for tourists, because of its natural and cultural 
values. Since 1892, boat rides for tourists on the Spree River canals were being 
organised, often connected with visiting Lusatian villages (Żochowska 1993).  
The diminishing number of Lusatian people at the end of the 19th century 
was caused not only by Germanisation, industrialisation and migrations from the 
villages to the cities, but also massive migrations overseas (from Upper and 
Lower Lusatia), with destinations as far flung as Texas and Australia (Marciniak 
1991).  
The First World War brought serious population losses to Lusatia (from the 
Bautzen district alone, more than 3000 mobilised soldiers died) (Šołta 1984, 
p. 100). Among the victims there were many Sorbs, which can be estimated by 
 a study of names of the dead on the monuments in their remembrance, which  
– according to the decree of German authorities – were created in every 
municipality. In terms of the economy, this area was prosperous during this time, 
because textile and metallurgy factories executed many deliveries for the army. 
Farmers were very much against the war, because of food requisitions for the 
army (Šołta 1984, pp. 100–103). After the war was over, Lusatian activists tried 
to create an independent Lusatia through diplomatic channels. They were not 
successful. The Sorbs accepted the creation of the Weimar Republic with 
enthusiasm, because they counted on the Republic government appreciating the 
laws of ethnic minorities. At this time, the number of the Sorbian minority was 
estimated at about 100 thousand (Scholze-Šołta 1994). This era also saw serious 
difficulty in the form of conflict between the various political groups of the area: 
the leftist organisations contacted the communists. The communist party 
condemned the discrimination of ethnic minorities many times during this period 
in Germany, and its activists spoke out many times on this in the press and at 
gatherings as well. The conservative, right wing groups, especially those 
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connected with Catholicism, joined the anti-communist movement (Cygański 
1994).  
When the Nazis took charge in Germany, the country saw a drastic intensi-
fication of sanctions against all ethnic minorities. The Sorbs became yet more 
victims of these politics. Already in April 1933, many Sorbian activists were 
arrested, and attacks against minorities appeared in the media, accusing them of 
“actions against the German nation”. Admittedly, after a couple of months this 
course was mitigated under the influence of international subjects, but all 
Sorbian organisations were subordinated to national socialists. The repeated inten-
sification of the repression came after 1936, when drastic restrictions on the 
usage of Lusatian languages came into being. The Germanisation of children and 
youths in education increased; talking and writing about the Sorbs as an ethnic 
minority was forbidden in the media. Officially they were “Germans using  
a non-German language”. Descriptions such as “Wends” and “Wendish” were 
forbidden, and there were attempts to present the most outstanding Sorbian 
artists (e.g. the poet Handrij Zeler) as German artists. In 1937, the activity of 
“Domowina” was forbidden, Lusatian inscriptions (signs, boards, even inscrip-
tions on graves) started being destroyed, and over 60 places with Sorbian names 
were given new, German ones (Cygański and Leszczyński 1997, pp. 37–42). 
These changes later became known as the “Nazi renaming”. Sorbian teachers 
and clergymen of both faiths were removed from Upper Lusatia and forced to 
work in another parts of Germany (often under in positions they were over-
qualified for). After the outbreak of the Second World War, these activities were 
intensified; many Sorbian activists ended up in prisons and concentration camps, 
where some of them died or were killed. The Nazi politics against ethnic 
minorities in the Third Reich was tending towards their complete Germanisation. 
The ways of achieving it – apart from banning Sorbian languages and activities 
of Sorbian organisations of all kinds – should have been displacements of the 
Sorbs to areas inhabited only by Germans, and their dispersal in this environ-
ment (though this was never actually achieved). The Sorbs were also forced to 
enter the Wehrmacht, and women were in the work services (German: Arbeit-
seinsatz). The armed anti-Nazi resistance in Lusatia did not reach far, and the 
Sorbs relied mostly on the tactic of passive resistance instead (Cygański and 
Leszczyński 1997, pp. 43–47).  
After the Second World War was over, the Sorbs started reactivating their 
organisations and their cultural life. The renewed attempts to create an 
independent Lusatian state failed (one of the projects was the creation of… the 
Socialist Soviet Lusatian Republic – fig. 2). Other projects, with the aim of 
incorporating Lusatia to the Czech Republic or Poland, were also not supported. 
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Fig. 2. Reach of the planned Socialist Soviet Lusatian Republic 
Source: from the collection of K.R. Mazurski, according to  
J. Szczepankiewicz-Battek (2005) 
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One of the most frequent arguments of international opinion was, in this case, 
the simple fact that the territory of Lusatia was not inhabited by a numerous, 
dense group using Sorbian languages, but by clusters of Sorbian people with of 
more an “island” nature. In addition, the relative economic and politic weakness 
of the Sorbs in comparison with the Germans living in the same area was also 
emphasised (Cygański and Leszczyński 1997, pp. 48–62). The rectangular 
Lusatian area, (its border from the west was a political boundary between 
Germany and the Czech Republic, and from the east – the Lusatian Neisse River, 
from the north – the northern border of the Spree Woods, and from the west  
– the line of cities Lübben – Senftenberg – Bischofswerda to the Czech border) 
had an area of about 7,000 km2 and with a population of about 800,000, 
including, at most 100,000 Sorbs declaring their access to this ethnic group, and 
about 300,000 Sorbs after Germanisation (who admitted their Lusatian roots, but 
did not know any Sorbian languages). Only a part of them were able to become 
Sorbs again (Cygański and Leszczyński 1997, pp. 61–62). The problem was 
additionally complicated by forced migrations of the German population from 
the areas given to Poland under the Potsdam agreement. A significant number of 
the displaced (coming mostly from Upper Silesia and Oppeln Silesia), mostly 
Catholics, were settled in Upper and Lower Lusatia which changed the popula-
tion structure of this area entirely: the percentage of Sorbs diminished, while the 
percentage of Catholics grew, including in the indigenously Protestant areas. 
There was also no success with creating a single administrative unit in Lusatia  
– particular fragments of it were incorporated in different districts.  
The authorities of the German Democratic Republic – a state working in the 
period 1949-1990 officially supported the Sorbian aspirations to preserve their 
own language and culture, though they dealt with this group as with a unique 
heritage park, ideally suited to show off on the international area as an example 
of an “excellent” attitude towards ethnic minorities in a socialist state. In the 
whole Lusatian territory, bilingual signs with street and square names were 
erected. The Sorbian organisations and institutions were given high state 
subsidies for their cultural activity (publishing houses, press, radio, theatres, folk 
groups, ethnographic museums etc.) and the development of tourism. All the 
time, primary and secondary schools gave Sorbian languages instructions or had 
Upper or Lower Sorbian languages taught as one of the subjects (Marciniak 
1991). After the war, the Catholic and the Protestant church services in Sorbian 
languages, banned entirely during the Third Reich period, were reactivated, 
though encountered problems due to the insufficient number of clergymen able 
to speak these languages (especially for the Protestant people of Lower Lusatia). 
At the same time, the whole Sorbian population was very strongly invigilated by 
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the political police – the Stasi, and the posts in Sorbian organisations were only 
given to the individuals whose attitude caused no doubts about their loyalty 
towards the socialist state (activists, who declared their secular attitude, were 
preferred). The Lusatian Protestants were especially subordinated to control, 
because the majority of the democratic opposition of the German Democratic 
Republic was connected with the Protestant Church. The Catholic GDR citizens 
were oppressed less, because the authorities of the Catholic Church emphasised 
their complete loyalty towards the state authorities, and Catholic Sorbs were 
almost never engaged in resistance. Living in a consistent aggregation (known as 
Catholic Lusatia) – a group of villages, a dozen or so, northwest from Bautzen  
– the Catholics preserved their identity much better than the dispersed Protestants. 
According to a contemporary researcher, in 1648 90% of Sorbs were Protestants 
and 10% Catholics, but by the 1980s, the percentage of Catholics among Sorbs 
had reached 23% (Elle 2006).  
In spite of the officially positive attitude of the GDR authorities towards the 
Sorbian minorities, this ethnic group was diminishing in number during the real 
socialism period step by step. The most outstanding researcher of the post-war 
time – Ernst Tschernik (Arnošt Černik) – established in the years 1955–1956 the 
number of Sorbs living in the countryside at 72,000 (Marciniak 1991). The 
urbanisation of the region was progressing very quickly (in 1950, the percentage 
of urban population was 19.8%, but by 1975 it was already 43.2% – Arcimowicz 
1993), and relocation to cities usually ended up with denationalisation, or at least 
with the loosening of connections with another Sorbs. The main reason for this 
phenomenon was industrialisation. In the GRD there were almost no coal 
deposits, which is why lignite became the basic solid fuel stock. Lignite pits on 
the Cottbus area alone occupied approx. 200,000 acres (1/4 of the area of the 
district), with 12 mines in Lower and Middle Lusatia giving more than 50% of 
the production in the country, and 1/6 of the production of the world. Until 1989, 
the economy was led entirely as a robbery, with no environment or water 
protection of any kind (Arasimowicz 1993). The pits caused the majority of the 
Lusatian villages to be destroyed: between 1945 and 1989, 71 locations (with 
13,543 people) were entirely destroyed, and a further 42 locations (8823 people) 
were partly destroyed, with their inhabitants forced to move to the nearby cities 
(Förster 1995). This meant the further dispersal of Sorbs among Germans. In the 
agricultural area of Upper Lusatia, it was the collectivisation of agriculture that 
played a significant role in people abandoning their Sorbian nationality. Family 
farms (where Upper Lusatian was spoken), were converted into large state-
owned farms, where Germans were working, too (Scholze-Šołta 1994). Then, 
German became the language spoken there. Even indigenous Sorbs, speaking 
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Lusatian languages in their homes, were almost always forced to use German at 
work (the reason was partly because Sorbian languages do not have large 
vocabulary in certain areas, e.g. technology). The influx of German people on 
the Lusatian territory also led to more mixed marriages; it is estimated that since 
the end of the war, at least 50% of Sorbs were in such relationships, where 
German is usually the everyday language. According to S. Marciniak (1992), 
“the Sorbs are, in fact, bilingual and bicultural. An incontestable truth is that all 
Sorbs can speak German at least as well, as their mother tongue”. The 
disappearance of knowledge of Sorbian languages was also influenced by the 
situation of education. Despite the fact that (at least in Upper Lusatia) during the 
whole GDR period access to Lusatian schools was not particularly difficult, the 
number of children and youths who wished to attend these schools was 
diminishing steadily. Schools with German as the language of instruction were 
at a higher level and were better able to prepare their graduates for college 
studies. In 1964, the number of children taught Sorbian had dropped by about 
25% in comparison with a few years earlier (Marciniak 1991). This trend 
continued, with the number of pupils at schools with Lusatian languages of 
instruction decreasing. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, within just a couple 
of years, the number of children at schools with Sorbian languages dropped from 
4,500 to 3,000, namely by about 30% (Scholte-Šołta 1994).  
The reunification of Germany in 1990 put the Sorbs in a completely new 
situation. Attempts to create Lusatia as a separate unit (a federal one) failed: 
Upper Lusatia was incorporated to Saxony, and Lower Lusatia to Brandenburg, 
with the border between both areas being artificial across the lignite pits. The 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany admittedly guaranteed the 
political rights for Sorbs, including the right to maintain their language and their 
culture, but economic difficulties, including the fall of the majority of industrial 
plants, once giving work to the population of the region, induced many of the 
people – Germans and Sorbs as well – to seek their livelihood in Western 
Germany. This is hardly surprising, since 1996 the unemployment rate was 
about 17.7% in the Bautzen area, reaching as much as 25.6% in Senftenberg 
(Cygański and Leszczyński 1997, p. 150). In just a couple of years, the Lusatian 
population diminished by about 30–50%, and the majority of those who left 
were young people, leaving their family homes, or people who planned to start  
a family later. According to the vicar of one of the Catholic communities in 
Lusatia, the number of the First Communion children decreased from 20–30  
a year in the eighties, to just 5–6 children a year at the beginning of the  
21th century. The economic crisis and political changes sometimes caused 
occasional conflicts between the Germans and the Sorbs living in the same area. 
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Their indirect topics were mostly discussions concerning the recent past 
(Germans involved in democratic resistance in the GDR, often bore a grudge 
against Sorbs that they were not cooperating very intensively) and also money.  
It was often considered that the subsidies given to the Sorbs for their activities 
were too high during times of crisis. The majority of these conflicts were, 
however, staved off as time passed by.  
In the 1990s, other Sorbian organisations came into being, including those 
promoting Sorbian languages in the church (the existence of these was for 
reasons of “ideology”, not possible during socialism times). One difficulty was, 
however, a significant restriction – compared to the GDR – of state subsidies for 
the activities of ethnic minorities associations. The rapidly decreasing number of 
children taught at schools with Sorbian languages led to a school closing down 
in Chrościce in 2001 – and that was one of the most significant places of 
Catholic Lusatia – resulting in fervent resistance of the Sorbs. However, an 
interest in teaching at schools with the Upper Lusatian language is clearly 
decreasing, and the reasons for closing schools down are purely economic, rather 
than political. After the reunification of Germany, the methods of exploiting 
lignite pits were also partly changed – some pits, where exploitation had come to 
an end, were re-cultivated (mainly as water reservoirs for recreational and 
leisure purposes), but also as botanic gardens or racecourses. In others, the 
exploitation continued, but with greater respect for the natural environment, as 
far as possible. Still, villages inhabited by Sorbian population were disappearing, 
despite strong protests from local people, Germans and the Sorbs. The process of 
diminishing the territories inhabited by the Sorbs continues. Nowadays (since 
the reunification of Germany), the area of the “Lusatian ethnic area” is estimated 
at about 3,000 km2 at most (Scholze-Šołta 1994); in addition to that, the Sorbian 
population is dispersed throughout the whole of the Lower Lusatian and part of 
Upper Lusatian area. The only two enclaves where the Sorbs live in dense 
groups, maintaining their language and traditions, are the dozen or so villages in 
the Bautzen area, known as Catholic Lusatia, and seven villages belonging to the 
Protestant community of Slepo (German: Schleife) in the Middle Lusatia. Other 
territories are a row of “islands”, which are not purely Lusatian and, although the 
Sorbs live there, the German population is a majority (Scholze-Šołta 1994).  
A surprise for many may be the fact that Germans living in Sorbian enclaves 
sometimes become Sorbs (Marciniak 1992), though, this means more the 
acceptance of some Sorbian elements of culture (festive traditions, folk dresses, 
local dishes), and it is very rarely connected with a wish to learn Sorbian 
languages. Sometime the acceptance of elements of the Lusatian culture by non-
Sorbian people is with a view to attracting more tourists to the region, since 
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many characteristic elements of the material culture of Lusatia are significant 
tourist attractions. Although the maintenance of these elements is decided 
mainly by commercial reasons, it would be difficult to take this the wrong way, 
as long as it is helping, at least in part, this characteristic and valuable culture to 
survive. In the reunited Germany, the Sorbs are involved in political activities  
– many of them take positions in local authorities. Since 2008, Stanislaw Tillich,  
a Sorb coming from the Catholic Lusatia and an activists of the CDU (Christian 
Democrats), has been the prime minister of the Saxony government.  
During the general register in Germany (2002), about 60,000 people declared 
their Sorbian nationality. Of these, however, only half at best (about 30,000) has 
a passive knowledge of any of the Sorbian languages, and just 15,000 an active 
knowledge. Of these, only about 1,000–2,000 at most know Lower Lusatian, 
though there are many more people speaking Upper Lusatian and using it in their 
everyday lives (fig. 3).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Contemporary reach of Sorbian languages  
Source: according to L. Elle (2001) 
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Ludwig Elle, at around the same time (2006), estimated the number of people 
using the Sorbian nationality at around 50,000, and those who know one of the 
Sorbian languages “well” (and can speak it fluently) at about 20,000. The Sorbs 
live in around 80 municipalities – in all these municipalities there are bilingual 
signs with place names and names of streets and squares. In Germany, there are 
no regulations concerning a fixed strength of the minority (Elle 2006). 
Population changes, decreasing number of pupils at schools with a Sorbian 
language in lecture, and, at the same time, a growing interest in language courses 
among people who are not of Sorbian origin, caused a need to work out other 
forms of teaching Sorbian languages. Since 1998, a project named “WITAJ” 
[“Welcome”] is being followed in Lusatia, modelled on successful similar 
programmes from, for example, Scotland and Wales, where learning the local 
language (often close to disappearing) is carried out at kindergartens and at 
schools in the frame of regional education. Upper or Lower Lusatian is a school 
subject for all children attending these kindergartens or schools, regardless of the 
declared nationality. Special courses are also organised for interested adults, 
including foreigners. Recently, however, (2017) the Lower Sorbs submitted  
a protest to the Brandenburg government because of planned restrictions of the 
project tasks (less course hours and the introduction of minimum numbers in 
groups – 12 participants).  
Protests in Lower Lusatia are still continued to save another locations 
(mainly old Sorbian villages to be erased because of lignite pits expansion). 
Almost all people of the area take part in them, regardless of the declared 
nationality (fig. 4). Apart from ethnic reasons, environmental questions and re-
cultivation of areas destroyed by previous economy led as a robbery are, of 
course, significant as well. However, one must clearly say, that the situation of 
Lusatia improved very much, since Germany was reunited. The protests are 
supported by the Greens and by activists of ecology associations from Germany 
and another countries including Poland (Gromm 2001). 
S. Marciniak (1992) draws attention to the inevitability of certain processes 
taking place in ethnic minorities, especially those that are dispersed. One of 
these is an acceleration of loosening the distinctive features. Firstly, the elements 
of the own, distinctive material culture (e.g. dresses, home equipment, personal 
objects) are abandoned in favour of the material culture of the surrounding 
majority. Then the traditions are abandoned, if they are not compatible with the 
traditions of the majority (for example, the way of celebrating feasts and family 
occasions). At the third stage, communication in the ethnic majority language 
narrows down.  
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Fig. 4. Protest of the Proschim municipality people  
against devastation of Lusatian villages (photo: M. Battek) 
Some ethnic or religious minorities attempt to counteract these processes 
through the forced isolation of their members from people outside the religious 
or ethnic group (ban on mixed marriages, participation in religious services or 
practices of the “majority”, a ban of breaking the characteristic mysteries of the 
group to the “outsiders”, sometimes even a ban on social contact), but it does not 
guarantee that the cultural identity will be preserved through the minority 
members, since it is a rule that individuals who are not ready to obey these rules 
will leave the community and break all connections with it. During a time of 
globalisation, it is the language of minorities that disappears first (for example, 
in tourism, using a language not understood by visitors makes communication 
with them not easier, but even more difficult – Szczepankiewicz-Battek 2005,  
p. 305). M. Cygański and R. Leszczyński (1997, p. 155) noticed that even the 
disappearance of a language does not necessarily cause the whole culture of the 
given group to vanish, because another elements – religion or another historic 
traditions then begin to integrate the minority group. Languages of ethnic 
minorities are, however, an important element of cultural heritage and UNESCO 
is decidedly supporting all activities leading to their maintenance. Processes of 
reactivating vanishing languages, being carried out in some European countries, 
show that such activities may be successful, though they require a great deal of 
effort and significant financial outlays.  
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